

How to use a car without the need for a driver's license.

By Thomas Clark Nelson.

A discourse, revealing that, without exception, every single driver's license issued in America is a *District of Columbia occupational certificate* granting one the privilege of pursuing his profession or calling in the operation of motor vehicles for commercial purposes on the highways as a *driver* in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo; providing a practical remedy, authorized by law, to extinguish such *occupational certificate* (driver's license) and thereafter use a car as he best thinks fit without the need of government permission to do so—and without penalty; and providing the simple but semi-secret Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation that allow anyone to decipher the hidden meaning of any statutory definition, no matter how cryptic, and thereby liberate himself from further victimization as a consequence of ignorance thereof.

June 7, 2013.

Disclaimer.

The contents hereof are not intended as legal advice, should not be inferred to be such, and are offered strictly in the spirit of education, scholarship, research, and helping one's fellow Man through the sharing of his experiences.

There is no recommendation that the reader apply any of said material to his life and no guarantee of results in the event that he does; but by the same token, there is no known falsehood within these pages.

Further, the writer hereof has never suggested that someone do what he has not done himself or would not do.

The reader should undertake a particular course of action not because it is written here, but only because of his own due diligence, verification and evaluation of pertinent facts, and realization of personal certainty in the matter under consideration.

The authors whose work is quoted herein are thanked for their diligence and scholarship. This *How to use a car without the need for a driver's license* is offered free of charge and is intended for the reader's erudition as set forth above, to be adopted or rejected as the reader sees fit.

Contents.

Preface	iv
How to use a car without the need for a driver's license	1
Commentary on application	38
Sample instrument of extinguishment of driver's license and accompanying Affidavit of Mailing	51
Addendum:	
• Sample <i>Certificate of Origin for a Vehicle</i>	
• Sample <i>Copy Certification by Notary</i>	
• Sample <i>Demand for Manufacturer's Certificate of Ownership</i>	
• Sample <i>Notice, Traffic-enforcement</i>	
• Sample <i>Notice, Parking-enforcement</i>	
• General note re criminal charges under Title 18 USC	

Preface.

Prior to February 21, 1871, people immigrating to America from around the globe are guaranteed, and possessed of, in personal capacity as Beneficiaries of that certain Trust known as *the United States of America*, established July 4, 1776, all unalienable Rights with which all men are endowed by their Creator, among which is Liberty, and assume, in collective capacity, standing as constituent member of that certain real and natural sovereign corporation, author and source of law, and supreme political authority of *the United States of America*.¹

Congress incorporate the District of Columbia February 21, 1871, for political purposes and operate the new municipal corporation as a commercial, for-profit enterprise. Thereafter, arriving immigrants are granted “corporate citizenship” in the new corporation only, entitled to civil (municipal) rights, possessed of no political authority, and the subject of all legislation within the District of Columbia.

Wherefore, the same inferior political status will continue to befall every new immigrant until the sovereign constituency decides to abolish—as expressly authorized by the supreme instrument of creation of *the United States of America*, the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776—said District of Columbia municipal corporation.

As documented herein: Until that day of abolishment, there is no reason why any American immigrant cannot deduct from his income-tax liability, every single penny spent on every single expense related to his DMV-registered vehicle—because, without exception, every such vehicle and all use thereof is commercial in nature and every driver’s license a *District of Columbia occupational certificate* and permission to pursue the privilege of his/her profession or calling in the operation of motor vehicles for commercial purposes on the highways as a so-called *driver*—his shadow “occupation.”

For *Union-state-born* Americans: Extinguishment of the (1) Social Security franchise, and (2) District of Columbia driving certificate (driver’s license) by reason of the giving of one’s consent by *mistake* dissolves the nexus between him and the de facto District of Columbia Municipal Corporation Social Security Political Movement and restores his precontractual position, established July 4, 1776, described *supra*, and obviates the need for official permission from government to do anything, such as *work* (Social Security account number) or *travel by car* (driver’s license, insurance, registration). Further, as authorized by law, any such American is entitled to recover any and all such taxes or fees previously paid in as a consequence of such *mistake*.

The within discourse documents the above and other related facts.

Thomas Clark Nelson.

June 7, 2013.

¹Nelson, *Purging America of the Matrix*, 2–7.

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Please note: In this discourse (1) “*Union-state*” means one of the several component commonwealths united by and under that certain Constitution ordained and implemented March 4, 1789, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, numbering 50 at present, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959, and (2) “state” and “State” are terms in conformance with their specialized and restricted meaning as defined in contemporary legislative statutes—the only exception being where “state” or “State” appears within the text of quoted material or is part of the title of something cited herein, thus requiring fidelity to the original.

Former Attorney General of the United States Janet Reno, in a brief from a 2000 United States Supreme Court case, presents the interests of the Government of the United States in the regulation of interstate commerce, as such relates to the power of subject-matter jurisdiction over personal information of individuals in DMV files, in conjunction with the activity licensed by each DMV—the *operation of motor vehicles*—which disclosure, upon standard interpretation of terms and content, reveals fraud of the highest order; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

1. The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, provides: “The Congress shall have Power * * * To regulate Commerce * * * among the several States.” [sic]

2. The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” . . .

A resident of a State who wishes to operate a motor vehicle in that State is generally required to obtain a driver’s license from his State’s DMV. As a condition of obtaining a driver’s license, an individual is usually required to provide the DMV with personal information, such as the driver’s name, address, telephone number, and in some cases medical information that may bear on the driver’s ability to operate a motor vehicle. In some States, the DMV also requires the driver to provide his social security number and takes a photograph of the driver. An individual who wishes to register a motor vehicle is also usually required . . . to provide personal information identifying his vehicle, such as make, model, and year of manufacture. . . .

. . . Personal information obtained from state [sic] DMV files is therefore subject to federal regulation under Congress’s Commerce Clause power because such information is itself in interstate commerce, and because disclosure of such information substantially affects interstate commerce. . . .

. . . The activity licensed by . . . DMVs and in connection with which individuals must submit personal information to the DMV—the operation of motor vehicles—is itself integrally related to interstate commerce.¹ [Emphasis added.]

There are two main aspects of Ms. Reno’s brief that we shall address:

1. Legal meaning of two Federal terms, “State” and “individual,” and one *Union-state* term, “driver,” vis-à-vis the commerce clause of the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the said 10th Amendment powers “*reserved to the States respectively*” include the power of personal jurisdiction over members of the sovereign constituency of the United States of America, established July 4, 1776.

¹*Reno v. Condon*, Brief for the Petitioners, No. 98-1464, decided January 12, 2000, Supreme Court of the United States, <http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/1999/3mer/2mer/98-1464.mer.aa.pdf>, 2–22.

Congress snuff out the spirit of the Constitution.

Sensus verborum est anima legis. The meaning of words is the spirit of the law.²

Proprietates verborum observerandæ sunt. The proprieties of words (i. e. proper meanings of words) are to be observed.

Quæ ad unum finem locuta sunt, non debent ad alium detorqueri. Words spoken to one end, ought not to be perverted to another.

Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas ibi nulla expositio contra verba fienda est. When there is no ambiguity in the words, then no exposition contrary to the words is to be made.

Verba nihil operandi melius est quam absurde. It is better that words should have no operation, than to operate absurdly.

The proper meaning of the words used by, and legislative intent of, the Framers of the Constitution in their efforts “*to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,*”³ have been perverted to another end by Congress as specially defined *terms*, and now operate so absurdly as to bear no resemblance to their original meaning as popular and ordinary *words* March 4, 1789; *to wit*:

SEC. 182. *And be it further enacted*, That wherever the word state is used in this act it shall be construed to include the territories and the District of Columbia . . .⁴ [June 30, 1864]

SEC. 3140. The word “State,” when used in this Title, shall be construed to include the Territories and the District of Columbia . . .⁵ [March 9, 1878]

State.— The term “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.⁶ [January 15, 2013]

²*Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Maxim.” Hereinafter, italicized text in Latin (followed by its underlined translation in English), signifies a maxim of law, each of which, unless noted otherwise, is found in *Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Maxim,” pp. 2122–2168, defined and described as follows:

MAXIM. An established principle [*see maxims immediately below*] or proposition. A principle of law universally admitted, as being a correct statement of the law, or as agreeable to natural reason. [Sir Edward] Coke defines a maxim to be “conclusion of reason,” and says . . . in another place: “A maxime is a proposition to be of all men confessed and granted without proofe, argument, or discourse.” . . . *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

Maxime ita dicta quia maxima est ejus dignitas et certissima auctoritas, atque quod maxime omnibus probetur. A maxim is so called because its dignity is chiefest, and its authority the most certain, and because universally approved by all.

Contra negantem principia non est disputandum. There is no disputing against or denying principles. *Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 6th ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

³Constitution, Preamble, in pertinent part (U/L emphasis added).

⁴“An Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, to pay Interest on the Public Debt, and for other Purposes,” Ch. 173, Sec. 182, 13 Stat. 223, 306, June 30, 1864.

⁵*Revised Statutes of the United States, Passed at the First Session of the Forty-third Congress, 1873–’74*, Title XXXV, Internal Revenue, Ch. 1, Officers of Internal Revenue, p. 601, approved retroactively as of the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved as of the Act of March 9, 1878.

⁶United States Code Title 18 *Crimes and Criminal Procedure*, Chapter 2 *Aircraft and Motor Vehicles* § 31(a)(9).

As of March 4, 1789: “the several States” means Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York (North Carolina and Rhode Island ratify the Constitution November 21, 1789, and May 29, 1790, respectively).

As of March 9, 1878: “the word State” (revised from “state,” *supra*, n. 5) means the District of Columbia, Alaska Territory, Arizona Territory, Dakota Territory, Indian (Oklahoma) Territory, Midway Atoll Territory, Montana Territory, Nevada Territory, New Mexico Territory, Utah Territory, or Washington Territory and no other thing.

As of this writing: Under Title 18 *Crimes and Criminal Procedure* of the United States Code (hereinafter “USC”), wherein the controlling definition of the terms “interstate commerce” and “motor vehicle” is found in, respectively, §§ 10 and 31(a)(6), “State” means the District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Atoll, Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Midway Atoll, North Island – JACADS (*infra*, n. 7), Sand Island, Kingman Reef, or Navassa Island and no other thing.⁷

Proof of the meaning of the Title 18 USC term “State”.

Statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed.⁸

Ea est accipienda interpretatio, quæ vitio caret. That interpretation is to be received which is free from fault.

Given that as of the time of submission of the aforesaid Supreme Court brief Ms. Reno is head of the Department of Justice and senior prosecuting attorney of the Government of the United States, it is reasonable to presume that she has knowledge of the meaning of the words and legal terms she uses therein.

Apparently, an American who is a resident of a *State* and wants to operate a motor vehicle in that *State* is required to obtain a driver’s license from that *State’s* DMV in order to do so; *to wit*:

A resident of a State who wishes to operate a motor vehicle in that State is generally required to obtain a driver’s license from his State’s DMV. [*Reno v. Condon, supra*, n. 1]

Re the term “State,” the Federal criminal code, Title 18 USC *Crimes and Criminal Procedure*, primary toolkit of the Attorney General of the United States, provides:

State.— The term “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. [18 USC § 31(a)(9)]

Before the full extent of the meaning of “State” can be determined, however, we must account for another Title 18 term used therein, “United States,” defined in Title 18 USC as follows:

The term “United States”, as used in this title in a territorial sense, includes all places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, except the Canal Zone. [18 USC § 5]

⁷U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of Insular Affairs, (1) “All OIA Jurisdictions,” and (2) “U.S. Territories under U.S. Fish and Wildlife Jurisdiction or Shared with Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS): (1) <http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/index.cfm>, (2) <http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/islandfactsheet2.cfm>, respectively.

⁸*Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

Whereas, in a *territorial* sense, the power of jurisdiction (1) obtains with any type of land mass (of which there are only two: continental and insular), and (2) always extends a certain distance into any adjoining waters: Inclusion of the words “*and waters, continental or insular,*” brings no new meaning to the said definition of “United States” and is therefore superfluous and, for purposes of interpretation, may be excluded without changing the meaning of the definition.

Regarding the phrase “*except the Canal Zone*” at the tag-end of said definition of “United States”: (1) As of October 1, 1979, the United States returns to Panama approximately 60% of what is known as the “Canal Zone,” the Canal Zone ceases to exist in name, and the remaining 40% is dubbed the *Canal Area*, and (2) as of 12:00 Noon December 31, 1999, the United States returns to Panamanian rule all interest in the Panama Canal and Canal Area. Wherefore, inclusion of the phrase “*except the Canal Zone*” in the 2013 Title 18 USC definition of “United States” operates to imply that the United States retains some kind of interest in a former U.S. territory defunct for more than 33 years and in which the United States retains no territorial interest, is an inference without factual basis and therefore superfluous and misleading and, for purposes of interpretation, may be omitted without changing the meaning of the Title 18 § 5 definition of “United States.”

The foregoing leaves the following with which to interpret the full extent of the meaning of the term “United States” in Title 18:

The term “United States,” as used in this title in a territorial sense, includes all places subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

We know from Article 1 § 8(17) and the *territorial clause*, Article 4 § 3(2), of the Constitution that only (1) the District of Columbia, (2) “all Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings,” and (3) “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” are subject to the *territorial* jurisdiction of the United States. Whereas, the above interpretation of the meaning of the Title 18 term “United States,” when used in a *territorial* sense, agrees in substance with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, it is reasonable to conclude that the full extent of the meaning thereof includes only *those places subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.*

Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum.
It is a miserable slavery where the law is vague or uncertain.

Dolus circuitu non purgator. Fraud is not purged by circuitry.⁹

Fraus latet in generalibus. Fraud lies hid in general expressions.

Returning to the Title 18 term “State,” the definition provides that the District of Columbia and any commonwealth, territory, and possession of the United States is a *State*; but we are left to determine what is meant by the general expression “*a State of the United States*”; *to wit*:

State.— The term “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. [Emphasis added.] [18 USC § 31(a)(9)]

Just as “*a petal of a plant with petals*” does not define “petal,” “*a State of the United States*” does not define “State.”

⁹*circuitry* . . . roundabout circuitous procedure . . . lack of straightforwardness Merriam-Webster’s *Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Circuitry.”

Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation.

Though generally unknown outside certain legal and legislative circles, the eight main rules and principles of statutory interpretation are easily understood and provide for the resolution of any discrepancy in the content of any statute or statutory definition; *to wit*:

The principal rules of statutory interpretation are as follows:

- (1) An Act must be construed as a whole, so that internal inconsistencies are avoided.
- (2) Words that are reasonably capable of only one meaning must be given that meaning whatever the result. This is called the literal rule.
- (3) Ordinary words must be given their ordinary meanings and technical words their technical meanings, unless absurdity would result. This is the golden rule.
- (4) When an Act aims at curing a defect in the law any ambiguity is to be resolved in such a way as to favour that aim (the mischief rule).
- (5) The rule *ejusdem generis* (of the same kind): when a list of specific items belonging to the same class is followed by general words (as in “cats, dogs, and other animals”), the general words are to be treated as confined to other items of the same class (in this example, to other *domestic* animals).
- (6) The rule *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* (the inclusion of the one is the exclusion of the other): when a list of specific items is not followed by general words it is to be taken as exhaustive. For example, “weekends and public holidays” excludes ordinary weekdays.
- (7) The rule *in pari materia* (on the like matter): when a prior Act is found to be “on the like matter” it can be used as an aid in construing the statute in question . . .
- (8) The rule *noscitur a sociis* (known by its associates): when a word or phrase is of uncertain meaning, it should be construed in the light of the surrounding words . . .¹⁰ [U/L emphasis added.]

The rule of statutory interpretation whose application clears up the meaning of the unclear word “State” in the phrase “*a State of the United States*” is Rule 8, *noscitur a sociis*, also defined in *Black’s Law Dictionary*, in pertinent part, as follows:

noscitur a sociis . . . [Latin “it is known by its associates”] A canon of construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it. [*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Noscitur a sociis”]

The words immediately surrounding the phrase “*a State of the United States*” in the Title 18 definition of “State” are “*The term ‘State’ means . . . the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.*”

We know that the District of Columbia¹¹ and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States are all geographical areas other than “*Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings*” over which the Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise exclusive legislation (of which the power of *territorial* legislative jurisdiction is a part); *to wit, in pertinent part*:

¹⁰*A Dictionary of Law*, 7th ed., Jonathan Law and Elizabeth Martin, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), s.v. “Interpretation, Rules and Principles of Statutory.”

¹¹Congressional provision for “a district of territory . . . for the permanent seat of the government of the United States” appears in the Act of July 16, 1790 (1 Stat. 130) and is referred to unofficially as the Territory of Columbia; later given the official name District of Columbia as of the Act of May 6, 1796 (1 Stat. 461).

territory . . . a geographical area belonging to or under the jurisdiction of a political authority [Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, inc. version 2.5, s.v. "Territory"]

The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation . . . over such District . . . as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and . . . like Authority over all Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; . . . [U.S. Constitution, Article 1 § 8(17)]

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . . [Ibid, 4 § 3(2)]

Wherefore, the general expression "*a State of the United States*" in the Title 18 USC § 31(a)(9) definition of "State" means *any geographical area other than "Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings" over which the Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise exclusive legislation*, and the full extent of the meaning of said definition is as aforesaid on page 3 and in footnote 7, *supra*, namely:

The District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Atoll, Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Midway Atoll, North Island – JACADS, Sand Island, Kingman Reef, or Navassa Island and no other thing.

Some of the above Title 18 USC *territorial-type* "States" appear in the definition of the term "State" in other Federal titles, as well; *e.g., in pertinent part*:

The term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. [26 USC § 3121(e)(1)]

When used in the regulations in this subpart, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii before their admission . . . and . . . Guam and American Samoa. [Title 26 CFR § 31.3121(e)-1(a)]

Wherefore, re the Title 18 USC § 31(a)(9) definition of the term "State":

1. The general expression "*a State of the United States*" is a pleonasm¹² and tautology¹³ and constitutes an instance of the practice of obscurantism¹⁴ that, investigation reveals, is employed in every other Federal definition of "State."

2. Violates *the literal rule* of statutory interpretation by giving a word a constitutionally opposite meaning to the only meaning of which it is reasonably capable, *to wit*:

Words that are reasonably capable of only one meaning must be given that meaning whatever the result. This is called the literal rule.

3. Violates *the golden rule* of statutory interpretation by disallowing an ordinary word its ordinary meaning, resulting in absurdity; *to wit*:

Ordinary words must be given their ordinary meanings and technical words their technical meanings, unless absurdity would result. This is the golden rule.

¹²ple'o-nasm . . . *Rhet.* The use of more words than are needed for the full expression of a thought; redundancy, as in saying "the very identical thing itself" . . . a violation of grammatical precision. . . . *Funk & Wagnalls Dictionary*, 1903 ed., s.v. "Pleonasm."

¹³tau-tol'o-gy . . . *Rhet.* That form of pleonasm in which the same word or idea is unnecessarily repeated; unnecessary repetition, whether in word or sense . . . Ibid, s.v. "Tautology."

¹⁴ob-scu-rant-ism . . . *n.* 1. Opposition to the increase and spread of knowledge. 2. Deliberate obscurity or evasion of clarity. [*Random House Dictionary*, coll. ed., s.v. "Obscurantism"]

“Jurisdiction”.

