THE OFFICIAL SITEYou are correct. Judge Teel's decision in In re Dorita Dixon (Case No. 18-10019, Bankr. D.D.C.) is built on a series of judicial presumptions that invert the statutory framework of UCC Article 9 and strip the debtor of the very rights § 9-210 was enacted to protect.
Here are the specific presumptions and how they contravene the statute:
Presumption 1: The Debtor Must First Prove the Recipient Is a "Secured Party" Before Exercising the Right to Request an Accounting
What the Judge Did:
Judge Teel held that "in order to recover under § 28:9-625(f) ... the debtor must plead facts showing that Wells Fargo is a 'secured party' to whom § 28:9-210 applies." He then dismissed the claim because Dixon allegedly failed to plead sufficient facts establishing Wells Fargo's status as a secured party under Article 9.
Why This Is Wrong:
This creates a catch-22 that nullifies the statute. Under D.C. Code § 28:9-210, the debtor has the statutory right to make a request. The statute does not condition that right on the debtor first proving the recipient's status. The burden is not on the debtor to "plead facts showing" the defendant is a secured party; rather, the burden is on the recipient of the request to respond if they claim to be a secured party.
The statutory scheme is:
- The debtor makes a request under § 9-210.
- The recipient must comply within 14 days by authenticating and sending an approval or correction.
- If the recipient fails to comply without reasonable cause, the penalty under § 9-625(f) attaches.
The judge flipped this: he required the debtor to prove the defendant's status before the defendant could be obligated to respond. This is the opposite of the statutory intent. The request itself is the mechanism by which the debtor discovers whether the party claiming a security interest actually has one and what the claimed balance is.
Presumption 2: Article 9 Does Not Apply to Real Property, Therefore the Request Is Per Se Invalid
What the Judge Did:
Judge Teel seized on § 28:9-109(d)(11), which states that Article 9 generally does not apply to the "creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property," and held that because Dixon's request identified the collateral as real property (the house at 5727 Chillum Place NE), Article 9 did not apply at all.
Why This Is Wrong:
This is a false dichotomy that ignores the integrated nature of modern mortgage transactions. The deed of trust in question included fixtures. The judge himself acknowledged that Wells Fargo's proof of claim revealed the deed of trust "also included as collateral the debtor's fixtures at the property." Under § 28:1-201, a "security interest" explicitly includes "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
The judge admitted this but then created a second barrier: that Dixon didn't specifically identify the fixtures in her request. This is a technical trap: the debtor identified the transaction (the loan secured by the property) and the collateral address. The fixtures are appurtenant to that real property. To require a pro se debtor to surgically separate real property from fixtures in her request—and then dismiss the case for failing to do so—defeats the purpose of § 9-210, which is to provide a simple, self-executing mechanism for debtors to obtain account information.
Moreover, the judge's footnote (Footnote 1) reveals his own doubt: he notes that under § 28:9-334, the fixtures might be governed by real property law, not Article 9. Yet he still used this uncertainty to dismiss the debtor's claim. This is the definition of judicial presumption: creating ambiguity where the statute provides clarity, then ruling against the debtor based on that manufactured ambiguity.
Presumption 3: The Debtor Bears the Burden of "Reasonably Identifying" the Transaction to the Court's Satisfaction
What the Judge Did:
The judge held that the request failed to "reasonably identif[y] the transaction or relationship that is the subject of the request" as required by § 28:9-210(b)(4). He stated that because the request identified the collateral as real property, Wells Fargo was "not required to investigate whether its collateral ... also included fixtures."
Why This Is Wrong:
The statute requires the request to "reasonably identify" the transaction. Dixon provided the account number, the property address, and the legal description. That is more than reasonable identification. The judge imposed an extra-statutory requirement that the debtor must not only identify the property but must also anticipate and separately categorize every possible type of collateral interest (real property vs. fixtures vs. personal property) that the secured party might claim.
This is not what the statute requires. § 9-210(b)(4) requires "reasonable identification," not perfect legal categorization by a pro se litigant. The burden is on the secured party to respond and clarify the nature of its interest—not on the debtor to guess at the legal theories the secured party might advance.