Rerum ordo confunditur, si unicuique jurisdictio non servatur. The order of things is confounded if every one preserves not his jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is defined, in pertinent part, as follows:

JURISDICTION . . . Power of governing or legislating. . . . *Jurisdiction*, in its most general sense, is the power to make, declare, or apply the law . . . *Jurisdiction* is limited to place or territory, persons, or to particular subjects. . . . [Webster’s Dictionary, 1828 ed., s.v. “Jurisdiction”]

Before a particular court or court forum can exercise *personal* jurisdiction (e.g., arraign and try someone for an alleged crime and thereafter acquit or convict him of the charges and pass sentence), however, the said court must have *territorial* jurisdiction; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

FORUM. Lat. A court of justice, or judicial tribunal ; a place of jurisdiction ; . . .¹⁵

forum . . . 2 a : a judicial body or assembly . . . b : the territorial jurisdiction of a court forum before personal jurisdiction may be exercised — *National Law Journal*¹⁶ [Emphasis added.]

territorial jurisdiction. 1. Jurisdiction over cases arising in or involving persons residing within a defined territory. 2. Territory over which a government, one of its courts, or one of its subdivisions has jurisdiction. [Emphasis added.] [Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed., s.v. “Jurisdiction”]

Whereas, generally, definition 1 of the above *Black’s Law Dictionary* definition of “territorial jurisdiction” is true and correct as stated, ***it is not complete***, as it omits to account for the unique political paradigm of the United States of America, the first and only one of its kind in the world, where the American People, as the supreme political authority, are the antithesis of so-called ***persons*** (i.e., *subjects* and *citizens* who live in the territory of and enjoy the protection of a government, to whom they owe allegiance and in exchange for which are entitled to the enjoyment of civil/municipal rights—all of which concepts fall under the heading of “rights and duties”) and rather are self-protecting, self-governing ***sovereigns***—constituting, in collective capacity, the author and source of law in the American Republic, whose constituent members are not the subject of any legislative statute as a consequence of *residence in a Union-state*, i.e., as a consequence of *membership in the sovereign constituency*, only as a consequence of *alleged commission of a common-law crime* in the defined territory over which a particular government has exclusive territorial jurisdiction—a fact reflected in the caption of every criminal complaint filed in the courts thereof, wherein “The People” are named as the sovereign authority that moves against the accused. To propose otherwise is to assert that the American People are subjects of their own servants and creations, an absurdity invalid on its face (addressed in detail *infra*).

The American People, i.e., *the good People of these Colonies* of July 4, 1776, and *We the People* of March 4, 1789, successor sovereign to King George III of England, in collective capacity as a *real and natural sovereign corporation*¹⁷ and private capacity as men and women possessed of unalienable Rights, among which is ***Liberty***, cannot be the subject of any legislative statute enacted by any of their servants in government by virtue of residence within the limits of one of their own creations, the *Union-states*.

Wherefore: The 10th Amendment is not the actual authority to require a driver’s license.

¹⁵*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Forum.”

¹⁶*Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law*, 1996 ed., s.v. “Forum.”

¹⁷Eric Enlow, *The Corporate Conception of the State and the Origins of Limited Constitutional Government*, Washington University Journal of Law & Policy (2001), quoted in Nelson, *Purging America of the Matrix*, 3–5.

As of June 30, 1864,¹⁸ under cover of the Civil War, Congress seek to evade and defeat the jurisdictional “chains of the Constitution” by perverting the meaning of the *word* that describes the fundamental building-block of the American Republic, “state,” into a *term of art* with a jurisdictionally opposite meaning, and thereby create the illusion in the mind of intended victims of the fraud, of authority to exercise *territorial* and *personal* legislative power and jurisdiction within the geographical limits of *Union-states*, over the American People who reside there.

Such “jurisdiction” exists in *form* only, not *substance*, and no arcane statutory *term of art* can be leveraged so as to overturn or negate any provision of the Declaration of Independence or Constitution. Such deceit depends upon the ongoing ignorance of its victims—and any situation resulting therefrom can be rectified by summary personal declaration of independence¹⁹ from the fraud or national removal from office of the traitors responsible for the hoax.²⁰

Legal meaning of the term “individual”.

The second distinctive term that Janet Reno uses in her brief to the Supreme Court (*supra*, n. 1) is “individual”; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

[A]n individual is usually required to provide the DMV with personal information. . . . The activity . . . in connection with which individuals must submit personal information . . . An individual . . . is also usually required . . . to provide personal information identifying his vehicle . . . [Emphasis added.]

The hierarchy of power and authority in the American political archetype, as provided in *The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America* of July 4, 1776, and echoed in the *Constitution for the United States of America* of March 4, 1789, is as follows:

1. The Creator creates Man, of which the American People are a part, so the power of Man can never be greater than that of the Creator.
2. The American People create the governments of the respective *Union-states* and United States (as service facilities), so the respective power of said governments can never be greater than that of the American People.
3. The government of the United States and that of each respective *Union-state* creates franchises²¹ (as revenue sources) called *corporations* and *individuals*, so the power of a franchise can never be greater than that of the respective government that creates it.

Franchise-creation is a normal aspect of the operation of government.²² The franchise held by nearly all American men and women under the Social Security retirement program of the Government of the United States consists in the *right* (entitlement) to receive Social Security²³ retirement or survivor benefits and the *duty* to pay income and Social Security payroll taxes. Each such franchise holder is defined in law as an “individual” and “person” and is a resident, for certain legal purposes, such as licensing, of the District of Columbia; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

¹⁸Nelson, *Why the 14th Amendment is a political Trojan horse*, n. 15, p. 8.

¹⁹Nelson, *Purging America of the Matrix*, 36.

²⁰*Ibid*, 2–7.

²¹FRANCHISE. A special privilege conferred by government upon an individual or corporation, and which does not belong to the citizens of the country generally. . . . In a popular sense, the political rights of subjects and citizens are franchises. . . . *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Franchise.”

²²The tax agency known as the *State of California Franchise Tax Board* (Emphasis added.) exacts taxes only from franchises: *corporations* and *individuals* domiciled or residing within the geographical limits of California.

²³Social Security is an extremist, exclusionary, prejudicial American political movement/faction whose custom is to prohibit members from engaging in commercial intercourse with non-members, such as the sovereign constituency. The percentage of Americans involved in the movement is so great that non-members generally believe (falsely) that they will be foreclosed from the opportunity to earn a living unless they join the movement.

the term “Federal personnel” means . . . individuals entitled to receive immediate or deferred retirement benefits under any retirement program of the Government of the United States (including survivor benefits). [Emphasis added.] [5 USC § 552a(a)(13)]

“person” includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency; . . . [Emphasis added.] [Ibid, § 551(2)]

PERSON. . . . A man considered according to the rank he holds in society, with all the right to which the place he holds entitles him, and the duties which it imposes. . . . A county is a person in a legal sense . . . but a sovereign is not Persons are the subject of rights and duties ; and, as a subject of a right, the person is the object of the correlative duty, and conversely. . . . [Emphasis added.] [Ibid, 3rd ed., s.v. “Person”]

Residence. The act or fact of living in a given place for some time. . . . Residence usu. just means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place; domicile usu. requires bodily presence plus an intention to make the place one’s home. A person thus may have more than one residence at a time, but only one domicile. Sometimes, though, the two terms are used synonymously. Cf. DOMICILE. . . . [U/L emphasis added.] [*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Residence”]

domicile The residence of a person or corporation for legal purposes. Also termed . . . legal residence. . . . [U/L emphasis added.] [Ibid, s.v. “Domicile”]

“[D]omicile . . . is a conception of law employed for the purpose of establishing a connection for certain legal purposes between an individual and the legal system of the territory with which he either has the closest connection in fact or is considered by law so to have because of his dependence on some other person.” R.H. Graveson, *Conflict of Laws* 185, 7th ed. 1974. [U/L emphasis added.] [Ibid]

Statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed.²⁴

Fides servanda. Good faith must be observed.

Ms. Reno’s opening statement in the said brief to the Supreme Court provides, in pertinent part:

A resident of a State who wishes to operate a motor vehicle in that State is generally required to obtain a driver’s license from his State’s DMV. [Emphasis added.] [*Reno v. Condon, supra*, n. 1]

Wherefore, we must construe Ms. Reno’s words and use of terms in good faith as presented.

Whereas: The only Title 18 USC *States* of the United States are the District of Columbia and the 19 insular commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States²⁵; and

Whereas: The 18 USC § 31(a)(9) definition of the term “State” includes no *Union-state* in the meaning thereof; and

Whereas: The only *State* of the United States, as the said term “State” is defined in Title 18 USC, of which every Social Security franchisee is, for certain legal purposes, a resident, is the District of Columbia,

Wherefore: Re *individuals* (Social Security franchisees/persons) residing throughout the Union: (1) “State,” as used by Ms. Reno, means *District of Columbia*, and (2) every DMV situate within the exterior limits of a particular *Union-state* is an instrumentality or political field unit of the *District of Columbia*.²⁶

²⁴*Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

²⁵“Proof of the meaning of the Title 18 USC term ‘State,’” *supra*, p. 3.

²⁶Nelson, *Why the 14th Amendment is a political Trojan horse*, “Holy of Holies . . .,” browser-pages 39–42.

To construe Ms. Reno's words otherwise is to accuse her and the seven other subscribers to the subject brief of, minimally, *misfeasance in public office*, a potentially career-ending charge.

Origo rei inspici debet. The origin of a thing ought to be inquired into.

Quæras de dubiis, legem bene discere si vis. Inquire into doubtful points if you wish to understand the law well.

If the above interpretation is correct—i.e., that “State,” as used by Janet Reno in her brief to the Supreme Court, with respect to legal residents of the District of Columbia (Social Security franchisees) residing throughout the Union, means *District of Columbia*—we should be able to corroborate that fact in other official pronouncements, publications, and laws.

The “Driver License Compact”.

Maryland.gov provides the following re the *Driver License Compact* (the “Compact”):

The Driver License Compact (DLC) is an agreement among states that obligates member jurisdictions to exchange information about an individual’s driving history. The primary purposes of the compact are:

- To promote compliance with the laws, ordinances, and administrative rules and regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles in each of the member jurisdictions;
- To ensure that each driver in a member jurisdiction has only one legitimate driver’s license at a time; and,
- To ensure that the state that issues the driver’s license has a complete record of the individual’s past driving history.²⁷ [Emphasis added.]

The subject of the Compact is *drivers* and *individuals*:

A “driver”²⁸ is a “person”²⁹ is a “natural person”³⁰ is an “individual”³¹ is a “citizen of the United States” is a member of the class defined as “Federal personnel”³² are by definition United States Government employees are residents, for certain legal purposes, of the District of Columbia³³ and the subject of all legislation therein.³⁴

²⁷Maryland Department of Transportation Motor Vehicle Administration, “Driver’s License Compact . . . Ensuring a Consolidated Driver Record,” <http://www.mva.maryland.gov/About-MVA/INFO/26100/26100-22T.htm>.

²⁸A “driver” is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. [Emphasis added.] California Vehicle Code § 305.

²⁹“Person” includes a natural person, firm, copartnership, association, limited liability company, or corporation. [Emphasis added.] Ibid, § 70.

“person” includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency; . . . [Emphasis added.] [5 USC § 551(2)]

³⁰Neither is “individual” a legal term of art that applies only to natural persons. As Black’s Law Dictionary 773 (6th ed. 1990) states:

Individual. As a noun, this term denotes a single person as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association . . . [Emphasis added.] *U.S. v. Middleton*, No. 99-10518, 231 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2000).

³¹the term “individual” means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. [Emphasis added.] 5 USC *Government Organization and Employees* § 552a(a)(2).

³²Ibid, § 552a(a)(13) (*supra*, definition 1, p. 9).

³³domicile . . . The residence of a person or corporation for legal purposes. Also termed . . . *legal residence*. . . . [Emphasis added.] [Ibid, s.v. “Domicile”]

³⁴*territorial jurisdiction*. . . . Jurisdiction over cases arising in or involving persons residing within a defined territory. . . . [Emphasis added.] *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Jurisdiction.”

The phrase “*administrative rules and regulations*” in the first bulleted item *supra*, pertains to territory over which Congress have the power of territorial jurisdiction; *to wit*:

administrative law. The law governing the organization and operation of the executive branch of government (including independent agencies) and the relations of the executive [President of the United States] with the legislature, the judiciary, and the public. . . .³⁵ [Emphasis added.]

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . .³⁶ [Emphasis added.]

In substance, the definition of “State” in the Compact is very similar to that in Title 18 USC, as shown *supra* (pp. 4–6); *to wit* (*Emphasis added in all citations.*):

“State” means a state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. [District of Columbia Code, Division VIII *General Laws* Title 50 *Motor and Non-Motor Vehicles and Traffic* Subtitle IV *Motorized Vehicle Registration, Inspection, Licensing* Chapter 10 *Driver License Compact* § 50-1001 Article II *Definitions* Subsection g]

“State” means a state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. [Montana Code Annotated, Title 61 *Motor Vehicles* Chapter 5 *Driver’s Licenses* Part 4 *Driver License Compact* § 61-5-401 *Driver License Compact* Article II *Definitions* Subsection 1]

“State” means a state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. [Vermont Statutes, Title 23 *Motor Vehicles* Chapter 37 *Driver License Compact* § 3903 *Definitions-Article II* Subsection 5]

Because the term defined begins the sentence in each definition, and therefore requires capitalization, it is not immediately clear whether the actual term defined is “State” or “state.” Rule 1 of the Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation (*supra*, n. 10) provides:

An Act must be construed as a whole, so that internal inconsistencies are avoided.

Consulting the remaining provisions of the Compact for the capitalized form, i.e., “State,” we find there are none; “state” is used exclusively elsewhere. Wherefore, the term defined is “state.”

Whereas, the meaning of the expression “*state . . . of the United States*,” which appears within the definition of the term “state,” is unclear, we follow the same procedure as before with the Title 18 USC definition of “State” and apply Rule 8 of the Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation, i.e., *noscutur a sociis* (“it is known by its associates”), which instructs us to determine the meaning of “state” by the words immediately surrounding it. Removing “state” from the said definition leaves:

“[s]tate” means a territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Non differunt quæ concordant re, tametsi non in verbis iisdem. Those things which agree in substance, though not in the same words, do not differ.

forum . . . the territorial jurisdiction of a court forum before personal jurisdiction may be exercised — *National Law Journal Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law*, 1996 ed., s.v. “Forum.”

And be it further enacted, That the legislative power of the District [of Columbia] shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within said District . . . [U/L emphasis added.] “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” Ch. 62, Sec. 18, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871.

³⁵*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Administrative law.”

³⁶Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2).

The foregoing distillation of the essence of the Driver License Compact definition of the term “state,” though not in the same words, agrees in substance with, and does not differ from, that of the Title 18 USC § 31(a)(9) definition of “State” (*supra*, p. 5); *to wit*, *respectively*:

- a territory³⁷ or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico [“state,” Driver License Compact]
- the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States [“State,” 18 USC § 31(a)(9)]

The full meaning of the Driver License Compact definition of the term “state” and the Title 18 definition of “State” comprehends the exact same objects/items; *i.e.*:

The District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Atoll, Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Midway Atoll, North Island – JACADS, Sand Island, Kingman Reef, or Navassa Island and no other thing.

Re the foregoing, the only significant difference between the Driver License Compact and 18 USC § 31(a)(9) is that the term in the latter is capitalized; both mean the same thing.

Statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed.³⁸

Fides servanda. Good faith must be observed.

Ea est accipienda interpretatio, quæ vitio caret. That interpretation is to be received which is free from fault.

The Driver License Compact also introduces another term, “Home state”; *to wit*:

“Home state” means the state which has issued and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle. [District of Columbia Code, Division VIII *General Laws* Title 50 *Motor and Non-Motor Vehicles and Traffic* Subtitle IV *Motorized Vehicle Registration, Inspection, Licensing* Chapter 10 *Driver License Compact* § 50-1001 Article II *Definitions* Subsection e]

“Home state” means the state which has issued and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle. [Montana Code Annotated, Title 61 *Motor Vehicles* Chapter 5 *Driver’s Licenses* Part 4 *Driver License Compact* § 61-5-401 *Driver License Compact* Article II *Definitions* Subsection 2]

“Home state” means the state which has issued and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle. [Vermont Statutes, Title 23 *Motor Vehicles* Chapter 37 *Driver License Compact* § 3903 *Definitions-Article II* Subsection 3]

Whereas, the only place “Home state” appears with a capital “H” within the provisions of the Compact is in the definition thereof (as shown above), we know from Rule 1 of the principal rules of statutory interpretation (*supra*, n. 10) that the precise spelling of the term defined is “home state.” Before we can ascertain the full extent of the meaning of “home state,” however, we must account for the meaning of another term used within the definition: “state.”

³⁷“The Federal law (the Covenant) making the CNMI a U.S. territory passed in 1975.” U.S. Department of the Interior, “Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,” <http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/cnmi.cfm>.

³⁸*Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

As defined in the Compact, the “states” of the United States are the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the other 18 insular U.S. possessions and territories of the United States (*supra*, p. 12).

There is one and only one of the above so-called states which is a party to the Driver License Compact: the District of Columbia.³⁹ None of the other 19 so-called states of the United States is a subscribing member thereof.

Conversely, no *Union-state* subscriber to the Compact (*infra*, n. 39) is a *state* of the United States, as the term “state” is defined in the Compact.

Wherefore, as regards the Compact and its members:

1. The Compact term “home state” means District of Columbia and no other thing;
2. Each and every use of the term “state” or “home state” within the provisions of the Compact means District of Columbia and no other thing;
3. The District of Columbia has exclusive power to issue licenses and permits to operate a motor vehicle and suspend or revoke the use of any such license or permit; and
4. Any Compact-member DMV that issues, suspends, or revokes a license or permit to operate a motor vehicle is an instrumentality of the District of Columbia.⁴⁰

Irrespective of any other factor:

The provisions of the Driver License Compact constitute irrefutable evidence that each respective Union-state-member DMV is an instrumentality of the District of Columbia and each Union-state-member government a political subdivision of the District of Columbia.

Notwithstanding that the above decryption of the Driver License Compact debunks the mystery as to how any *Union-state* government can purport to subject to personal jurisdiction any constituent member of the sovereign authority of the United States of America, i.e., *the good People of these Colonies* of July 4, 1776, and *We the People* of March 4, 1789, namely the American People, the only group in history to break free of goldsmith-banker tyranny, there is one thing left for which we need to account: Only 45 of the 50 *Union-state* governments are Compact members; five declined to join.⁴¹

Wherefore we must account for the possibility that one or more of the said five *Union-states* retains (is withholding from the District of Columbia) the power to issue, suspend, or revoke a license or permit to operate a motor vehicle. For this to be so, any one or more of the five *Union-states* would need to identify itself in its own statutes as a state of the United States. Otherwise, any such *Union-state* is the same as the 45 other non-states of the United States.

Code/statutes of the five non-Compact Union-states.

The *Union-states* declining membership in the Compact are Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Tennessee,⁴² and Wisconsin. The respective statutes thereof provide:

- Georgia — Georgia Code provides, in pertinent part:
‘State’ means a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a province of Canada. [Georgia Code, Title 40 *Motor Vehicles & Traffic* § 40-1-1(61)]

³⁹http://www.dmv.state.pa.us/pdotforms/fact_sheets/fs-dlc.pdf, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, “Driver License Compact Fact Sheet,” 2.

⁴⁰Nelson, *Why the 14th Amendment is a political Trojan horse*, “Holy of Holies . . .,” 36–39.

⁴¹*Supra*, n. 38.

⁴²Tennessee joined in 1965, but dropped out in 1997 (*supra*, n. 38).

- Massachusetts — Code of Massachusetts Regulations (the “CMR”), Title 540 *Registry of Motor Vehicles* provides no definition for the term “state.” Wherefore, we must look to the authority upon which the CMR is issued, the Massachusetts General Laws, which provide, in pertinent part:

Thirty-first, “State”, when applied to the different parts of the United States, shall extend to and include the District of Columbia and the several territories; and the words “United States” shall include said district and territories. [Massachusetts General Laws, Part I *Administration of the Government Title I Jurisdiction and Emblems of the Commonwealth, the General Court, Statutes and Public Documents Chapter 4 Statutes § 7 Definition of statutory terms; statutory construction*]
- Michigan — Michigan Compiled Laws provide, in pertinent part:

“State” means any state, territory, or possession of the United States, Indian country as defined in 18 USC 1151, the District of Columbia, the Dominion of Canada, or any province or territory of the Dominion of Canada. [Michigan Compiled Laws, Chapter 257 *Motor Vehicles Act 300 of 1949 Michigan Vehicle Code Chapter I Words and Phrases Defined § 257.65 “State” defined*]
- Tennessee — Tennessee Code provides, in pertinent part:

State, when applied to the different parts of the United States, includes the District of Columbia and the several territories of the United States. [Tennessee Code, Title 1 *Code and Statutes Chapter 3 Construction of Statutes § 1-3-105 Definition of terms used in code Subsection 32*]
- Wisconsin — Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations provide, in pertinent part:

Words and phrases defined in chs. 340 to 349 have the same meaning in this chapter . . . [Emphasis added.] [Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations, Chapter 110 *Motor Vehicles § 110.01 Definitions*]

“State” means any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any province of the Dominion of Canada. [Ibid, Chapter 344 *Vehicles — Financial Responsibility § 344.01 Words and phrases defined Subsection (2)(f)*]

Applying, to the above five definitions, Rule 1 (“An Act must be construed as a whole, so that internal inconsistencies are avoided.”) and Rule 8 (*noscitur a sociis*, “it is known by its associates”) of the rules and principles of statutory interpretation, each respective definition of “state” means either (1) any of the specific items named in that definition, or (2) any other item not specifically named in said definition, but one of a class of items named therein; *to wit*:

- Georgia: any territory or possession of the United States, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a province of Canada
- Massachusetts: the District of Columbia or any territory of the United States
- Michigan: any territory or possession of the United States, Indian country as defined in 18 USC 1151, the District of Columbia, the Dominion of Canada, or any province or territory of the Dominion of Canada
- Tennessee: the District of Columbia or any territory of the United States
- Wisconsin: any territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any province of the Dominion of Canada

Enumeration of the unnamed items of the different classes of items named in each respective definition is an extraneous exercise and therefore is omitted here.

There is no meaningful difference in the content of the above five *Union-state* definitions of “state” and that of any of the other 45 Compact-member *Union-state* statutes: *to wit*:

- Ohio — Ohio Revised Code, Title 45 *Motor Vehicles, Aeronautics, Watercraft* Chapter 4501 *Motor Vehicles – Definitions; General Provisions* § 4501.01 *Motor Vehicle Definitions* Subsection Z provides:
“State” includes the territories and federal districts of the United States, and the provinces of Canada.
- South Carolina — South Carolina Code of Laws, Title 56 *Motor Vehicles* Chapter 1 *Driver's License* Article 1 *General Provisions* § 56-1-10 *Definitions* Subsection 5 provides:
“State” means a state, territory, or possession of the United States and the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
- Texas — Texas Code *Transportation Code* Title 7 *Vehicles and Traffic* Subtitle B *Driver's Licenses and Personal Identification Cards* Chapter 521 *Driver's Licenses and Certificates* Subchapter A *General Provisions* § 521.001 *Definitions* Subsection (a)(8) provides:
“State” means a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Uno absurdo dato, infinita sequuntur. One absurdity being allowed, an infinity follow.

Fraus est celare fraudem. It is a fraud to conceal a fraud.

What is significant about the above and all other *Union-state* definitions of “state” is not what is found within their provisions, *but what is not found; to wit*:

No Union-state code/statute provides that any Union-state is a state of the United States.

This fact (1) aligns with the Federal definition of the term “State” in Title 18 USC § 31(a)(9), (2) affirms that the government of every *Union-state* is a political subdivision of the District of Columbia (society of Social Security franchisees), and (3) is in keeping with the seminal statutory absurdity of 1864 and revision thereof 14 years later, when Congress tacitly declare, by omission, that the *Union-states* are not *states/States of the United States*, maintain the fraud in all subsequent legislation, and thereafter conceal the fraud from the American People; *to wit*:

SEC. 182. *And be it further enacted*, That wherever the word state is used in this act it shall be construed to include the territories and the District of Columbia . . . [June 30, 1864 (*supra*, n. 4)]

SEC. 3140. The word “State,” when used in this Title, shall be construed to include the Territories and the District of Columbia . . . [March, 9, 1878 (*supra*, n. 5)]

The above absurdities lie behind every single other governmental absurdity you have ever observed.

“Drivers,” “persons,” and “individuals”.

Besides the Federal terms “State” and “individual” in the subject brief to the Supreme Court, Ms. Reno uses a *Union-state* term, “driver.” *Union-state* statutes define “driver” as follows:

DRIVER. Every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. [Emphasis added.] [Code of Alabama, Title 32 *Motor Vehicles and Traffic* Chapter 1 *General Provisions* § 32-1-1.1(14)]

A “driver” is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. . . . [Emphasis added.] [California Code *Vehicle Code* Division 1 *Words and phrases defined* § 305]

“Driver” means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. [Emphasis added.] [Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 169 *Traffic Regulations* § 169.011 *Definitions* Subd. 24 *Driver*]

Unless one is a *person* he cannot be a *driver*. At the exact instant in time a particular person “*is in actual physical control of a vehicle*” that *person* is a *driver*—and not so until such time. There is no statute that provides for any type of driver other than a person.

Persons are *subjects*—and in matters political there are only two species of actor: *sovereign* and *subject*. The former has supreme political authority (sovereignty) and governs the latter with absolute, uncontrollable power. *Subjects* have *rights and duties* (privileges and obligations), owe allegiance to, and are under the dominion, control, and influence, and enjoy the protection of, a *sovereign*; *to wit*:

person. . . . Persons are the substances of which rights and duties are the attributes. . . .” [Black’s *Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Person”]

[T]he term “person” does not include the sovereign . . . [Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979)]

SOVEREIGNTY. The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed ; supreme political authority . . . *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd ed., s.v. “Sovereignty.”

Union-state statutes define “person” as either a *natural person* or an *individual*. Examples of the former are as follows:

“Person” means every natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation. [Emphasis added.] [Utah Code, Title 41 *Motor Vehicles* Chapter 6a *Traffic Code* § 41-6a-102 Subsection 44]

”Person” means every natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation. [Emphasis added.] [Arkansas Code, Title 27 *Transportation* Subtitle 2 *Motor Vehicle Registration and Licensing* Chapter 16 *Driver’s Licenses Generally* Subchapter 2 *Definitions* § 27-16-204 Subsection c]

Person. Every natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation. [Emphasis added.] [New York Code, VAT *Vehicle & Traffic* Title 1 *Words and Phrases Defined* Article 1 *Words and phrases defined* § 131]

There are two species of “person”: *natural* and *artificial*. Whereas, “natural person” is neither a Federal nor *Union-state* term, we must look to the dictionary for clarification:

pěrsōn (or -sn), *n.* [L *persona*, lit., a face mask used by actors on the stage, hence a character, a person, from *personare*, to sound through; *per* through, and *sonare*, to sound.] . . . [Webster’s *Dictionary*, new 20th cent. ed. (unabr.), s.v. “Person”]

person. . . . “So far as legal theory is concerned, a person is any being whom the law regards as capable of rights and duties. Any being that is so capable is a person, whether a human being or not . . . Persons are the substances of which rights and duties are the attributes. . . .” [Emphasis added.] [Black’s *Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Person”]

natural person. A human being, as distinguished from an artificial person created by law. [Ibid]

All so-called *persons*, whether artificial or natural, are the subject of rights and duties. Human beings that are *not* the subject of rights and duties—such as *the good People of these Colonies* of July 4, 1776, and *We the People* of March 4, 1789—are what are known in law as *sovereigns*.

Natural persons are also known as *individuals*. “Individual” is a *term of art* and signifies a creature of the law, existing only by force of or in contemplation of law; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

Neither is “individual” a legal term of art that applies only to natural persons. As Black's Law Dictionary 773 (6th ed. 1990) states:

Individual. As a noun, this term denotes . . . a . . . natural person . . . and . . . may, in proper cases, include artificial persons. . . . [Emphasis added.] *U.S. v. Middleton*, No. 99-10518, 231 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2000).

Not all *Union-states* beat around the bush about persons being *natural persons*; some, like Indiana, cut straight to the chase; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

“Person” has the meaning set forth in IC 9-13-2-124. [Emphasis added.] [Indiana Administrative Code, Title 140 *Bureau of Motor Vehicles Article 7 Driver's License Division Rule 1.1 Definitions; Required Documentation for Credentials* § 140 IC 7-1.1-1 Subsection kk]

IC 9-13-2-124 . . . “Person” means . . . an individual, a firm, a partnership, an association, a fiduciary, an executor or administrator, a governmental entity, a limited liability company, or a corporation. . . . [Emphasis added.] [Indiana Code, Title 9 *Motor Vehicles Article 13 General Provisions and Definitions Chapter 2 Definitions* IC 9-13-2-124 *Person* § 124 Subsection a]

IC 9-24-1-1 . . . Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, an individual must have a valid Indiana . . . license . . . or . . . permit . . . issued to the individual by the bureau under this article to drive upon an Indiana highway the type of motor vehicle for which the license or permit was issued. [Emphasis added.] [Ibid, Article 24 *Drivers Licenses Chapter 1 Individuals Required to Obtain a License or Permit* IC 9-24-1-1 *License required* § 1]

Every *driver* is a *natural person* is a *person* is an *individual* is a *Social Security franchisee* is a *United States Government employee*; *to wit (Emphasis added in all citations.):*

the term “Federal personnel” means . . . individuals entitled to receive immediate or deferred retirement benefits under any retirement program of the Government of the United States (including survivor benefits). [5 USC *Government Organization and Employees* § 552a(a)(13)]

the term “individual” means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. [Ibid, § 552a(a)(2)]

“person” includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency; . . . [Ibid, § 551(2)]

Legal meaning of Janet Reno's opening statement.

In light of the preceding 16+ pages, the actual meaning of the opening paragraph of Janet Reno's brief, *supra*, footnote 1, page 1, is as follows:

A member of the political society of Social Security franchisees residing in a particular *Union-state*, who wants to operate a motor vehicle for commercial purposes within said society, is required to obtain, from the DMV of the respective District of Columbia political subdivision of which he is a part, a driver's license. As a condition of obtaining a driver's license, the Social Security franchisee is required to provide the DMV with personal information, such as said franchisee's name, address, telephone number, and in some cases medical information that may bear on said franchisee's ability to operate a motor vehicle. The DMV operated by some political subdivisions of the District of Columbia also requires a Social Security franchisee to provide his social security number and takes a photograph of said franchisee. A Social Security franchisee who wishes to register a vehicle with the DMV run by the political subdivision of the District of Columbia of which he is a member is required to provide personal information identifying his vehicle, such as make, model, and year of manufacture.

Whereas, the above is a legally accurate translation of Janet Reno's quoted statements to the Supreme Court regarding the driving privilege and includes almost every *Union-state*-born American, there are other government franchises besides Social Security, such as patents and the *right to practice law*,⁴³ that also operate to make one a resident, for certain legal purposes, of the District of Columbia. If a particular *Union-state*-born Social Security franchisee has a patent or is admitted to practice law in the courts of a certain *Union-state*, yet wants to be free of personal subjection to Federal and State statutes, he or she would need to extinguish that particular franchise, as well.

Interstate commerce by motor vehicle impossible.

Because all Federal and State executive-branch actors are authorized to apply deadly force against anyone with a driver's license, we shall disregard the fact that the *terms of art* "State" and "United States," upon which the Attorney General et al rely to justify their actions, have a jurisdictionally opposite meaning to the *words* "State" and "United States" as used in the Constitution of March 4, 1789, and therefore are inapposite⁴⁴ to the matter at hand, and dissolve such "arguments" otherwise, using only law, fact, and reason.

Ms. Reno tells us that "*The activity licensed by . . . DMVs . . . the operation of motor vehicles . . . is itself integrally related to interstate commerce*" (*supra*, n. 1). The Title 18 USC definition of "interstate commerce" provides:

The term "interstate commerce", as used in this title, includes commerce between one State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia. [Title 18 USC *Crimes and Criminal Procedure* Part I *Crimes* Chapter 2 *Aircraft and Motor Vehicles* § 10]

Whereas, the District of Columbia and Territories and Possessions are all territorial-type "States" of the United States by definition (*supra*, pp. 4–6), the words "*Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and . . . Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia*" in the Title 18 USC definition of "interstate commerce" are superfluous and misleading, and, for purposes of interpretation, may be omitted from the definition without changing its meaning; leaving:

The term "interstate commerce", as used in this title, includes commerce between one State and another State.

Every Title 18 USC territorial-type State of the United States except the District of Columbia is surrounded by water on all sides, with no connecting bridge to any other Title 18 USC State.

⁴³There is no such thing as a *license to practice law* per se, nor is there any such term in any law dictionary. Not surprisingly, no instrument conferring the right to practice law can be found in the licensing statutes of any *Union-state*. As of 1178 A.D., King Henry II of England, monopolizes the practice of law [Wade F. Baker, "Benchmarks For Your Practice," *Journal of the Missouri Bar*, July–August 1976, 271] as a property right and franchise conferred by the king by *letters patent* [Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland, *The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1895), 191]. In America the chief justice of the Supreme Court of each political subdivision of the District of Columbia confers this franchise and property right by what is known as the *certificate of admission* [*Unger v. Landlords' Management Corp.*, 114 N.J. Eq. 68, 168 A. 229 (Ch.1933)]. This writer can say "*by the Chief Justice of the supreme court of each political subdivision of the District of Columbia*" because no Federal or District of Columbia certificate of admission (or bar card) is needed for any attorney to practice law in a United States District Court (Federal property) situate within the exterior limits of any *Union-state*—i.e., territory over which (1) Congress have power of exclusive legislation, and (2) no *Union-state* legislature has any authority or power of any kind whatsoever. The right to practice law is a Federal franchise and each franchisee a resident, for certain legal purposes, of the District of Columbia.

⁴⁴*inapposite* . . . not apposite : not pertinent *Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. "Inapposite."

apposite . . . highly pertinent or appropriate : RELEVANT, APT *Ibid*, s.v. "Apposite."

Though not so by other modes, such as air or sea, commerce between any two of the 20 Title 18 USC States by motor vehicle on the highways is physically impossible.

Wherefore: The commerce clause is not the actual constitutional authority for the power to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the personal information of Social Security franchisees in DMV files.

Actual constitutional authority.

Article 1 § 8(17) and the territorial clause, Article 4 § 3(2), of the Constitution confer power of exclusive legislation, i.e., plenary⁴⁵ legislative power, on Congress in the District of Columbia and other places/property belonging to the United States.

As defined in Federal statutes, every Social Security franchisee is, among other things, an *individual, person*, United States Government employee, citizen of the United States, and resident, for certain legal purposes such as licensing, of the District of Columbia and the subject of all legislation therein, no matter where in the world said franchisee may live, work, or travel, and over whom and whose personal information in DMV files the Constitution authorizes the Government of the United States, also known as the Government of the District of Columbia, to exercise power of *personal* and *subject-matter* jurisdiction.

The Attorney General indulges in the “interstate commerce” charade to keep up appearances with the natives. The commerce clause of the Constitution is irrelevant. Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2) authorize Congress and the remainder of the Government of the United States (District of Columbia) to exercise exclusive personal jurisdiction over all Social Security franchisees and subject-matter jurisdiction over their personal information in DMV files.

The “50 States”.

Whereas, “state” is a *Union-state* term that means the District of Columbia or any of the 19 insular U.S. territories, “State” is a Federal term for the selfsame 20 territories. As shown *supra*, effectively and ultimately the two terms boil down to the same thing: the *District of Columbia*. This is the case in all Federal titles and all *Union-state* code and statutes.

Further, as demonstrated hereinabove, no *Union-state* is a State of the United States under Title 18 USC, so the provisions of the Constitution of March 4, 1789, regarding “States” of the “United States” are inapposite to any “State” (District of Columbia) of the United States (District of Columbia)⁴⁶ today.

Rarely do the statutes of a particular *Union-state* use the proper name of that *Union-state* in their provisions (usually only “this state,” “in this state,” or “the state.”). Because (1) “State” (with a capital “S”) is not defined in any *Union-state* statute, (2) all officers, employees, and elected officials of all *Union-state* governments are residents of the District of Columbia (Social Security franchisees), and (3) “*Statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed,*” “State of Oklahoma” (as found in Oklahoma Statutes) can mean only *District of Columbia of Oklahoma* as determined *supra* (see “Documentary evidence that ‘State’ = Federal,” page 3 of 3, “General note re criminal charges under Title 18 USC,” browser-page 85 hereof).

Whereas, constitutionally, “*Commerce . . . between the several States*” (10th Amendment) is impossible by modern definition, commerce between political subdivisions (societies of Social Security franchisees) of the District of Columbia such as the *State (District of Columbia) of Rhode Island* and the *State (District of Columbia) of Connecticut*—is not.

The expression the “50 States” may be a catchy phrase but is only window dressing for the fraud, of no legal consequence, and immaterial for our purposes.

⁴⁵plenary . . . complete in every respect : ABSOLUTE, PERFECT, UNQUALIFIED Ibid, s.v. “Plenary.”

⁴⁶Nelson, *Why the 14th Amendment is a political Trojan horse*, “Holy of Holies: Legal meaning of ‘United States’,” 36–39.

Contents hereof based on results, not theories.

The reason this writer can say with certainty the things that are found within the pages of this discourse is that they are based on empirical results. A 1982 United States District Court ruling tells us, in pertinent part:

Slater's protestations to the effect that he derives no benefit from the United States government have no bearing on his legal obligation to pay income taxes. . . . Unless the defendant can establish that he is not a citizen of the United States, the IRS possesses authority to attempt to determine his federal tax liability. [Emphasis added.] [*United States v. Slater* (D. Del., 1982), 545 F.Supp. 179, 182]

The expression "citizen of the United States" means *individual; to wit:*

the term "individual" means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. [5 USC *Government Organization and Employees* § 552a(a)(2)]

Every prosecuting attorney or attorney for the plaintiff in every Federal (District of Columbia) or state/State (District of Columbia) criminal or civil complaint counts on the jurisdiction of the particular court forum to hear the matter pleaded based on his/her allegation that the defendant is a so-called *individual*, i.e., a *citizen of the United States* and resident of the District of Columbia (political subdivisions are part of the District of Columbia). This is an allegation that, as far as this writer knows, goes unchallenged in every civil and criminal case against a *Union-state-born* American except those in which he assists. In respect thereof:

No United States District Judge or United States Attorney has ever failed to dismiss, summarily, any Federal case in which this writer has assisted, upon the filing into the record of the case of a single document (with attachments), prepared by this writer and signed and sworn to by the defendant, demonstrating that the defendant is neither an *individual* (citizen of the United States) nor a *resident of the United States* (District of Columbia), for lack of jurisdiction of the court.

An example of how one might go about producing evidence that he is neither an *individual* nor citizen or resident of the United States is found in the instrument entitled "Conditional Acceptance and Demand for Proof or Withdrawal of Claims" beginning on browser-page 7 of 17 in annexed Link 4, "Sample handling of a demand from a tax collector." See also addendum hereto for attachment entitled "General note re criminal charges under Title 18 USC."

The circuitry, ambiguity, and fraud inherent in all state/State (District of Columbia) and Federal (District of Columbia) statutes works equally effectively *against* the perpetrators as it does *for* them when presented in proper form.⁴⁷ To their credit, the judiciary do the right thing when presented with evidence and material facts demonstrating the meaning of key terms.

The solution offered herein to recover one's standing as a creator of the United States of America, on equal footing with *the good People of these Colonies* of July 4, 1776, and *We the People* of March 4, 1789, and natural right to travel as one thinks fit, without the need for official permission from government to do so, likewise is based on empirical results. Experience shows that law-enforcement officers conduct themselves equally as honorably as the judiciary upon realization they are bereft of evidence of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.

Having revealed that the actual constitutional authority for (1) the Government of the United States to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the personal information of *individuals* in DMV files, and (2) a "State" to exercise personal jurisdiction over *individuals* of its respective namesake *State of [Union-state]*, is not as advertised but Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2) thereof, we now turn our attention to the driving-privilege apparatus and remedy therefor.

⁴⁷The worldwide legal system runs not on *substance* but *form*, and extreme formalism is the rule.

Unalienable Right of Liberty.

I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!⁴⁸

Patrick Henry, 1775.

As this writer opines earlier (Link 3, browser-page 38), freedom is a function of responsibility and one is only as free as he is responsible. *Witness* Patrick Henry's sentiments regarding life under the policies of the goldsmith-bankers of the private Bank of England, enforced in the colonies by their debtor-servant tool, King George III of England. The same house of goldsmith-bankers today holds controlling interest in the Federal Reserve, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund—each of which private banks is domiciled in the District of Columbia.

Not everyone looks at life under British goldsmith-bankers, however, in terms of the same polar opposites as Patrick Henry. This discourse is tendered so *Union-state*-born Americans can recover the former, established July 4, 1776, and avoid the latter, peacefully, without violence.

The Declaration of Independence and Constitution authorize Congress to exercise, via "*the consent of the governed*" (Declaration of Independence, Preamble), the power of exclusive legislation over residents of the District of Columbia and other places/property belonging to the United States (Constitution, Articles 1 § 8(17), and 4 § 3(2)). Through the deceit of the Social Security retirement program, the District of Columbia municipal corporation exercises exclusive personal legislative power and jurisdiction over all Social Security account holders as residents, for certain legal purposes such as taxation and licensing, of the District of Columbia.