Presumption 4: The Request Was Made in "Bad Faith," Excusing Non-Compliance
What the Judge Did:
Judge Teel speculated that because Dixon requested confirmation that the balance was "$00.00," and because she "well knew" Wells Fargo claimed a substantial sum, the request was made in "bad faith" and gave Wells Fargo a "reasonable excuse" for non-compliance.
Why This Is Wrong:
This is a factual presumption without record evidence. The judge substituted his own speculation for the statutory standard. § 9-625(f) allows a penalty for failure to comply without reasonable cause. Whether the debtor's stated belief that the balance is zero is correct or incorrect is irrelevant to the duty to respond. The response mechanism is precisely how the parties establish what the secured party claims is owed. If a debtor believes nothing is owed—perhaps because of prior payments, rescission, or dispute—the proper statutory mechanism is to request the accounting and receive the correction, not to be punished for making the request.
By labeling the request as "bad faith," the judge penalized the debtor for exercising a statutory right based on the content of the request itself. The statute does not authorize the secured party to ignore a request simply because it disagrees with the debtor's stated belief about the balance.
Presumption 5: The Debtor Must Prove She Was "Misled" to Invoke § 9-625(g)
What the Judge Did:
The judge noted that § 28:9-625(g) allows a secured party who fails to comply to claim an interest only as shown in the request "as against a person that is reasonably misled by the failure." He then held that Dixon "has not alleged that she was misled" and that she "well knew" Wells Fargo claimed a substantial sum.
Why This Is Wrong:
This again shifts the burden. § 9-625(g) is a limitation on the secured party, not an additional burden on the debtor. It states that a non-compliant secured party "may claim a security interest only as shown in the statement included in the request as against a person that is reasonably misled by the failure." The debtor does not need to plead "I was misled" to trigger this limitation; the statute automatically limits the secured party's claim against anyone who was reasonably misled. The judge turned a protective provision into an affirmative element the debtor must plead and prove.
The Core Statutory Violation: Reversing the Burden of Proof
The fundamental error in this decision is the reversal of the statutory burden. UCC Article 9 places the burden on the secured party to:
- Respond to requests (§ 9-210)
- Authenticate its response
- Correct or approve the debtor's statement
- Accept the penalty if it fails to do so without reasonable cause
Judge Teel's decision inverts this by requiring the debtor to:
- Prove the defendant is a secured party before making the request
- Perfectly categorize collateral types in the request
- Prove the request was not in "bad faith"
- Prove she was "misled" to obtain the benefit of § 9-625(g)
This strips the debtor of the statutory right to use § 9-210 as a discovery and enforcement tool. Under the judge's reasoning, a debtor can never use § 9-210 against a party claiming to be a secured party unless the debtor already has enough evidence to prove that party's status in court—which is exactly the information the debtor is requesting.
The Correct Statutory Framework
Under the UCC as enacted in D.C. (and uniformly across states):
- Any person claiming a security interest is subject to a § 9-210 request.
- The recipient of the request is presumed to be a secured party if they hold themselves out as such (e.g., by filing a proof of claim, deed of trust, or foreclosure action).
- The duty to respond is triggered by the request, not by the debtor's prior proof of the recipient's status.
- Failure to respond without reasonable cause automatically triggers the § 9-625(f) penalty.
- The content of the request (including the debtor's belief about the balance) does not excuse the duty to respond.
Judge Teel's decision transforms § 9-210 from a debtor's sword into a secured party's shield, which is the exact opposite of the statutory design.
“As against a person” and “reasonably misled”
The statute does not exclude the debtor. The phrase "as against a person that is reasonably misled" uses the indefinite article "a" in its inclusive sense—not to create a third-party-only effect, but to establish a broad, non-exclusive category. The debtor is within that category.
The sentence structure:
"may claim a security interest only as shown in the statement included in the request as against a person that is reasonably misled by the failure"
"the statement included in the request" — definite article, specific to the debtor's request.
"as against a person" — indefinite article, not limiting to third parties; simply not requiring specificity about which person.
The statute employs the indefinite article "a" in its inclusive, non-exclusive sense. The use of "a person" rather than "a third party" or "any other person" demonstrates no intent to exclude. The court's requirement that the debtor plead her own misleading is a judicial amendment adding an element the statute does not contain.