The *good People of these Colonies* of July 4, 1776, via the Declaration of Independence, to which the Constitution hews in letter and spirit for its validity, expressly guarantee *the People* certain unalienable Rights with which all men are endowed by their Creator, among which is **Liberty**; and *We the People* of March 4, 1789, ordain and establish the Constitution for the United States of America, "*in Order to . . . secure the Blessings of **Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity***" (U/L and bold emphasis added; Constitution, Preamble.).

Being that *Liberty* is the cornerstone of the American Republic, and that for which the Founding Fathers and Framers of the Constitution were *willing to die* to secure for themselves and their posterity (thee and me), let us revisit these concepts; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

unalienable . . . INALIENABLE [Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, inc. version 2.5, s.v. "Unalienable"]

inalienable . . . incapable of being alienated, surrendered, or transferred . . . [Ibid, s.v. "Inalienable"]

LIBERTY (Lat. *liber*, free; *libertas*, freedom, liberty). Freedom from restraint. The faculty of willing, and the power of doing what has been willed, without influence from without. . . .

Liberty, "on its positive side, denotes the fullness of individual existence ; on its negative side it denotes the necessary restraint on all, which is needed to promote the greatest possible amount of liberty for each." Amos, Science of Law p. 90. . . .

Natural liberty is the right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the manner they judge most consistent with their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the law of nature and so as not to interfere with an equal exercise of the same rights by other men. . . .

Personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing one's person to whatever place one's inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law. . . . [Emphasis added.] [Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. "Liberty"]

⁴⁸Patrick Henry (American statesman, 1736–1799), from a speech in the Virginia Convention, March 23, 1775, quoted in William Wirt, *Patrick Henry* (1818), section 4, quoted in *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, Elizabeth Knowles, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 371.

Natural liberty vs. personal liberty.

[The law of nature] “is the living embodiment of the collective reasoning of civilized mankind and as such is adopted by the common law in substance, though not always by name.”⁴⁹

Sir Frederick Pollock, 1904.

When the common law and statute law concur, the common law is to be preferred.⁵⁰

Under the distinctive political structure of the United States of America, neither the *good People of these Colonies* of July 4, 1776, nor *We the People* of March 4, 1789, nor their posterity are *persons* or *individuals* or the subject of statutes enacted by their servants in government.

Whereas, American residents of the District of Columbia and the territories consent to a life under the statutes, rules, and regulations of Congress, the American People residing in *Union-states* rather enjoy *natural liberty*, dispose of their persons and property as they see fit, as afforded by the common law, and enjoy *personal liberty* and the power of locomotion unmolested by their servants in government unless *by due course of law*, i.e., for alleged trespass, under the common law, against the rights of another.

No matter what other ideas you may have developed along the way about the American legal paradigm, the above is the quintessence—confirmation of which is the fact that, *without exception*, production of evidence by way of the practical instruments offered in this webpage, as prepared by this writer and signed and sworn to by *Union-state-born* American defendants, that contradicted and overcame the *prima facie* evidence of said defendants’ residence in the District of Columbia, resulted in immediate abandonment of all statutory claims/allegations and summary dismissal of each case for lack of jurisdiction.

As used in the Constitution the word “law” denotes the *common law*. Notwithstanding that the common law exists regardless of statutes, because of the District of Columbia municipal corporation’s *Social Security political movement*: Every *Union-state* government is a political subdivision of the District of Columbia and rules Social Security franchisees residing in that particular *Union-state* by statute, and every such *person* is a resident, for certain legal purposes, of the District of Columbia and the subject of all legislation therein. Evidence of this is the contemporary statutory abolition of common-law trespasses by “*this state*,” i.e., by the government of a particular political subdivision of the District of Columbia, such as the “*State of Kentucky*,” a measure not possible under the Constitution except in the District of Columbia and other places/property belonging to the United States over which Congress exercise power of exclusive legislation, via Articles 1 § 8(17) or 4 § 3(2) thereof; *to wit*:

Common law offenses are abolished and no act or omission shall constitute a criminal offense unless designated a crime or violation under this code or another statute of this state. . . . [Emphasis added.] [Kentucky Revised Statutes, Title L *Kentucky Penal Code* Chapter 500 *General Provisions* § 500.020 *Offenses defined by statute – Common law abolished* Subsection 1]

“State” [actual term is “state”] when applied to a part of the United States, includes territories, outlying possessions, and the District of Columbia; . . . [Emphasis added.] [Ibid, Title XLI *Laws* Chapter 446 *Construction of statutes* § 446.010 *Definitions for statutes generally* Subsection 37]

⁴⁹Sir Frederick Pollock, *The Expansion of the Common Law* (London: Stevens and Sons, Limited, 1904), 128, quoted in *Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Law of Nature.”

⁵⁰*Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

The law of nature.

Despite usurpation mid-19th century of the political government of the United States of America by goldsmith-bankers of the private Bank of England and their relentless assault on “*the collective reasoning of civilized mankind,*” the *law of nature* abides in the American People; *to wit*:

LAW OF NATURE. That which God, the sovereign of the universe, has prescribed to all men, not by any formal promulgation, but by the internal dictate of reason alone. It is discovered by a just consideration of the agreeableness or the disagreeableness of human actions to the nature of man ; and it comprehends all the duties which we owe either to the Supreme Being, to ourselves, or to our neighbors : as, reverence to God, self-defence, temperance, honor to our parents, benevolence to all, a strict adherence to our engagements, gratitude, and the like. . . .

The divine will, or the dictate of right reason, showing the moral deformity or moral necessity there is in any act, according to its suitableness or unsuitableness to a reasonable nature. Sometimes used of the law of human reason, in contradistinction to the revealed law, and sometimes of both, in contradistinction to positive law. . . .

They are independent of any artificial connections, and differ from mere presumptions of law in this essential respect, that the latter depend on and are a branch of the particular system of jurisprudence to which they belong ; but mere natural presumptions are derived wholly by means of the common experience of mankind, without the aid or control of any particular rule of law, but simply from the course of nature and the habits of society. These presumptions fall within the exclusive province of the jury, who are to pass upon the facts. . . .

The primitive laws of nature may be reduced to six, namely : comparative sagacity, or reason ; self-love ; the attraction of the sexes to each other ; the tenderness of parents towards their children ; the religious sentiment ; sociability.

When a man is properly organized he is able to distinguish moral good from moral evil ; and the study of man proves not only that man is an intelligent but a free being, and he is, therefore, responsible for his actions. The judgment we form of our good actions produces happiness ; on the contrary, the judgment we form of our bad actions produces unhappiness.

Every animated being is impelled by nature to his own preservation, to defend his life and body from injuries, to shun what may be hurtful, and to provide all things requisite to his existence. Hence the duty to watch over his own preservation. Suicide and dueling are, therefore, contrary to his law ; and a man cannot mutilate himself, nor renounce his liberty.

The attraction of the sexes has been provided for the preservation of the human race ; and this law condemns celibacy. The end of marriage proves that polygamy and polyandry are contrary to the law of nature. Hence it follows that the husband and the wife have a mutual and exclusive right over each other.

Man from birth is wholly unable to provide for the least of his necessities ; but the love of his parents supplies for this weakness. This is one of the most powerful laws of nature. The principal duties it imposes on the parents are to bestow on the child all the care its weakness requires, to provide for its necessary food and clothing, to instruct it, to provide for its wants, and to use coercive means for its good, when requisite.

The religious sentiment which leads us naturally towards the Supreme Being is one of the attributes which belong to humanity alone ; and its importance gives it the rank of the moral law of nature. From this sentiment arise all the sects and different forms of worship among men.

The need which man feels to live in society is one of the primitive laws of nature whence flow our duties and rights ; and the existence of society depends upon the condition that the rights of all shall be respected. On this law are based the assistance, succors, and good offices which men owe to each other, they being unable to provide each every thing for himself.

In the Middle Ages, the law of nature, identified by Gratian with the law of God, was regarded by the canonists and civilians as the reasonable basis of all law. In English law not so much is heard of the law of nature. The work done elsewhere by it was done in England by “reason.” . . . It is the living embodiment of the collective reasoning of civilized mankind and as such is adopted by the common law in substance, though not always by name. [*Bouvier’s*, 8th ed., s.v. “Law of nature”]

The Social Security political movement.

Whereas, it is indisputable that the supreme organic instrument of creation of the United States of America has all essential elements of what is defined in law as a *trust*,⁵¹ the trustees named therein, Congress, are contractually obligated to manage/administer in behalf of the beneficiaries thereof, i.e., *the People*, the trust property, i.e., the Confederation, in good faith and in accordance with and fidelity to the letter and spirit of said trust agreement/declaration of trust, namely *The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America* of July 4, 1776.

As of the Act of February 21, 1871, Congress depart the de jure operation of government as contemplated in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution and incorporate the District of Columbia for political purposes (*infra*, n. 56). The *Social Security political movement* is their primary device for the usurpation/seizure of the life, liberty, and property of the trust beneficiaries, the American People, in behalf of the goldsmith-banker owners of the private Federal Reserve.⁵²

Prior to Social Security, Supreme Court Justices refer to the American People as *sovereigns*⁵³ and *nontaxpayers*⁵⁴ and America has only *peace officers*,⁵⁵ whose job is to keep the peace under the common law. Upon arrival of the *Social Security political movement* in 1935, Americans begin “volunteering” en masse at an increasing rate to assume the status of *taxpayer*, and soon thereafter registering as a type of latent criminal known as a *driver*, and paying a fee for the “privilege” of using a car, “voluntarily” placing themselves in constant danger of fines or arrest at the hands of *law enforcement officers* for alleged violation of driving regulations.

Until 1935 the Government of the United States—a/k/a Government of the District of Columbia—exercises personal jurisdiction over about 1% of the American population. Today nearly every American over the age of 18 is a card-carrying member of the *Social Security political movement*, legal resident of the District of Columbia, and licensed driver.

Municipal corporations, motor vehicles, and licenses.

Congressional provision for “*a district of territory . . . for the permanent seat of the government of the United States*” appears in the Act of July 16, 1790 (1 Stat. 130), is referred to unofficially as the Territory of Columbia, and is later given the official name *District of Columbia* in the Act of May 6, 1796 (1 Stat. 461).

Governments have the prerogative to create, for political purposes, municipal corporations that have their own subordinate powers of legislation within the territory of such municipality; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. A public corporation, created by government for political purposes, and having subordinate and local powers of legislation . . . [*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Municipal corporation”]

⁵¹Nelson, *Purging America of the Matrix*, 2–7.

⁵²Nelson, *Why the 14th Amendment is a political Trojan horse*, 14–27.

⁵³[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects . . . and have none to govern but themselves . . . *Chisholm v. Georgia*, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 472 (1793).

The sovereignty of the United States resides in the people, and Congress cannot invoke the sovereignty of the people to override their will as declared in the Constitution. . . . *Perry v. United States*, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).

⁵⁴The revenue laws are a code or system in regulation of tax assessment and collection. They relate to taxpayers, and not to nontaxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No procedure is prescribed for nontaxpayers, and no attempt is made to annul any of their rights and remedies in due course of law. With them Congress does not assume to deal, and they are neither of the subject nor of the object of the revenue laws. *Long v. Rasmussen*, [9 Cir.] D.C.Mont. 1922, 281 F. 236.

⁵⁵The first appearance of the term “law enforcement officer” in an American law dictionary is 1951: *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 4th ed., s.v. “Law enforcement officer.”

The Act of February 21, 1871, provides, in pertinent part:

Be it enacted . . . That all that part of the territory of the United States included within the limits of the District of Columbia be, and the same is hereby, created into a government by the name of the District of Columbia, by which name it is hereby constituted a body corporate for municipal purposes, and may contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, plea and be impleaded, have a seal, and exercise all other powers of a municipal corporation . . .

SEC. 18. *And be it further enacted*, That the legislative power of the District shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within said District . . .⁵⁶ [Emphasis added.]

As of February 21, 1871, “District of Columbia” may mean any one of three different things; which, exactly, applies, however, is indeterminable unless expressly stated; *to wit*:

1. Name of the territory comprising the *seat* of the Government of the United States⁵⁷;
2. Name of the government created out of the *territory* comprising the seat of the Government of the United States; and
3. Name of the municipal corporation constituted (for political purposes) from the *name* of the government created out of the territory comprising the seat of the Government of the United States.

As demonstrated hereinabove, the Title 18 USC definition of the term “State” and every *Union-state*-statute’s definition of the term “state” equates to one thing: the *District of Columbia*.

The District of Columbia requires that residents thereof who wish to pursue their respective profession or calling within said municipality obtain a license for the privilege of doing so.

Any American entitled to receive retirement or survivor benefits under the Social Security retirement program of the Government of the United States is:

- a member of the class defined as *Federal personnel* and a *United States Government employee*;
- an *individual*;
- a *person*;
- a citizen of the *United States*, also known as the *District of Columbia*;
- *domiciled* in and a *resident* of the District of Columbia; and
- the subject of all legislation within the District of Columbia, whether *national* or *municipal*; *to wit*:

the term “Federal personnel” means officers and employees of the Government of the United States, members of the uniformed services (including members of the Reserve Components), individuals entitled to receive immediate or deferred retirement benefits under any retirement program of the Government of the United States (including survivor benefits). [Emphasis added.] [5 USC *Government Organization and Employees Part I The Agencies Generally* Chapter 5 *Administrative Procedure* Subchapter II *Administrative Procedure* § 552a *Records maintained on individuals* Subsection (a)(13)]

⁵⁶“An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” Ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” Ch. 180, Sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, i.e., § 2 of the *Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873-’74*); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, Ch. 332, Sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

⁵⁷Constitution, Article 1 § 8(17).

the term “individual” means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence; . . . [Ibid, Subsection (a)(2)]

“person” includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency; . . . [Emphasis added.] [Ibid, § 551 Definitions Subsection 2]

“United States” means— (A) a Federal [municipal] corporation; . . . [Emphasis added.] [Title 28 USC Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Part VI Particular Proceedings Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure Subchapter A Definitions and General Provisions § 3002 Definitions Subsection 15)

domicile . . . *noun* . . . the place with which a person has a settled connection for important legal purposes (as determination of his civil status, jurisdiction to impose personal judgments or taxes on him . . . [Emphasis added.] [*Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Domicile”])

Residence. The act or fact of living in a given place for some time. . . . *Residence usu.* just means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place; *domicile usu.* requires bodily presence plus an intention to make the place one’s home. A person thus may have more than one residence at a time, but only one domicile. Sometimes, though, the two terms are used synonymously. Cf. DOMICILE. . . . [U/L emphasis added.] [*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Residence”]

domicile . . . “domicile . . . is a conception of law employed for the purpose of establishing a connection for certain legal purposes between an individual and the legal system of the territory with which he . . . has . . . because of his dependence on some other person.” R.H. Graveson, *Conflict of Laws* 185, 7th ed. 1974.

The residence of a person or corporation for legal purposes. Also termed . . . *legal residence.* . . . [U/L emphasis added.] [Ibid, s.v. “Domicile”]

SEC. 18. *And be it further enacted*, That the legislative power of the District shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within said District . . . [*Supra*, n. 56]

There exists no provision in any code/statute of any *Union-state* relating to motor vehicles or the licensing of the activity of the operation of motor vehicles that defines any *Union-state* to be a state of the United States.

The only *state*—as the term “state” is defined in the Driver License Compact—*of the United States* that is a subscribing member of the Driver License Compact is the District of Columbia.

The Driver License Compact provides that the District of Columbia is the only *state of the United States* with the power and authority to (1) issue a license or permit to operate a motor vehicle, or (2) suspend or revoke the use of any license or permit to operate a motor vehicle.

The definition of the term “state” in the code/statutes relating to motor vehicles and the licensing of the activity of the operation of motor vehicles of the five *Union-states* declining membership in the Driver License Compact is (1) substantially the same as that in each of the corresponding statute of the 45 subscribing-member *Union-states*, and (2) omits to include in said definition, as a *state of the United States*, any *Union-state*.

Every *Union-state* government is a political subdivision, and every DMV situate within the exterior limits of a particular *Union-state* an instrumentality, of the District of Columbia.

Regarding residents of the District of Columbia, the controlling definition of the term “motor vehicle” in all Federal and State statutes is found in the criminal code, Title 18 USC; *to wit*:

Motor vehicle.— The term “motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo. . . . [Emphasis added.] [18 USC *Crimes and Criminal Procedure* Part I *Crimes* Chapter 2 *Aircraft and Motor Vehicles* § 31 *Definitions* Subsection (a)(6)]

driver's license. The state-issued certificate authorizing a person to operate a motor vehicle. [Emphasis added.] [*Black's Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. "Driver's license"]

LICENSE (Lat. *licere*, to permit).

In real property law. A permission. A right, given by some competent authority to do an act, which without such authority would be illegal, or a tort [⁵⁸] or trespass. . . .

In contracts. A permission to do some act which, if lawful, would otherwise be a trespass or tort ; the evidence of such permission when it is in writing. . . .

In international law. Permission granted by a belligerent state to its own subjects, or to the subjects of the enemy, or to neutrals to carry on a trade interdicted by war. . . .

In pleading. A plea of justification to an action of trespass, that the defendant was authorized by the owner of the [real property] to commit the trespass complained of. . . .

In governmental regulation. Authority to do some act or carry on some trade or business, in its nature lawful but prohibited by statute, except with the permission of the civil authority or which would otherwise be unlawful.

A license to carry on a business or trade is an official permit to carry on the same or perform other acts forbidden by law except to persons obtaining such permit. . . .

A license of this sort is a personal privilege . . .

A license fee is a tax . . . which a state may impose on all citizens within its borders . . .

When the power is exercised by municipal corporations, a license is the requirement, by the municipality, of the payment of a certain sum by a person for the privilege of pursuing his profession or calling, whether harmful or innocent, for the *general* purpose of producing a reliable source of revenue.

If the occupation is *harmful*, the sum paid for its prosecution may be said to be a license fee ; but if *innocent*, it is a license tax. . . . Where the occupation is not dangerous to the public, either directly or incidentally, it cannot be subjected to any police regulation which does not fall within the power of taxation . . . In the regulation of occupations harmful to the public, it is constitutional to require those who apply for a license to pay a reasonable sum to defray the expense of issuing the license and maintaining the proper supervision. . . . [U/L emphasis added.] [*Bouvier's Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. "License"]

Wherefore, as *Union-state* statutes define the term "state," and Title 18 USC, "State":

- The states/States of the United States are the 20 *territories* over which Congress have power of exclusive legislation;
- No *Union-state* is a state/State of the United States;
- The only state/State of the United States that is a party to the Driver License Compact is the District of Columbia;
- The statutes of Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Tennessee, and Wisconsin relating to the licensing of drivers are substantially the same as those of the 45 *Union-state* members of the Driver License Compact, and likewise provide no *Union-state* with the power to issue, suspend, or revoke a license or permit to operate a motor vehicle;
- The sole authority with power to issue, suspend, or revoke a license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in America is the District of Columbia;
- The domicile and residence, for legal purposes such as taxation and licensing, of every Social Security franchisee is the District of Columbia;

⁵⁸TORT. Wrong ; injury ; the opposite of right. So called, according to Lord Coke, because it is *wrested*, or crooked, being contrary to that which is right and straight. . . .

In modern practice, *tort* is constantly used as an English word to denote a wrong or wrongful act for which an action will lie, as distinguished from a contract. . . .

A tort is a legal wrong committed upon the person or property independent of contract. . . . [*Black's Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. "Tort"]

- Every Social Security franchisee is a *person* and *individual* and the subject of all legislation in the District of Columbia;
- The only type of license issued by the District of Columbia or one of the *50 States* (political subdivisions), whether by way of governmental regulation or municipal-corporation legislation, is an *occupational license*⁵⁹ in the form of a certificate;
- A *person* who wishes to use a *motor vehicle* “for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo” must pay a certain sum, called a *license fee*, to a Department/Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) in the District of Columbia or one of the 50 political subdivisions thereof, for the privilege of pursuing his profession/calling as a *driver*⁶⁰ and obtain official permission in the nature of a *contract* and in the form of an *occupational license*, a *driving certificate* called a *driver’s* or *operator’s license*;
- “The activity [profession] licensed by . . . DMVs . . . the operation of motor vehicles” (Janet Reno, *supra* n. 1), i.e., the *activity/profession* of *driving*, is a *harmful activity/profession* and subject to police regulation;
- As regards residents of the District of Columbia, such as Social Security franchisees, the controlling definition of the term “motor vehicle” is 18 USC § 31(a)(6);
- Any “description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power” whose identifying information is in a *motor vehicle record*⁶¹ is a *motor vehicle*;
- *Motor vehicles* are used exclusively “for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo”; and
- Any and all expenses relating to a *person’s* profession/occupation in the operation of *motor vehicles* as a *driver* are business expenses for income-tax purposes.⁶²

⁵⁹Shortly after principals of the private Bank of England secure control of Congress (mid-19th century), in “An Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government and to pay interest on the Public Debt,” Ch. 119, §§ 57–64, 12 Stat. 432, July 1, 1862, Congress, during the *War Between the States*, make their first big move in licensing and require a license tax/fee of residents of the District of Columbia and the territories for the privilege of pursuing any of hundreds of ordinary *occupations* in 33 different general areas of production/commerce.

⁶⁰D.C. Regulations and D.C. Register (a different body of law than District of Columbia Code, Title 50 *Motor and Non-Motor Vehicles and Traffic*), Secretary of the District of Columbia, Office of Documents and Administrative Issuances, Title 18 *Vehicles and Traffic* Chapter 18-3 *Cancellation, Suspension, or Revocation of Licenses* Rule 18-310 *Limited Occupational Licenses* provides that a *person* whose *occupational license* of *driver* is revoked, suspended, or canceled may make application for a *limited occupational license* to continue his *occupation* on a limited basis despite such revocation, suspension; or cancellation; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

310 Limited Occupational Licenses

[A] person whose . . . driver's license . . . is revoked, suspended or canceled may request, in writing, that the order be modified to allow the issuance [*in the case of a canceled license*] or retention [*in the case of a revoked or suspended license*] of a driver's license or privilege on a limited basis. . . . [§ 310.1]

[T]he applicant for an occupational license must show to the satisfaction of the examiner that loss of operating privileges precludes carrying out the applicant’s normal . . . occupation, and that driving is necessary to support the applicant and his or her family. . . . [§ 310.2]

If the applicant operates a commercial vehicle [*i.e., if the person’s occupation is that of driver*] . . . the application shall be accompanied by a written request from the applicant’s employer that the license be issued. [Emphasis added.] [§ 310.5]

⁶¹“motor vehicle record” means any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator’s permit, motor vehicle title, motor vehicle registration, or identification card issued by a department of motor vehicles. 18 USC *Crimes and Criminal Procedure* Part I *Crimes* Chapter 123 *Prohibition on Release and Use of certain Personal Information from State Motor Vehicle Records* § 2725 *Definitions* Subsection (1).

⁶²*Cujus per errorem dati repetitio est, ejus consulto dati donatio est. Whoever pays by mistake what he does not owe, may recover it back; but he who pays, knowing he owes nothing; is presumed to give.*

All persons must register a new carriage/contrivance with the DMV and obtain a driver's license to use it.

Union-state statutes obtain only against *persons*, i.e., Social Security franchisees; *to wit*, in pertinent part:

Application for the original or renewal registration of a vehicle of a type required to be registered under this code shall be made by the owner to the department upon the appropriate form furnished by it and shall contain all of the following . . . [Emphasis added.] [California Code *Vehicle Code* Division 3 *Registration of Vehicles and Certificates of Title* Article 2 *Owner Registration* § 4150]

An “owner” is a person having all the incidents of ownership, including the legal title of a vehicle . . . [Emphasis added.] [Ibid, Division 1 *Words and Phrases Defined* § 460]

A “driver's license” is a valid license to drive the type of motor vehicle . . . for which a person is licensed under this code . . . [Emphasis added.] [Ibid, § 310]

From whence “motor vehicles” come.

Title 15 USC *Commerce and Trade* Chapter 28 *Disclosure of Automobile Information* § 1231 *Definitions* provides, in pertinent part (Emphasis added in all citations.):

The term “person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, business trust, or any organized group of persons. [15 USC *Commerce and Trade* Chapter 28 *Disclosure of Automobile Information* § 1231 *Definitions* Subsection (b)]

The term “automobile” includes any passenger car or station wagon. [Ibid, Subsection (c)]

The term “new automobile” means an automobile the equitable [exposé thereof *infra*] or legal title to which has never been transferred by a manufacturer, distributor, or dealer to an ultimate purchaser. [Ibid, Subsection (d)]

The term “dealer” shall mean any person resident or located in the United States or any Territory thereof or in the District of Columbia engaged in the sale or the distribution of new automobiles to the ultimate purchaser. [Ibid, Subsection (e)]

The term “ultimate purchaser” means, with respect to any new automobile, the first person, other than a dealer purchasing in his capacity as a dealer, who in good faith purchases such new automobile for purposes other than resale. [Ibid, § Subsection (g)]

Every new “*carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power*” is the property of the manufacturer and comes with a document of title called a “Certificate of Origin for a Vehicle,” “Manufacturer’s Certificate of Origin,” etc. (“certificate of ownership” in statutes) bearing its particular identifying information. **This certificate is the actual title of the new carriage/contrivance.** (See Addendum for a copy of such instrument.) Said title also transfers to the distributor or dealer, the “owner,” what is called *equitable title* thereto, to be held in trust by said distributor/dealer (“owner”) until sale to the *initial* “ultimate purchaser” (original buyer).

Whereas, the *motor vehicle* paradigm is in the nature of a *constructive trust* and operates as a *passive trust*, wherein rights are enforceable solely in *equity* (all of which terms, and others, are defined *infra*) and ignorance of such things opens the door for abuse, it would behoove any potential victim of such confidence game to familiarize himself with the subject.⁶³ The elements involved in the creation of any trust are *trustor*, *trust property*, *trustee*, and *beneficiary* (and, sometimes, *trust protector*); *to wit*:

⁶³Even though the law dictionaries define terms in the fields of *trusts* and *equity*, these are esoteric subjects not intended for general consumption (*to wit*: the American People are not aware that the nature of *the United States of America* is a trust) and, many times, as much can be ascertained from what is omitted as what is expressed.

trust, *n.* . . . The right, enforceable solely in equity, [*infra*] to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which another person holds the legal title; a property interest held by one person (the trustee) at the request of another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third party (the beneficiary). For a trust to be valid, it must involve specific property, reflect the settlor's intent, and be created for a lawful purpose. . . .

"[A] trust involves three elements, namely, (1) a trustee, who holds the trust property and is subject to equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of another; (2) a beneficiary, to whom the trustee owes equitable duties to deal with the trust property for his benefit; (3) trust property, which is held by the trustee for the beneficiary." Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 cmt. h (1959). . . . [Emphasis added.] [*Black's Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. "Trust"]

—Constructive trust. . . . Wherever the circumstances of a transaction are such that the person who takes the legal estate [⁶⁴] in property cannot also enjoy the beneficial interest without necessarily violating some established principle of equity, the court will immediately raise a *constructive trust*, and fasten it upon the conscience of the legal owner, [defined *infra*] so as to convert him into a trustee for the parties who in equity are entitled to the beneficial enjoyment. . . . [Ibid, 2nd ed., s.v. "Trust."]

"A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee." *Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co.*, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.) [Ibid, 7th ed., s.v. "Trust"]

passive trust. A trust in which the trustee has no duty other than to transfer the property to the beneficiary. . . . [Ibid]

The scheme works as follows (terms underlined defined *infra*):

The *trustor/settlor* (manufacturer) vests equitable title of the *trust property* (new carriage/contrivance) in a *trustee* (distributor/dealer), to be held in *trust* for another person, the *beneficiary* (ultimate purchaser).⁶⁵ Upon sale of the new carriage/contrivance to the initial ultimate purchaser, the *trustee* (distributor/dealer)—without disclosing the details of the process to the initial ultimate purchaser—transfers the *title* (provided by the manufacturer) to the DMV (District of Columbia), who is now the legal owner of the carriage/contrivance and holds legal title thereto, for the benefit of another, the *beneficiary* (original buyer), who is the beneficial owner of the *trust property* (new carriage/contrivance) and receives a certificate of title from the legal owner, the DMV (District of Columbia), as evidence thereof; *to wit, in pertinent part* (*U/L emphasis added in all citations*):

equitable title. A title that indicates a beneficial interest in property that gives the holder the right to acquire formal legal title. [*Black's Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. "Title"]

legal owner. One recognized by law as the owner of something; esp., one who holds legal title to property for the benefit of another. [Ibid, s.v. "Owner"]

legal title. A title that evidences apparent ownership but does not necessarily signify full and complete title or a beneficial interest. [Ibid, s.v. "Title"]

beneficial owner. . . . One recognized in equity [*infra*] as the owner of something because use and title belong to that person, even though legal title may belong to someone else; esp., one for whom property is held in trust. — Also termed *equitable owner*. . . . [Ibid, s.v. "Owner"]

certificate of title. A document indicating ownership of real or personal property. . . . [Ibid, s.v. "Certificate of title"]

⁶⁴Further, estates may be *legal* or *equitable*. The former is that kind of estate which is properly cognizable in the courts of common law . . . *Black's Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. "Estate."

⁶⁵The reason the manufacturer is willing to vest *equitable title* in the dealer is to allow for the sale of as many new carriages/contrivances as possible without the distributor/dealer having to come out-of-pocket up front and pay in-full for each new carriage/contrivance in order to realize the opportunity to display and sell it, allowing the initial ultimate purchaser to provide the funds therefor, a facility that serves the manufacturer well.

The above process is a permutation of the ancient *cestui que trust* (defined *infra*). In the above analysis the initial ultimate purchaser, the original buyer of the new carriage/contrivance, is the *cestui que trust*; the District of Columbia, via its instrumentality, the DMV, the trustee; *to wit*:

cestui que trust . . . Etymology: Anglo-French, literally he for whom (the) trust (is held) : a person who has the equitable and beneficial interest in property the legal interest in which is vested in a trustee [Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, inc. version 2.5, s.v. "Cestui que trust"]

trustee . . . One who, having legal title to property, holds it in trust for the benefit of another and owes a fiduciary duty to that beneficiary. . . . [Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., s.v. "Trustee"]

The distributor/dealer ("owner") transfers the original title (received from the manufacturer) of the new carriage/contrivance to the DMV (District of Columbia), by "equitable assignment," defined, in pertinent part, as follows:

equitable assignment . . . an assignment that is not recognizable at law but will be enforced in equity subject to equities Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, inc. version 2.5, s.v. "Equitable assignment."

The "altruistic" and cloying⁶⁶ content of, and surfeit⁶⁷ of adjectives in, the definition of "equity" is evidence that its implementation comes by way of force, for the benefit of a powerful private special-interest group (goldsmith-bankers). Antecedents of the *cestui que trust* trace to ancient Rome, from whence its effects are seen to expand by orders of magnitude in France, England, and now America. What we know as *equity* comes into full bloom under the goldsmith-bankers of the private Bank of England and private Federal Reserve, each domiciled in the territory of a municipal corporation, the latter of both bank and municipal corporation modeled after the former, as facilitated by the successors of the cadre of French attorneys accompanying William the Barbarian of Normandy to England in 1066 A.D.; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

equity 1 a : a free and reasonable conformity to accepted standards of natural right, law, and justice without prejudice, favoritism, or fraud and without rigor entailing undue hardship : justice according to natural law or right : FAIRNESS . . . *specifically* : IMPARTIALITY . . . b : something that conforms to the principle of equity (as an equitable act) : an instance of equity . . .

2 a : a system of law (as in England and the United States) . . . and comprising a settled and formal body of legal and procedural rules and doctrines that supplement, aid, or override common and statute law and are designed to protect rights and enforce duties fixed by substantive law . . . b : trial or remedial justice under or by the rules and doctrines of equity administered in a separate court (as in some states) or in a court of law as in the federal court system c : a body of legal doctrines and rules (as the Roman praetorian law [⁶⁸]) developed to enlarge, supplement, or override a system of law that has become too narrow and rigid in its scope; *specifically* : a set of rules or treaties accepted or acknowledged in international relations as imposing certain obligations in the mutual conduct of affairs between politically organized peoples

3 a : a right, claim, or interest existing or valid in equity . . . b : the money value of a property or of an interest in a property in excess or claims or liens (as mortgaged indebtedness) against it c : a risk interest or ownership in property; *specifically* : EQUITY SECURITY . . . [Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, inc. version 2.5, s.v. "Equity"]

⁶⁶cloying . . . *adjective* : having an excess of a quality (as sweetness or sentimentality) to the point of arousing distaste or disgust. . . . Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, inc. version 2.5, s.v. "Cloying."

⁶⁷surfeit . . . *noun* . . . an overabundant supply, yield, or amount of something : EXCESS, SUPERFLUITY . . . Ibid, s.v. "Surfeit."

⁶⁸praetor . . . an ancient Roman magistrate ranking below a consul Ibid, s.v. "Praetor."

praetorian law . . . *Roman law* : a system of equity developed by the praetors after their acquisition about 149 B.C. of criminal jurisdiction providing for their right to allow an action not provided for by law, their right to disallow an action that would strictly lie by the *jus civile*, [civil law, Ibid, s.v. "Jus civile"] and their right to allow an equitable defense where no defense was provided by law Ibid, s.v. "Praetorian law."

Upon sale of a new carriage/contrivance to an original buyer the dealer, as “owner,” makes *equitable assignment*, and transmits to the DMV the manufacturer’s title and fees, whereupon DMV personnel lodge in a *motor vehicle record* (*supra*, n. 61) the personal information of the original buyer and identifying information of the carriage/contrivance, showing that said original buyer is the “registered owner” and, if the transaction is financed by a third party, that the lender is the lien holder. At this point the said carriage/contrivance is a *motor vehicle*—legal title to which is held by the DMV (instrumentality of the state/State: District of Columbia). DMV personnel then (1) create and mail to the registered owner (or registered owner and lien holder, respectively) the “Certificate of Registration” and “Certificate of Title” re the new motor vehicle, and (2) microfilm the dealer-endorsed original title from the manufacturer and destroy it.

The subject *motor vehicle record* (DMV file) is the ultimate repository of the identifying information (Vehicle Identification Number, Engine Number, etc.) of said carriage/contrivance. Custody of said identifying information, which also is affixed to the said motor vehicle, gives the DMV (District of Columbia), as legal owner, power of ultimate disposition of the motor vehicle.

If an officer or employee of the state/State (District of Columbia) is unable to locate the identifying information of a particular carriage/contrivance in a motor vehicle record, the state/State has no right thereto, in law or in equity; nor personal jurisdiction over the motorist unless he/she is a *person* and *individual*, such as a “licensed driver,” and a resident, for legal purposes, of the District of Columbia and the subject of all legislation therein, such as the statutes of a particular political subdivision of the District of Columbia, the so-called *State of [Union-state]*.

Should the registered owner (Social Security franchisee) fail to pay the registration fees, parking tickets, etc. of a motor vehicle registered in his/her name, an agent of the state/State (District of Columbia) can cite and seize and impound the motor vehicle for sale at auction in order to raise the funds needed to discharge the unpaid fees. Should a registered owner neglect to insure said motor vehicle, he/she can be fined and the motor vehicle likewise seized and sold.

Wherefore: The *Social Security political movement* is isolationist, exclusionary, prejudicial, and barbaric by nature and Americans who are not members thereof have no business using any property, such as a motor vehicle, legal title to which is held by the District of Columbia for the exclusive use of Social Security franchisees; outsiders should stick to those descriptions “*of carriage or contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power*” for which they hold the certificate of ownership from the manufacturer (meaning they must pay in full for a new car), whose identifying information is not lodged in a motor vehicle record, and never allow a *person* (Social Security franchisee), whether any such person holds an occupational license to operate a motor vehicle or not—to use his/her own carriage/contrivance (private property) for any reason.

Actual encounters with law-enforcement.

De non apparentibus et non existntibus eadem est ratio. The reason is the same respecting things which do not appear, and those which do not exist.

Idem est non probari et non esse; non deficit jus, sed probatio. What does not appear and what is not is the same; it is not the defect of the law, but the want of proof.

Whereas, under equity a motor vehicle can be used on the highways only by a *person* (Social Security franchisee) with a “*valid license to drive the type of motor vehicle for which a person is licensed,*” under common law a carriage/contrivance whose identifying information is inscribed on the actual title thereof, which is in the possession of the owner—and not lodged in a motor vehicle record—can be used just like any other article of private property with impunity.

In multiple incidents in which a motorist traveling on a public highway in a carriage/contrivance that had never been registered with a DMV, was stopped by a traffic officer and asked for “license, registration, and proof of insurance,” having none of the requested articles the motorist produced other ID and original title of the carriage/contrivance from the manufacturer. Upon the respective officer’s failure to receive from his co-workers confirmation that the motorist was subject to licensing (personal jurisdiction) or the carriage/contrivance’s identifying information lodged in a motor vehicle record (subject-matter jurisdiction), the officer’s response in each instance was to proclaim (verbatim) “*This car does not exist,*”⁶⁹ and then politely excuse himself and depart. It is important to note, however, that at no point in this particular motorist’s life had he obtained a driver’s license in his name.

If a law-enforcement officer can make no determination that (1) the subject “*carriage or contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power*” is a *motor vehicle* whose identifying information is lodged in a *motor vehicle record*, or (2) the motorist a *person / individual / driver* and the subject of all legislation within the state/State (District of Columbia), there is no law to enforce and no basis for an alleged violation of a statute.

Notwithstanding that the government, legal system, and media effectively have insinuated the sovereign constituency of the United States of America of July 4, 1776, out of existence, there nevertheless are constituents left and more and more are recovering their original standing every day via execution of that certain instrument beginning on browser-page 40 of Link 3, *Purging America of the Matrix*, and extinguishing the Social Security contract and franchise by rescission, as authorized by law, by reason of the giving of consent by mistake and recovering their original standing (the Order to the postmaster is an essential part of the process).

In the only instance with a negative outcome, the circumstances were identical to the others in every respect except that the motorist also happened to be a licensed driver and produced for the officer’s inspection a *driver’s license*. Whereupon, the officer arrested the *driver / natural person / person / individual / citizen of the United States / Social Security franchisee / United States Government employee / taxpayer / resident of the District of Columbia / subject of all Federal and state/State legislation* and took him to jail and seized and impounded the carriage/contrivance, never to be seen again by the said/ *driver / natural person / person / individual*.

Thereafter, the said *driver / natural person / person / individual* agreed to pay fines amounting to a little over \$900 in order to avoid a trial for his “crimes.”

Translation: Law-enforcement officers must discover evidence of a material fact, such as a Vehicle Identification Number, in a state/State motor vehicle record that matches the serial number affixed to the carriage/contrivance before him, or a valid or DMV-suspended/-revoked “driver’s license” belonging to the motorist behind the wheel, that demonstrates that said motorist is the subject of state/State (District of Columbia) statutes regulating the “activity” (occupation) of “the operation of motor vehicles” (driving), before any such officer will exercise personal jurisdiction and charge a motorist (issue a traffic citation) or arrest him for an offense in the nature of a “crime.”

Technically, the motorist is under arrest as soon as the traffic officer hits his emergency lights; but mistakes are forgivable in law, even for law-enforcement officers, and as long as the officer does not attempt any further exercise of personal jurisdiction following his failure to discover evidence of a “crime,” i.e., material facts demonstrating that the carriage/contrivance is a *motor vehicle* or the motorist a *person*, and does not detain the motorist unduly thereafter, any such mistake is forgivable.

Once a fraud, always a fraud.⁷⁰

Once a motor vehicle, always a motor vehicle.

Once an individual/person based on mistake or fraud, never an individual/person.

⁶⁹In a particular legal matter or proceeding, that which is not admissible in evidence does not exist.

⁷⁰*Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

Procedure to extinguish the driver's license.

Error qui non resistitur, approbatur. An error not resisted is approved.

Errores ad sua principia referre, est refellere. To refer errors to their origin is to refute them.

The authority to pursue one's profession (occupation) in the activity of the operation of motor vehicles is a *privilege* evidenced by a *driving certificate*, called a "driver's license"; *to wit*:

certificate . . . a document certifying the bearer's status or authorization to act in a specified way <nursing certificate> . . . [Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., s.v. "Certificate"]

driver's license. The state-issued certificate authorizing a person to operate a motor vehicle. [Ibid, s.v. "Driver's license"]

A driver's license is in the nature a *contract* and agreement, (1) on the part of the *person*, to observe, as a *driver*, the state/State statutes relating to the operation of motor vehicles, and (2) on the part of "this state" (District of Columbia), to allow the said *person* the privilege of pursuing his profession or calling (occupation) in the operation of motor vehicles as a *driver* without undue interruption or molestation so long as the *person* observes the statutes of "this state" (District of Columbia) relating to the operation of motor vehicles: *to wit*:

A contract is an agreement to do or not to do a certain thing. [California Code *Civil Code* Division 3 *Obligations* Part 2 *Contracts* Title 1 *Nature of a Contract* Chapter 1 *Definition* § 1549]

A *person* who wishes to drive any "*description of carriage or contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power*" must obtain a driver's license to enjoy the privilege of doing so.

Any American who submits, under *mistake* (erroneous belief) that he/she is a *person*, an application for the privilege of pursuing his/her profession (occupation) in the operation of motor vehicles as a driver (driving privilege) and consents to terms and obtains the *driving certificate* (occupational license) authorizing such "activity" (occupation), may extinguish the said contract by rescission and terminate his/her relation with the District of Columbia (DMV) through voluntary surrender of the said certificate so obtained; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be . . . Parties capable of contracting . . . Their consent . . . [Ibid § 1550]

The consent of the parties to a contract must be . . . Free . . . [Ibid, Chapter 3 *Consent* § 1565]

An apparent consent is not real or free when obtained through . . . Mistake. [Ibid, § 1567]

Mistake of fact is a mistake, not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the person making the mistake, and consisting in:

1. An unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact past or present, material to the contract; or,
2. Belief in the present existence of a thing material to the contract, which does not exist, or in the past existence of such a thing, which has not existed. [Emphasis added.] [Ibid § 1577]

A contract is extinguished by its rescission. [Ibid, Title 5 *Extinction of Contracts* Chapter 2 *Rescission* § 1688]

A party to a contract may rescind the contract in the following cases: (1) If the consent of the party rescinding, or of any party jointly contracting with him, was given by mistake, or obtained through duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, exercised by or with the connivance of the party as to whom he rescinds or of any other party to the contract jointly interested with such party. [Emphasis added.] [Ibid, § 1689(b)]

rescission . . . A party's unilateral unmaking of a contract for a legally sufficient reason . . . Rescission is generally available as a remedy or defense for a nondefaulting party and restores the parties to their precontractual positions. . . . [Emphasis added.] [*Black's Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. "Rescission"]

rescission . . . an act of rescinding, annulling, or vacating or of canceling or abrogating (as by restoring to another party to a contract or transaction what one has received from him). [Emphasis added.] [*Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. "Rescission"]

Cancellation of license may be made only when specifically authorized in this code, when application is made for a license to operate vehicles of a higher class, or when a license has been issued through error or voluntarily surrendered to the department. [Emphasis added.] [California Code *Vehicle Code* Division 6 *Drivers' Licenses* Chapter 2 *Suspension or Revocation of Licenses* Article 1 *General Provisions* § 13100]

Restoration of precontractual position and recovery of the unalienable Right of Liberty.

Notwithstanding that simple surrender of one's driving certificate (driver's license) terminates the driving privilege and appears to restore "*the parties to their precontractual positions*," the "precontractual position" of the former licensee is not so clear-cut because at the time the said former licensee obtained the said license he/she erroneously believed he/she (1) was a *person* (Social Security franchisee), and (2) required a driver's license in order to use any description of carriage/contrivance. The instrument extinguishing the Social Security franchise is evidence that demonstrates that **at no time was the former licensee a person or individual or eligible for the driving privilege** (an exclusive political right of those Americans who knowingly, willingly, intelligently, deliberately, and voluntarily *consent to be governed by Congress* as a resident of the District of Columbia, e.g., Social Security franchisees); and the appended instrument wields said evidence as such and demonstrates that the appearance in a motor vehicle record of any personal information of the former licensee **is there by mistake**—and "prima facie evidence" of nothing except the said mistake and therefore of no force or effect. If one needs to sue in order to have such information purged from DMV records, then that is what he should do.

The nature of the Social Security and motor-vehicle paradigms is that of a trust, wherein legal title to property (your paycheck and carriage/contrivance, respectively) is vested in a trustee, who has legal ownership, i.e., *right of property*, but who manages the trust property for the sake of a beneficiary, who has beneficial ownership, i.e., *right of possession*. Under the laws of *equity*, neither trustee nor beneficiary has complete ownership of the trust property: The trustee is the *legal* owner; the beneficiary, the *beneficial* owner.

For example, a renter of a home or apartment knows that even though the landlord has the *right of property* of the home/apartment in which he lives, he, the renter, has *right of possession* of said home/apartment and the landlord has no right to use the spare key and waltz into the rental whenever he wants. By the same token the renter has no right to sell the rental property.

When both *legal* and *beneficial* ownership of a particular article of property are held by one party, he is said to have a "double right": (1) *right of property* (legal ownership), and (2) *right of possession* (beneficial ownership). Although this ancient concept applies originally to land, it nevertheless is useful for understanding the operation of the Social Security and motor-vehicle confidence games; *to wit*:

—Droit-droit. A double right ; that is, the right of possession and the right of property. These two rights were, by the theory of our ancient law, distinct ; and the above phrase was used to indicate the concurrence of both in one person, which concurrence was necessary to constitute a complete title to land. . . . [*Black's Law Dictionary*, 3rd ed., s.v. "Droit"]

In the encounters with law-enforcement cited *supra*, the personal information of the fellow who had no difficulty with law-enforcement had never been lodged in a motor vehicle record; and that fact cannot be discounted as not contributing to his good fortune. Wherefore, it is essential that the instrument one uses to terminate the District of Columbia driving privilege demonstrate the nullity of the Social Security contract and franchise *ab initio*,⁷¹ and that (1) *at no time is the former licensee eligible for the District of Columbia driving certificate/occupational license of a driver*, and (2) any assertion to the contrary constitutes an additional offense.

Termination of the “driving privilege” vis-à-vis extinguishment of the Social Security franchise.

There are many former licensed drivers who no longer enjoy the “driving privilege,” nearly all of whom by way of revocation of driver’s license on the part of the DMV. Notwithstanding such termination, each such former licensed driver is still a *person* and *individual* (Social Security franchisee) and resident, for legal purposes, of the District of Columbia and can be penalized for using a carriage/contrivance that is not registered with the DMV (District of Columbia).

That one terminates the driver’s license by reason of the giving of his consent by mistake does not mollify the fact of *fraud* on the part of the respective *Union-state* legislature, governor, and Director of Motor Vehicles/Commissioner of DMV, etc. in connivance with the United States Congress—and production of evidence of this fact and provision of the same to all parties responsible for rectifying such things charges each with knowledge thereof and is essential for universal recognition that one knows what he is doing and that his “precontractual position” extends back *prior* to acceptance of the Social Security franchise by mistake.

A party’s unilateral unmaking of a contract [*Social Security contract and franchise*] for a legally sufficient reason [*mistake*] restores the parties to their precontractual positions. [*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Rescission”]

Wherefore, following one’s extinguishment of the Social Security franchise, he recovers his original standing as member of the sovereign constituency, *the good People of these Colonies* of July 4, 1776, and *We the People* of March 4, 1789, just like the day he arrived in this world, possessed of all unalienable Rights guaranteed every *Union-state-born* American man/woman.

Knowledge of a prior mistake prevents one from using it a second time for the same reason. Production of a driver’s license anytime after one extinguishes the Social Security franchise, as authority to do something, can operate as *prima facie* evidence of voluntary reestablishment of residence in the District of Columbia and can, for jurisdictional purposes, erase the effects of the extinguishment of the Social Security franchise. This is why the two exercises need to be coordinated time-wise so as to avoid such eventuality.

Extinguishment of the Social Security franchise restores one’s precontractual position as one possessed of the unalienable Rights of “*Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.*” Using one’s own carriage/contrivance—*to which he holds the original title/certificate of ownership from the manufacturer and bill of sale from the dealer*—as one best thinks fit is an exercise of *Liberty* and does not make one the subject of statutes. The Federal statute defining the term “new automobile” echoes this fact, albeit impliedly, by virtue of the explicit wording thereof; *to wit*:

The term “new automobile” means an automobile the equitable or legal title to which has never been transferred by a manufacturer, distributor, or dealer to an ultimate purchaser. [Emphasis added.] [15 USC *Commerce and Trade* Chapter 28 *Disclosure of Automobile Information* § 1231 *Definitions* Subsection (d)]

⁷¹*ab initio* . . . Etymology: Latin . . . from the beginning : from the instant of the act . . . *Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Ab initio.”

A maxim of law tells us “*Where there is a right, there is a remedy,*”⁷² and the unalienable Right of *Liberty* guaranteed by the Declaration of Independence and reiterated in the Constitution is such a right. If one executes a contract by mistake, such as the driver’s license, and is deprived of the Right of *Liberty* as a consequence thereof, there is a remedy.

Notwithstanding that at the time a *Union-state-born* American obtains a driver’s license he appears to be the holder of a Social Security contract and franchise and an *individual* and *person*, demonstration of *mistake* in the Social Security contract restores the precontractual positions of the parties to the degree that the driver’s license contract/agreement is rendered inapposite: a privilege for which said *Union-state-born* American is ***ineligible*** (no Social Security account number). That *Union-state* legislatures, governors, and DMV chiefs, in connivance with Congress, are engaged in wholesale constructive fraud (organized crime), depriving the victims of the Social Security sting of full enjoyment of their respective carriage/contrivance, only works against them. The sample instrument appended hereto establishes that the “driving privilege” is an aspect of the District of Columbia municipal corporation *Social Security political movement* and provides for its extinguishment (destruction) by rescission, as authorized by law.

Implications of tolerance of the fraud.

This remedy is not for everyone. “*One absurdity being allowed, an infinity follow,*”⁷³ and the volume and complexity of absurdities today defies comprehension; triggering the phenomenon known as *cognitive dissonance*,⁷⁴ effectively barring most from liberation.

Breaking free of the draconian⁷⁵ mores⁷⁶ of the *Social Security political movement*, however personally and spiritually liberating, nevertheless brings one face-to-face with the reality of survival without the numerous modern “conveniences” (traps) such as financing the purchase of things (instead of saving and buying outright) and having a (*Social Security political movement*) bank account, used to lure and lull Social Security franchisees. Escape therefrom is a personal resolution not unlike that of Patrick Henry’s; and unless enough Americans take a similar stance the American Republic stands to suffer the same fate as all others before it whose “leaders” were political whores of the selfsame line of goldsmith-bankers.

What makes the steady decay and disintegration of the American Civilization at the hands of the goldsmith-bankers seem “bearable” is that it is a relatively slow process, evolving over the generations; *but make no mistake*: Their “utopian dream” for America, a psychotic impulse detectible in every single piece of congressional legislation, is devoid of actual compassion for life, and the only reason things do not deteriorate faster is that the instigators and their henchmen live in constant fear that the victims will figure out what is happening and deal with them accordingly; hence the incessant political and media clamor to abolish the 2nd Amendment to the Constitution. Notwithstanding their best-laid plans, however, remedy awaits.

⁷²*Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there is a remedy.*

⁷³*Uno absurdo dato, infinita sequuntur. One absurdity being allowed, an infinity follow.*

⁷⁴cognitive dissonance . . . *noun* : psychological conflict resulting from incongruous beliefs and attitudes (as a fondness for smoking and a belief that it is harmful) held simultaneously. *Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Cognitive dissonance.”

⁷⁵draconian . . . of, relating to, or suggestive of the lawgiver Draco or the severe code of laws that is said to have been framed by him as thesmothete *Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Draconian.”

thesmothete . . . LAWGIVER, LEGISLATOR; *specifically* : one of the six ancient Athenian junior archons Ibid, s.v. “Thesmothete.”

archon . . . a chief magistrate in ancient Athens; *especially* : one of nine chief magistrates in Athens after 683 B.C. with executive, judicial, religious, military, legislative, and administrative functions Ibid, s.v. “Archon.”

⁷⁶mores . . . [mō’-rāz] the fixed customs or folkways of a particular group that are morally binding upon all members of the group and necessary to its welfare and preservation . . . Ibid, s.v. “Mores.”

Commentary on application.

As shown *supra*, termination of the driving privilege is a simple process, requiring only voluntary surrender of the driver's license. The matter that requires attention is the exact estimation of effort—no more, no less—needed to dissolve to zero-point any future allegation from a law-enforcement officer that one is a person/individual and the subject of a particular *Union-state's* statutes relating to the activity of the operation of motor vehicles and required to register the carriage/contrivance he uses and obtain a driver's license to do so.

The general requirement that the license to operate a motor vehicle be “*voluntarily surrendered to the department*” affords great discretion in how one goes about it. Minimally, when surrendering the driver's license and thereafter using a carriage/contrivance for which one holds both *right of property* and *right of possession*, to ensure the interrupted enjoyment thereof the most important factors/contingencies which such instrument must address are:

1. Government infested with quislings⁷⁷ loyal to the philosophy and agenda of the owners of the private Federal Reserve (collectivism, totalitarianism, genocide);
2. Existence of one's personal information in a motor vehicle record; and
3. Encounters with law-enforcement (traffic) or code-enforcement (parking) officers.

The Social Security and motor-vehicle constructive trusts (*supra*, p. 30), are essential to the aims of the principals of the Federal Reserve in that they operate to provide, respectively:

- the Secretary of the Treasury with a presumption of *subject-matter jurisdiction* over, and *right of property* of, minimally, among other things, the paycheck and bank account of every Social Security franchisee; and
- officers, employees, and agents of the District of Columbia and political subdivisions thereof (“States”) with a presumption of *personal jurisdiction* over every Social Security franchisee with a driver's license.

Wherefore, the instrument one uses to surrender the driver's license must, perforce, contain sufficient documentary evidence to contradict, surmount, and obviate the aforesaid presumptions, which serve as the basis for:

1. Congress to justify the borrowing of “*an undeterminable amount of abstract money, ledger credit page entry, or paper notes*”⁷⁸ for the war budget of the Pentagon (military conquest of Earth in behalf of the British goldsmith-bankers of the private Federal Reserve) based on the “full faith and credit”⁷⁹ pledge to exact income tax from Social Security franchisees for payment of interest on all such “loans,” thereby serving to keep in check the rate of inflation and conceal the fraudulent nature of the so-called fractional-reserve lending scheme (keystrokes of digits in an account); and
2. state/State/Federal officers and agents to justify application of deadly force against *individuals / persons / citizens / subjects* (residents of the District of Columbia) who do not comply with state/State/Federal (District of Columbia) statutes.

⁷⁷quisling . . . a traitorous national who aids the invader of his country and often serves as chief agent or puppet governor *Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Quisling.”

⁷⁸David Astle, *The Babylonian Woe: A study of the Origin of Certain Banking Practices, and of their effect on the events of Ancient History, written in the light of the Present Day* (Toronto: Published privately, 1975), 140.

⁷⁹FULL FAITH AND CREDIT phrase meaning that the full taxing . . . power . . . is pledged in payment of interest . . . of a bond issued by a government entity. U.S. Government securities . . . are backed by this pledge. [Emphasis added.] John Downes and Jordan Elliot Goodman, *Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms*, 6th ed. (Hauppauge, N.Y.: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 2003), s.v. “Full faith and credit.”

The greatest fear of all government personnel is exposure for wrongdoing and the personal liability that goes with it. They are terrified that someone will discover their fraud and betrayal of the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and oath of office and hold them accountable. As the treatise *Why the 14th Amendment is a political Trojan horse* and discourse *Purging America of the Matrix* demonstrate—virtually every single high-ranking official is either (1) guilty of all of the foregoing, or (2) too effete or incompetent to be allowed to hold a position of trust. The only ones who *might* be worthy of trust are those who have put their name to legislation abolishing the Federal Reserve.

The instrument that ensures one's Liberty following extinguishment of the Social Security franchise and driver's license provides the recipients thereof with evidence of constructive fraud by Congress, thereby saddling them, by virtue of knowledge of the same, with the responsibility of dealing with the situation and observing the law and ensuring that all in their charge do so as well—because any situation that arises as a result of law-enforcement's failure to honor the extinguishment of the Social Security franchise and driving certificate *will* roll back up to them personally if they fail to ensure nationwide observance of the extinguishing party's precontractual position.

Up until this point, apparently, no outsider has pegged the origin of the seeming infinity of congressional absurdities to the Act of June 30, 1864. Once the recipients of the appended extinguishing instrument have knowledge thereof, and the fact verified by United States Postal Service® Certified Mail™ delivery record, there is nowhere to hide. So far, every Federal judge presented with the same information acted appropriately by dismissing, summarily, each case for lack of jurisdiction. As far as this writer can tell, at the moment of truth and risk of personal liability for felonious acts or omissions, high-ranking officials prefer to save their own neck rather than continue to push the political agenda dictated by the private Federal Reserve.

Notes on mailing.

The *Domestic Mail Manual* (“DMM”) provides, in pertinent part (Emphasis added.):

General Information . . .

600 Basic Standards for All Mailing Services . . .

602 Addressing

1.0 Elements of Addressing . . .

1.3 Address Elements . . .

e. ZIP Code where required . . .

2. ZIP Codes may be omitted from single-piece price First-Class Mail (including Priority Mail), single-piece price Parcel Post, and pieces bearing a simplified address. . . .

1.5 Return Addresses . . .

1.5.3 Required Use of Return Addresses

The sender's domestic return address must appear legibly on:

a. Mail of any class bearing a printed ancillary service request . . .

1. Certified Mail if a return receipt is requested.

m. Express Mail if a return receipt is requested. The return address on the Express Mail label meets this standard. . . .

1.8 ZIP Codes

602-1.8.1 Purpose of ZIP Code

The ZIP (Zone Improvement Plan) Code system is a numbered coding system that facilitates . . . mail processing. The USPS assigns ZIP Codes. All Post Offices are assigned at least one unique 5-digit ZIP Code. Larger Post Offices may be assigned two or more 5-digit ZIP Codes (multi-5-digit ZIP Code offices). Separate 5-digit ZIP Codes are assigned to each delivery unit at these offices.

Notwithstanding that under DMM provisions there are only two types of mail, *Domestic* and *International*, DMM 602-1.5.3 (*supra*) provides, in pertinent part, that:

The sender's domestic return address must appear legibly on . . . [Emphasis added.]

Since USPS™ has no control over International (foreign) post offices or those who send mail through them, use of “domestic” to describe the sender’s return address appears to be superfluous or redundant, i.e., another pleonasm/tautology (*supra*, nn. 12–13).

In this particular instance this is not the case; to wit:

Whereas, USPS® will gladly accept for processing a Certified Mail™ mailpiece whose return address is devoid of a ZIP Code™ (DMM 602-1.5.3(l)), as anyone can verify for himself: USPS® will not accept the same mailpiece if a return receipt is requested (Ibid); **meaning:** “Domestic” does not include any place that does not have a ZIP Code™, such as the *Union-states*; i.e., “domestic” means *District of Columbia* (or one of its political subdivisions, the so-called *50 States*) and the territories, a meaning that squares with the term “state” in the Act of June 30, 1864, and “State” and “state” in Title 18 USC and *Union-state* statutes today.

Here is another example:

Retail Mailing Services

100 Retail Mail

Letters, Cards, Flats, and Parcels

120 Retail Mail

Priority Mail

125 Mail Preparation

1.2 Required Use

The sender's domestic return address must appear legibly on Priority Mail.
[Emphasis added.]

Further, it is uncertain whether “address” is an ordinary *word* or a USPS® *term*; *to wit:*

Commercial Mailing Services

333 Prices and Eligibility

300 Commercial Flats

3.0 Eligibility Standards for First-Class Mail Flats

3.6 ZIP Code Accuracy

The ZIP Code accuracy standard is a means of ensuring that the 5-digit ZIP Code in the delivery address correctly matches the delivery address information. For the purposes of this standard, address means a specific address associated with a specific 5-digit ZIP Code. . . . [Emphasis added.]

General acceptance of free carrier delivery of mail is prima facie evidence of residence in the District of Columbia. The way to avoid the unwanted effect of this “benefit” is through control of what the letter carrier delivers to one’s mail box, as authorized by law; *to wit, in pertinent part:*

General Information

500 Additional Mailing Services

508 Recipient Services

1.0 Recipient Options

1.1 Basic Recipient Concerns

1.1.1 Delivery to Addressee

Addressees may control delivery of their mail. Without a contrary order, the mail is delivered as addressed. Mail addressed to several persons may be delivered to any one of them. . . . [Emphasis added.]

Important note re “Change of Address” cards: The official USPS® form entitled “Official Mail Forwarding Change of Address Order” (PS Form 3675), can operate to reestablish one’s residence in the District of Columbia without one knowing it; *to wit*: (1) There is a check-box for “Individual,” and (2) the USPS® term “address” appears therein. If one attests that he is an *individual*, or if a USPS® employee inserts a check-mark in that check-box without his knowledge or consent, he generates prima facie evidence that he is, once again, a resident of the District of Columbia. PS Form 3575 also uses “address” in its language, described *supra* (DMM 333-3.6), and a USPS® employee could insert a ZIP Code™ without one’s knowledge or consent. Wherefore, when one wishes to notify the Post Office™ of a change of address after completing the within process, it is best provide the respective postmaster with all the information said postmaster needs (same info as requested on the PS Form 3675 card) to do his/her job, but in the form of a *letter* and without any information that could be used as prima facie evidence of reestablishment of residence in the District of Columbia.

Government actors need only the slightest justification to exercise personal jurisdiction over any American—and acceptance of a mailpiece, especially from government, bearing a ZIP Code™ is a primary justification. If such mailpieces are not returned by you (marked “No such address”) and received by the sender as undeliverable, you are presumed to have accepted them. Legally, such fact means that you have reestablished residence in the District of Columbia—and that is all the justification a state/State/Federal officer, employee, or agent needs to destroy the peace and dignity of your life or worse. Such is the advanced stage of absurdity of a society originally free and clear of such goldsmith-banker-contrived menace at the moment of creation 237 years ago.

Postmasters know exactly what is going on—and it can be difficult just to get the name of the postmaster of the United States Post Office™ that delivers one’s mail, in order to send him/her the lawful one-page Order provided on browser-page 49 of Link 3, *Purging America of the Matrix*. All you need is his/her name. A good way to get it is to visit that particular Post Office™ and request to speak with him/her; and if that does not work, to make an appointment. Politeness is essential at all times, but do not share with the USPS® employee through whom you make the request or appointment any details of the purpose of your request; it is none of his/her business.

Mailpieces one wishes to return always make it back to the sender if one (1) blacks out, completely, both bar codes (one on the obverse and one on the reverse of the envelope) and other words, numbers, and codes impressed thereon by USPS®, (2) makes diagonal hash marks (about ¼ in. apart) through the Street and City-State-ZIP Code™ identifiers, and (3) writes “RTS” (returned to sender) near the sender’s return address on the envelope.

Send by Certified Mail™ only and do not request a return receipt (DMM 602-1.3(e)(2) and 1.5.3(l), *supra*, p. 39). Your return mailing location on the envelope is the same that appears on the correspondence, including “(Please be advised: ZIP Code™ declined.)” but without the footnote. Affix a Certified Mail™ Receipt sticker (PS Form 3800) and sufficient postage and seal and deposit in a blue, United States Postal Service® collection box. For evidence of delivery, go to www.usps.gov, “Track & Confirm,” and print/save details to your computer in PDF format.

Once one drops in the mail the envelope (with his own proper return mailing location and the Director of Motor Vehicles/Commissioner of the Department/Division of Motor Vehicles’ name and proper address and the correct postage, with driver’s license affixed to page 16 thereof) the extinguishment of contract by rescission (as authorized by law), disavowal of consent, and restoration of precontractual (pre-Social Security contract) position is complete. The other four envelopes get their own original of that which goes to the senior executive of the *Union-state* DMV; the only difference being that page 16 thereof is a color *photocopy* of the page 16 going to the DMV chief with the actual *Union-state* driver/operator license affixed thereto.

Procedure.

Generally.

It is essential to this process that one reread and understand (1) “Commentary on application,” beginning on document-page 27 of Link 3 (*Purging America of the Matrix*) and iii of Link 4 (“Sample handling of a demand from a tax collector”), and (2) “Contents of Attachment B,” browser-page 16 of said Link 4.

The primary factor one must take into consideration is how to schedule and complete all essential steps to recover his innate standing, established July 4, 1776, without inadvertently reestablishing residence in the District of Columbia either before the conclusion thereof or anytime thereafter. The essential steps, in proper sequence, are:

1. Issuance of lawful Order to postmaster responsible for delivery of one’s mail (Link 3, browser-page 49), including *closure* of any P.O. Box™ in one’s name and vigilant monitoring of mailpieces that arrive in his mail box⁸⁰ and return of every single one bearing an improperly written mailing location.⁸¹
2. Execution and transmission of *Extinguishment of Contract by Rescission . . . re Social Security franchise* (Link 3, browser-page 40).
3. Execution, transmission of *Extinguishment of Contract by Rescission . . . re driving certificate (driver’s license)* appended hereto, to senior executive of the *Union-state* DMV (whose name and title and address you will need to procure), and thereafter a certified copy of said instrument and Affidavit of Mailing to the following persons:
 - a. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States;
 - b. United States Attorney General;
 - c. Chief Justice of the [*Union-state*] Supreme Court; and
 - d. [*Union-state*] Attorney General.

If one finds the above list daunting, he may want to reassess what he is doing and determine if he really wants the responsibility of being free. What we are doing is dealing with the situation in a lawful, peaceful manner, and establishing a record of evidence,⁸² just like in a court case, that cannot be denied or surmounted by *anyone*. System operatives and actors generally follow “the law”; the problem is that the subject has been perverted for the aggrandizement of the owners of the Federal Reserve to such a degree that few Americans are aware of what it is.

⁸⁰A *Private Mail Box* can operate as a liability because personnel at that business are duly authorized by you to handle your mail and can sign, whether intentionally or by mistake, for mailpieces bearing a ZIP Code™.

⁸¹Do not be alarmed if the postmaster allows to be delivered to your mail box, mailpieces bearing a two-capital-letter “State”/ ”State” identifier or ZIP Code™; simply return them, preferably via a different Post Office™ than the one that delivered them, as described *supra*, p. 40. As long as no damage results there is no harm done and one does not have sufficient cause to take legal measures against the postmaster. One is free, however, to file a misconduct report with the Inspector General, United States Postal Service, 1735 North Lynn Street, Arlington, VA 22209. Be sure to enclose a copy of your original Order and Affidavit of Mailing to the postmaster, preferably *certified*, and send a copy of the said report to the offending postmaster. This will get his/her attention—because *now* the Inspector General has knowledge of the situation and can be held accountable for any subsequent damage and *knows it*. Further, there is no requirement to have a mail box or a numerical street identifier; wherefore, once this process is complete, one is free to remove the mail box and street numbers from his home/property and thereafter anticipate and make other arrangements for the proper handling of the substance of all correspondence that *would have arrived* in his mail box if he had one. As long as creditors or providers of services (electrical power, water, gas, garbage pick-up, etc.) receive payment as expected, it is not an issue.

⁸²Quod per recordum probatum, non debet esse negatum. What is proved by the record, ought not to be denied.

Mailing day.

Prepare a 9X12 mailing envelope for each of the five (5) recipients and one for one's own records, making sure that the Certified Mail™ sticker for each respective recipient matches up with the Certified Mail™ no. on page 1 of the instrument of extinguishment.

Prepare, sign, and have witnessed **six (6) Originals** of the instrument of extinguishment and accompanying Affidavit of Mailing. Affix the subject [*Union-state*] Driver/Operator License to page 16 of the Original going to the senior DMV executive and make five (5) color photocopies of that particular page 16 and use them to replace the page 16 in each of the Originals going to the other four recipients and the Original you keep for your records.

Place (1) completed Original instrument of extinguishment for the senior DMV executive (with driver/operator license affixed to page 16) and Affidavit of Mailing in its respective 9X12 envelope, and (2) Original instrument of extinguishment and Affidavit of Mailing in each of the other four envelopes and seal and affix sufficient postage to cover expense of First Class mail and Certified Mail™ and drop in a blue USPS® collection box for pick-up that day.

Certified copies.

It is prudent to have on hand a few (3–5) certified copies of the above mailing. You will need to check with a notary public or your *Union-state's* statutes or the National Notary Association (“NNA”) to see what is available in terms of an official form or exact language the notary needs to use in order to make a certified copy. Do not be dismayed if the notary is ignorant on the subject; many notaries are unfamiliar with this aspect of his/her powers.

Many *Union-states* allow for use of the NNA “Copy Certification by Notary” Form 15922, a photocopy of which, for purposes of education, is appended hereto.⁸³ NNA puts out other such forms, depending on the *Union-state*, so make sure you either have or acquire (from NNA or elsewhere) the proper form (or language from your respective *Union-state's* statutes).

Always write in grammatically proper English and type or print you Full True Name in the proper blank (notated “*Original Document's Custodian on Above Date*” in the sample form) before giving it to the notary and fill in the identifying info below the line marked “*OPTIONAL.*” The potentially damaging portion of the form is blacked-out for security purposes. The top part of the form should be left blank, to be completed by the notary public.

As soon as is convenient after mailing, take *your* Original of the instrument of extinguishment and Affidavit of Mailing to a notary public and have her/him make certified copies.

Acquiring a new carriage/contrivance.

Likely the most important determinant in this process is the need, or lack thereof, in one's life to get behind the wheel of a “carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power” and travel (only *persons* “drive”): If one cannot afford a new carriage/contrivance yet cannot do without the use of one or is unable to make other arrangements (public transportation, friends, etc.) that allow him/her to avoid the need to get behind the wheel and travel, one should consider postponing the entire process until such time as he can afford to do so. Since this process is based on *mistake*, one can use the particulars of that mistake only *once*.

One should never do anything illegal—and using certain property to which the District of Columbia holds ultimate legal title for the exclusive use of beneficiaries of the Social Security Motor Vehicle Constructive Trust, when one is not such a beneficiary, is readily construed as illegal by the “trustees” thereof and their agents.

⁸³The title of the subject document (extinguishment instrument) and name of the document custodian (“Full True Name”) in the sample form first were printed on a piece of paper in, respectively, 8- and 10-point Arial font and then cut out (with scissors) and attached to the form with glue-stick.

Regarding acquiring from the dealer the original title from the manufacturer, called the “certificate of ownership,” California Code *Vehicle Code* provides, in pertinent part:

(a) It is unlawful for any person to fail or neglect properly to endorse, date, and deliver the certificate of ownership and, when having possession, to deliver the registration card to a transferee who is lawfully entitled to a transfer of registration.

(b) Except when the certificate of ownership is demanded in writing by a purchaser, a vehicle dealer licensed under this code shall satisfy the delivery requirement of this section by submitting appropriate documents and fees to the department for transfer of registration in accordance with Sections 5906 and 4456 of this code and rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. [Emphasis added.] [California Code *Vehicle Code* Division 3 *Registration of Vehicles and Certificates of Title* Chapter 2 *Transfers of Title or Interest* Article 2 *Endorsement and Delivery of Documents* § 5753]

“*Statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed,*”⁸⁴ and the above Section 5753 of the California Vehicle Code is such a statute: *to wit*:

Subsection (a) cites the term “transferee,” who is a *person* under said code, and uses the transitive verb “deliver” twice in the same sentence. If said verb were to appear only once, it would apply equally to the (1) certificate of ownership, and (2) possible registration card, which thereby would concern a transferee. As written, the second use of “deliver” is conditional and applies only to the second part of the sentence and registration cards and transferees, but only when a seller has possession of said registration card—which only occurs only in the case of a carriage/contrivance previously registered with a DMV (and converted into a “motor vehicle”) and so, is immaterial for purposes of application of the statute for our needs.

Subsection (b) references two other Sections of the California Vehicle Code, 5906 and 4456:

- Section 5906 applies to dealers who use “new vehicles” themselves or as demo models for “test drives,” loaners, etc. before selling them to an original ultimate purchaser and is immaterial for our purposes; and
- Section 4456 applies to both used-vehicle and new-vehicle dealers (but not to purchasers), confirming that Section 5753(a) and (b) above apply for our purposes.

Note: The language of Section 5753, *supra*, is a clue that the California Vehicle Code is *District of Columbia code* based strictly on use of the expression “rules and regulations” in Subsection (b), the origin of which expression traces to the territorial clause of the Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2), *to wit*:

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . . [Emphasis added.]

Section 5753 of the California Vehicle Code—which is *in pari materia* with all other *Union-state* code/statutes—reveals that when the original “ultimate purchaser” demands in writing the “certificate of ownership,” i.e., the original title of a particular carriage/contrivance provided by the manufacturer, the dealer, as a person bound by law, must endorse and date and deliver to said ultimate purchaser (you) said *certificate of ownership* (negotiable document of title) upon sale of that carriage/contrivance. Because dealers like to persuade buyers to forgo the *certificate of ownership*, it is a good idea to find your *Union-state* statute that requires them to endorse and tender it before typing up your written demand. Appearance of said requirement in any vehicle code, however, is sufficient evidence of the buyer’s right to obtain the *certificate of ownership*.

⁸⁴*Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

Written demand for the *certificate of ownership*, a copy of one of which is appended hereto, should be presented at time of tender of payment in-full for the new carriage/contrivance—and not sooner. Let the dealer/salesman expend/invest the time and energy to close the deal; introduce the demand for the *certificate of ownership* as the very last thing. When you type up (or write out by hand) your written demand, leave room to inscribe the serial number (Vehicle Identification Number) of the particular carriage/contrivance you want to buy after arriving at the dealership.

Some helpful tips when making your purchase:

- Do not reveal your strategy or what you intend to do until it is time to do it;
- Time the purchase so as to fall as close to the last calendar day of the month as you can—because *all dealers are desperate to move as many cars as possible by the end of each month* and this gives a buyer tremendous leverage (best time is after 5:00 P.M.; bring tired, hungry, whiny kids with you);
 - Do reconnaissance ahead of time and if the particular carriage/contrivance you want is not on the lot, tell the dealer what you want and that you will purchase it if he can get one from the distributor or another dealer—but time your request as best you can so the car you want arrives near the end of the month and then make as many excuses as he will accept to make the sale date as close to the last day of the month as possible;
 - If the dealer requires a deposit to bring in the car you want, and such deposit also locks in the price and counts as a sale, do it on the last day of the month and require that the dealer guarantee the *certificate of ownership* upon tender of payment in full; otherwise, you get a refund of your deposit;
- When it is time to make payment in full, ***but before tendering payment***, present the written demand for the *certificate of ownership* from the manufacturer—and as long as the salesman/dealer complies and produces said certificate and is willing to date and endorse and deliver it to you immediately upon his receipt of payment in full (in accordance with law), you should proceed; otherwise:
 - Refusal of the dealer to tender the *certificate of ownership* at sale/purchase or conclude the sale as agreed is a violation of law and ground for a lawsuit for ***political discrimination*** (because of the implied demand that you join the dealer's political movement, the *Social Security political movement*, before he will sell you the carriage/contrivance)—and he will settle out of court because he cannot surmount the evidence of your political standing as a non-person, and no judge wants such damning evidence of congressional fraud admitted in evidence in one of his/her cases or argued in his/her courtroom; and
 - Registration (by the dealer) with the DMV of the carriage/contrivance by the dealer would operate to deprive you of the use of it because you are not eligible to use any such carriage/contrivance so registered—thereby defeating the purpose of the purchase and causing you financial damage—and you can explain these things (politely) and, in an extreme case, even produce evidence thereof by way of a certified copy of the instrument to (1) Commissioner/Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and (2) senior DMV executive.

In any event, the path of least resistance, whatever that may be, is the best course of action. The purchaser is holding all the Aces because he/she has the statute law on his/her side.

Using, “departing from” a new carriage/contrivance; dealing with law-, code-enforcement officers.

The reason the above words *departing from* are in quotes is—as is the case with nearly every otherwise ordinary *word* associated with carriages/contrivances—the verb “park” is a Social Security Motor Vehicle Trust *term* (defined in statutes) with commercial connotations and applies strictly to *motor vehicles* and *persons*.

It is essential to this process that one understand the details of what is happening: i.e., that he/she, as an outsider to the *Social Security political movement* and bereft of a Social Security account or number, is ineligible for a driver’s license, and does not need one because he/she is not behind the wheel of a motor vehicle and has both *right of property* and *right of possession* of the carriage/contrivance he/she is using, and the state/State (District of Columbia) has no subject-matter jurisdiction or legal interest of any kind whatsoever in such private property.

The first rule in using any carriage/contrivance is this: Never give a law-enforcement officer any reason/excuse to speak with you. That means that all lights and turn-signals are in good working order, there is plenty tread on the tires, the car is clean and in good working order, etc. and you conduct yourself like a model motorist.⁸⁵

Instead of license plates you can use the promotional plates the dealer uses to advertise his dealership if you like; it is a new car, after all.

In the event law-enforcement decides to speak with you, be calm, self-assured, and respectful; this is likely going to be a first-time experience for him/her, as well. You should have a color photocopy (front and back), of your dealer-endorsed original *certificate of ownership* from the manufacturer (keep the original in a safe place, not in the car) and the bill of sale.

It is not a bad idea to have on hand in your carriage/contrivance, a certified copy of the instrument extinguishing the (1) Social Security franchise, and (2) driver’s license. These document the reality of your standing (but should not be produced except as a last resort).

Attached hereto in the Addendum is a sample informational sheet, entitled “Notice, Traffic-enforcement,” that one could hand to a traffic officer, along with a photocopy of the certificate of ownership and bill of sale (three pieces of paper). As long as you are polite and respectful and not irritated or confrontational the officer should treat you respectfully—and he/she will not be able to confirm any state/State (District of Columbia) claim over the car. Even though he/she might discover that it appears you once had a driver’s license, you are not eligible for one now and never were eligible for one in the first place, having obtained it though your *mistake*. This is why we serve the four senior officials with Notice of the extinguishment of the driving certificate: **They all have a duty to ensure that no injustice ensues.**

Also appended hereto is a second sample informational sheet entitled “Notice, Parking-enforcement,” that one could laminate and place on the dashboard next to the serial number (do not cover the serial number) when departing the carriage/contrivance to go to a restaurant, movie theater, shopping, etc.

Notwithstanding that no parking-enforcement officer has subject-matter jurisdiction over one’s carriage/contrivance he/she needs to be as respectful as possible to avoid pointless confrontations. Once a traffic or parking officer is given proper Notice and thereafter attempts to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over one’s property, he/she is personally liable for damages (his/her actions being outside the authorized powers of his/her job) and subject to criminal charges for theft, malicious mischief, etc. The best way to avoid such encounters is to take precautions beforehand to prevent them from happening.

⁸⁵ Part of being free is *knowing* that you are free, not just having that idea. Such certainty comes from familiarity with the facts of the game and the decision/resolution to be responsible for one’s actions, as well as the final outcome of any encounter.

Insurance.

Notwithstanding that, following one's completion of the within-contemplated exercises, he has no statutory obligation/duty to carry liability insurance on his her new carriage/contrivance, it nevertheless is prudent to ensure that he can manage things in the event such need arises. Even state/State statutes provide for other means of such financial responsibility, such as a bond with an insurance company. Insurance companies want to make profit—and if you present your situation in coherent terms you should be able to cut a deal for a bond that will provide funds in the event of an accident whose cause may be attributed to you, and in such a way so as not to compromise your standing as one whose residence is without the District of Columbia, i.e., among other things, no ZIP Code™. You may want a bond that covers the value of your own car, as well. In any event this is a self-determined act, not a political duty as a so-called *person* under statute.

Lawsuits you may bring.

Qui jure suo utitur, nemini facit injuriam. He who uses his legal rights, harms no one.

No system operative wants the remaining inmates of the asylum to find out how they, too, can break free and recover their unalienable Right of Liberty. This unspoken fact affords tremendous leverage in legal matters. Any penalty—*such as seizure/levy, in behalf of any tax authority, of but a single cent (1¢, i.e., \$0.01) from funds owed him, in the temporary custody of any statutory person, such as a company with whom one has a labor contract or a bank with whom one has a deposit account*—inflicted on him because he/she declines to join the *Social Security political movement*, constitutes political discrimination and, among other things, theft under color of law.

The papers one uses to bring a lawsuit should not provide prima facie evidence of residence in a state, State, the United States, or the District of Columbia; i.e., one must avoid any use of a ZIP Code™ and the terms “state” and “State” and any reference to the “United States” (District of Columbia) *as regards himself*, but not so with the defendant he sues. After the within process, one is a resident of a *Union-state* and the United States of America, and, if ever in doubt, these things need express definition in your legal paperwork, substantially as follows:

- In this [title of instrument], the proper noun “United States of America” means the collective of the commonwealths united by and under that certain Constitution ordained and implemented March 4, 1789, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (the “Constitution”), and thereafter, numbering 50 at present; also known as *the Union* and *the Republic.*; and
- In this [title of instrument], “*Union-state*” means one of the component commonwealths united March 4, 1789, by and under the Constitution, or the 37 others so-united since then, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959.

If one needs to make the distinction and things cannot be done otherwise, he could employ use of “state or “State” either (1) per statutory definition, or (2) under the following proviso:

- In this [title of instrument], “State” has its ordinary and popular meaning as a word used in *The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America* of July 4, 1776, and Constitution of March 4, 1789; and “state,” its ordinary and popular meaning as a word used in all congressional legislative acts prior to June 30, 1864.

Deceitful definition of terms in “State” codes.

Quæ ad unum finem locuta sunt, non debent ad alium detorqueri. Words spoken to one end, ought not to be perverted to another.

Nihil quod est contra rationem est licitum. Nothing against reason is lawful.

Dolus versatur in generalibus. A deceiver deals in generalities.

Dolus versatur in generalibus. Fraud deals in generalities.

Actor qui contra regulam quid adduxit, non est audiendus. He ought not to be heard who advances a proposition contrary to the rules of law. [. 6th]

The only reason the current District of Columbia municipal-corporation paradigm is not full-blown totalitarianism is that the statutes are artfully crafted so as to operate, at least in *form*, within the *literal* constraints of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution— notwithstanding that the dictionary definition of certain key words therein no longer apply and instead are *terms of art* with opposite meanings—and allow access to *remedy*.

For example, (1) in equity matters there are two types of ownership, *legal* and *beneficial* (*supra*, p. 30), and (2) because Social Security franchisees are construed to be residents of the District of Columbia, the legislative statutes of Congress—not those of a particular *Union-state* legislature—*control*.

Keeping the foregoing in mind, some DMV-issued certificates of title display the expression “legal owner” thereon. Such usage would appear to contradict equity rules and imply that some other person, other than the state/State (District of Columbia), holds ultimate legal title to the subject carriage/contrivance, a false notion. Investigation reveals that “legal owner” is a *Union-state* legislative *term of art* whose definition explicitly establishes that—all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding—any such person is nothing more than an inferior political subject of the sole licensing authority and ultimate legal owner of every motor vehicle in America, the District of Columbia; *to wit*:

A “legal owner” is a person holding a security interest [⁸⁶] in a vehicle which is subject to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code . . . [California Code *Vehicle Code* Division 1 *Words and phrases defined* § 370]

An example of the name of the so-called *legal owner* that might appear on the face of the DMV-issued certificate of title is that of the bank that financed the purchase. Even though designated “legal owner,” the bank is a mere lienholder entitled to hold the subject certificate of title to the motor vehicle—but only until the debtor pays off the loan. At no time does any lender ever supplant the ultimate legal owner of the subject motor vehicle, i.e., the state/State (District of Columbia), who holds in trust, ultimate legal title to the said new carriage/contrivance in behalf of a particular beneficiary (Social Security franchisee), a fact established upon lodgment of the personal information of the initial ultimate purchaser (Social Security franchisee) and identifying information of the subject new carriage/contrivance in a motor vehicle record.

In the end, District of Columbia legislation rules all states, States, persons, and individuals.

⁸⁶security interest. A property interest created by agreement or by operation of law to secure performance of an obligation (esp. repayment of a debt). . . . *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Security interest.”

“Occupational licenses” other than the driver license.

Without exception, every single occupational license issued in America is a District of Columbia *occupational certificate* where, for the payment of a fee/tax, a Social Security franchisee can obtain the “privilege” of pursuing his profession or calling without committing a “crime.”

All one needs to do to confirm this fact for himself is to look up the definition of “state” in the statutes of his particular *Union-state* governing his profession and, using the Rules and Principals of Statutory Interpretation (*supra*, n. 10), determine full extent of the meaning thereof.

Upon completion of the within process one recovers his/her unalienable Right of Liberty and is no longer the subject of any state/State/Federal statute—just like July 4, 1776.

The British, vis-à-vis American, Empire.

**Oliver Cromwell aimed to bring about the kingdom
of God on earth and founded the British Empire . . .⁸⁷
Christopher Hill, 1988.**

**When Britain first, at Heaven’s command,
Arose from out the azure main, [⁸⁸]
This was the charter of the land,
And guardian angels sung this strain:
‘Rule, Britannia, rule the waves;
Britons never will be slaves.’⁸⁹**

James Thomson, 1740.

Oliver Cromwell is the British traitor in the employ of the goldsmith-bankers of the private Bank of Amsterdam who covet control of the British throne to create the Bank of England—and want revolution. With unlimited finance for the best of arms and a horde of mercenaries and trained revolutionaries at his disposal, Cromwell assumes the powers of tyranny and augments the English revolution and plots and carries out the death of the British king, Charles I, to make way for the Amsterdam goldsmith-bankers’ Dutch proxy and “king-elect,” William III of Orange.⁹⁰

With “*an undeterminable amount of abstract money, ledger credit page entry, or paper notes*”⁹¹ available from the goldsmith-bankers’ costless loan process (fractional-reserve lending), as sanctioned by the new British King William III with arrival of the private Bank of England in 1694, the British people swell with national pride as the English navy conquers the world by force of arms and Britannia “rules the waves” at the pleasure of the goldsmith-bankers—but expense of Britons who, under the personal legislative jurisdiction of Parliament, pay increasingly heavy taxes that allow the private Bank of England to conceal that it does not loan actual *money* (gold coins) to the British people, only paper *promises-to-pay* money it does not have (fraud), in the form of bookkeeping entries of digits in the account of a “borrower.”

⁸⁷Christopher Hill (British historian, 1912–2003), *A Turbulent, Seditious, and Factious People: John Bunyan and his Church, 1628–1688* (1988), quoted in *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, Elizabeth Knowles, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 376.

⁸⁸main . . . *noun* . . . [short for obsolete English *main sea*, from ²*main* + *sea*] : HIGH SEA *Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Main.”

²main . . . *adjective* . . . *obsolete* : of or relating to wide reaches or expanse (as of sea or land) . . . *Ibid.*

⁸⁹James Thomson (Scottish poet, 1700–1748), *Alfred: a Masque* (1740) act 2, quoted in *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, Elizabeth Knowles, ed., 774.

⁹⁰Nelson, *Why the 14th Amendment is a political Trojan horse*, nn. 55–60, pp. 18–19.

⁹¹A. Andréadès, *History of the Bank of England 1640 to 1903*, 4th ed. (reprint), trans. Christabel Meredith (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1966), 73, cited in David Astle, *The Babylonian Woe: A study of the Origin of Certain Banking Practices, and of their effect on the events of Ancient History, written in the light of the Present Day* (Toronto: Published privately, 1975), 140.

Just 32 short years after institution of the Amsterdam goldsmith-bankers' new private Bank of England, we get the classic proverb about death and taxes; *to wit*:

Things as certain as death and taxes, can be more firmly believed.⁹²

Not too long thereafter (1799) the goldsmith-bankers effectuate their dream of a personal income tax on the Englishmen who “borrow” the digits they loan, whereupon reality debunks delusion and: *Even though Britannia may rule the waves, Britons always will be wage-slaves.*

When the United States of America hits the scene July 4, 1776, and thereafter, American residents of the several *Union-states*, as constituent members of the supreme political authority of the American Republic, enjoy the unalienable Rights of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” free of the personal jurisdiction of their servants in Congress and respective *Union-state* legislature and are the subject of no legislative statute—***and know it.***

On June 30, 1864, Congress, as personal agents of the goldsmith-bankers of the private Bank of England, plant the statutory seed of absurdity that, ultimately, negates all the aforesaid unalienable Rights and places firmly under the ***personal legislative jurisdiction*** of Congress, the American People. This single act of fraud is the cause of the condition of the world today, a product directly attributable to the purveyors of usury and fractional-reserve lending⁹³: pandemic national-debt crises, worldwide poverty, collectivism, false-flag instigation of war, “terrorism,” perversion of the food supply, destruction of the environment, materialism, erosion of morals, etc., facilitated by Congress' pledge of *full faith and credit* (*supra*, n. 79) to pay interest, primarily with ***personal income taxes*** collected from the former sovereign American People, now wage-slaves, on “*an undeterminable amount of abstract money, ledger credit page entry, or paper notes*” (*supra*, n. 91) created by the selfsame goldsmith-bankers, now ensconced in their new command post, the Federal Reserve, for the military conquest of Earth by their personal hit men, the U.S. war machine. Unless something changes, America shall go the way of Britannia before her (overwhelmed with debt, taxed to exhaustion, robbed of vitality, insolvent, etc.) and the goldsmith-banker parasites will wage their war on Mankind through their next victim-host, China, whose de facto administrative headquarters is the World Bank, District of Columbia.

The congressional stratagem of June 30, 1864, results in inversion of the American paradigm through redefinition of a single word, “state,” i.e., a *Union-state*, into a *term of art* with a constitutionally and statutorily opposite meaning, which equates, ultimately, to the District of Columbia. Congress has *no* personal legislative power or jurisdiction in the former, *exclusive* in the latter; and now nearly every American falsely believes that he/she resides in a particular “state”/“State” of the “United States” and is a “citizen of the United States.”

Following in the footsteps of foolhardy egocentric Britons before them, who “*never will be slaves,*” American wage-slaves propound that contemporary America is “*the land of the free.*”

The *District of Columbia Municipal Corporation Social Security Motor Vehicle Constructive Trust* provides the goldsmith-bankers and their debtor-servant congressional proxies with:

1. *Subject-matter jurisdiction* over the paycheck, bank account, and property of every Social Security franchisee (via Taxpayer Identification Number); and
2. *Personal jurisdiction* over every Social Security franchisee (via occupational certificate to operate a motor vehicle for commercial purposes on the highways as a *driver* in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo).

The within-offered remedies provide for restoration of one's precontractual position as of July 4, 1776, and recovery of all unalienable Rights, as authorized by law. ■

⁹²Daniel Defoe (English novelist and journalist, 1660–1731), *History of the Devil* (1726) bk. 2, ch. 6, quoted in *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, Elizabeth Knowles, ed., 254.

⁹³Nelson, *Why the 14th Amendment is a political Trojan horse*, 14.

[Full True Name]
[Street identifiers]
[City, Union-state]
(Please be advised: ZIP Code™ declined.¹)

[Name of senior executive of motor vehicles] [20-digit Certified Mail™ No.]
[Union-state] [Title of senior executive of motor vehicles]
[Union-state] [Department/Division] of Motor Vehicles
[Street address or P.O. Box]
[City, State, ZIP Code]

John G. Roberts, Jr. [20-digit Certified Mail™ No.]
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
One First Street N.E.
Washington, DC 20543

Eric H. Holder, Jr. [20-digit Certified Mail™ No.]
Attorney General of the United States
United States Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

[Name of Union-state Chief Justice] [20-digit Certified Mail™ No.]
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of [Union-state]
[Street address or P.O. Box]
[City, State, ZIP Code]

[Name of Union-state Attorney General] [20-digit Certified Mail™ No.]
[Union-state] Attorney General
State of [Union-state] Department of Justice
[Street address or P.O. Box]
[City, State, ZIP Code]

- (1) **Documentary evidence of actual, constructive fraud, betrayal of trust on the part of Congress; connivance therewith by the [Union-state] Legislature et al;**
- (2) **Extinguishment of contract (driving certificate) by rescission by reason of the giving of consent by mistake; disavowal of apparent consent;**
- (3) **Voluntary surrender of occupational license (driving certificate) to operate a motor vehicle (18 USC 31(a)(6)) as a driver, obtained by mistake by one ineligible, ab initio, to hold such certificate; and**
- (4) **Demand for expunction from every motor vehicle record of the Undersigned's personal information, given by the Undersigned and obtained by the United States, District of Columbia, and State of [Union-state] through the Undersigned's mistake.**

¹We note that under section 122.32 of the U.S. Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual, the use of a zip code remains voluntary. See United States Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual § 122.32, at 55 (Mar. 1992). . . . *Joseph Peters v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation*, 966 F.2d 1483, 296 U.S.App.D.C. 202, 22 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1123 (1992).

Authorities.

1. This (1) Documentary evidence of actual, constructive fraud, betrayal of trust on the part of Congress; connivance therewith by the [Union-state] Legislature et al; (2) Extinguishment of contract (driving certificate) by rescission by reason of the giving of consent by mistake; disavowal of apparent consent; (3) Voluntary surrender of occupational license (driving certificate) to operate a motor vehicle (18 USC 31(a)(6)) as a driver, obtained by mistake by one ineligible, ab initio, to hold such certificate; and (4) Demand for expunction from every motor vehicle record of the Undersigned's personal information, given by the Undersigned and obtained by the United States, District of Columbia, and State of [Union-state] through the Undersigned's mistake (this "Extinguishment of Driving Certificate by Rescission") is authorized by The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776, Constitution for the United States of America of March 4, 1789, and certain universal principles² of contract law; common law; rules, principles, and doctrines of equity; maxims of law and equity³; rules and principles of statutory interpretation; and, in pertinent part, *California Civil Code* ("CCC"), which civil code is *in pari materia* with that of all other jurisdictions and provides, in pertinent part:

1550.

It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be:

1. Parties capable of contracting;
2. Their consent;
3. Lawful object; and,
4. A sufficient cause or consideration.

1565.

The consent of the parties to a contract must be:

1. Free;
2. Mutual; and,
3. Communicated by each to the other.

1566.

A consent which is not free is nevertheless not absolutely void, but may be rescinded by the parties, in the manner prescribed by the Chapter on Rescission.

1567.

An apparent consent is not real or free when obtained through:

1. Duress;
2. Menace;
3. Fraud;
4. Undue influence; or
5. Mistake.

1688.

A contract is extinguished by its rescission.

1689. . . .

(b) A party to a contract may rescind the contract in the following cases: (1) If the consent of the party rescinding, or of any party jointly contracting with him, was given by mistake, or obtained through duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, exercised by or with the connivance of the party as to whom he rescinds or of any other party to the contract jointly interested with such party. . . . (5) If the contract is unlawful for causes which do not appear in its terms or conditions, and the parties are not equally at fault. (6) If the public interest will be prejudiced by permitting the contract to stand. . . .

²*Contra negantem principia non est disputandum.* There is no disputing against or denying principles. *Bouvier's Law Dictionary*, 6th ed., s.v. "Maxim."

Non est certandum de regulis juris. There is no disputing about rules of law. *Ibid*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. "Maxim."

³*Regula pro lege, si deficit lex.* In default of the law, the maxim rules. *Ibid*.

Maxime ita dicta quia maxima est ejus dignitas et certissima auctoritas, atque quod maxime omnibus probetur. A maxim is so called because its dignity is chiefest, and its authority the most certain, and because universally approved by all. *Ibid*.

2. *Bouvier's Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. "Maxim" provides, in pertinent part:

- *Regula pro lege, si deficit lex*. In default of the law, the maxim rules.
- *Ubi jus, ibi remedium*. Where there is a right, there is a remedy.
- *Consensus facit legem*. Consent makes the law. A contract is a law between the parties, which can acquire force only by consent.
- *Non consentit qui errat*. He who errs does not consent.
- *Error qui non resistitur, approbatur*. An error not resisted is approved.
- *Origo rei inspici debet*. The origin of a thing ought to be inquired into.
- *Error ad sua principia referre, est refellere*. To refer errors to their origin is to refute them.
- *Non sunt longa ubi nihil est quod demere possis*. There is no prolixity where nothing can be omitted.
- *Facultas probationum non est angustanda*. The faculty or right of offering proof is not to be narrowed.
- *Ea est accipienda interpretatio, quæ vitio caret*. That interpretation is to be received which is free from fault.
- *In omnibus quidem, maxime tamen in jure, æquitas spectanda sit*. In all affairs, and principally in those which concern the administration of justice, the rules of equity ought to be followed.
- *Cessante causa, cessat effectus*. The cause ceasing, the effect must cease.

3. Herein:

- "United States of America" means the collective of the commonwealths united by and under that certain Constitution ordained and implemented March 4, 1789, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (the "Constitution"), and thereafter, numbering 50 at present; also known as *the Union* and *the Republic*;
- "*Union-state*" means one of the component commonwealths united March 4, 1789, by and under the Constitution, or the 37 others so-united since then, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959;
- 5 USC §§ 551(2) and 552a(a)(2) and (13) re, respectively, "person," "individual," and "Federal personnel" apply herein *non obstante*;
- The term "natural person" means an individual (*U.S. v. Middleton*, No. 99-10518, 231 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2000));
- 18 USC §§ 31(a)(9); 5; 31(a)(6); and 10 re, respectively, the terms "State," "United States," "motor vehicle," and "interstate commerce" apply herein, the only exceptions being where one of said terms appears within the text of quoted material or is used in the title of something cited herein, thus requiring fidelity to the original; and
- The Driver License Compact definition of the term "state" applies herein, the only exception being where "state" appears within the text of quoted material or is used in the title of something cited herein, thus requiring fidelity to the original.

4. A certified copy of that certain instrument extinguishing the subject former Social Security contract and franchise by rescission by reason of the giving of consent by mistake, executed by [Full True Name] (the "Undersigned") as of [date executed], entitled "*Extinguishment of Contract by Rescission by Reason of the Giving of Consent by Mistake, Disavowal of Apparent Consent, and Divestment of Right (Entitlement) to Receive Social Security Retirement or Survivor Benefits*" and evidence of mailing thereof is attached hereto, made fully part hereof, and included herein by reference as Attachment A (the "Extinguishment of Social Security Contract/Franchise").

Averments of [Full True Name].

Introductory Certification.

The Undersigned affiant, [Full True Name] (“Affiant”), does hereby solemnly swear, declare, and state as follows:

- 5. Affiant can competently state the matters set forth herein.
- 6. Affiant has personal knowledge of the facts stated herein.
- 7. All the facts stated herein are true, correct, and complete and admissible in evidence, in accordance with Affiant’s best firsthand personal knowledge and belief.

Plain Statement of Facts.

- 8. Affiant has neither seen nor been presented with any evidence, and likewise any material fact, that demonstrates that at the time of submission of application for a driving certificate for [Full True Name] to engage in the activity of the operation of motor vehicles, [Full True Name] or any derivative or variation in the spelling thereof, e.g., [FULL T NAME],⁴ is one born in, or a citizen or resident of, a state or State or the United States or a person, natural person, or individual, and believes that none exists.

Verification and Certification.

- 9. The undersigned Affiant, [Full True Name], does hereby solemnly swear, declare, and state that Affiant executes this “Averments of [Full True Name]” of this *Extinguishment of Driving Certificate by Rescission* on Affiant’s unlimited liability, that Affiant can competently state the matters set forth herein, that the facts stated herein are true, correct, and complete in accordance with Affiant’s best firsthand personal knowledge and belief, and that this “Averments of [Full True Name]” is signed and sworn to in [County name] County, [Union-state], United States of America.

Further Affiant sayeth naught.

Date: The [sequential (spelled out)] day of the [sequential (spelled out)] month in the year of our Lord two thousand [year (spelled out)] [[Month] [day], A.D. 20[year]]

[Full True Name (printed)]

Date

Witness: [Name of Witness (printed)]

Date

Witness: [Name of Witness (printed)]

Date

Witness: [Name of Witness (printed)]

⁴*Talis non est eadem, nam nullum simile est idem.* What is like is not the same, for nothing similar is the same. *Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure. He who is prior in time is stronger in right. *Ibid.*

Part 1.

Documentary evidence of actual, constructive fraud, betrayal of trust on the part of Congress; connivance therewith by the [Union-state] Legislature et al.

Section 1.1: Meaning of the Title 18 USC terms “State,” “United States”.

10. A maxim of law provides:

Statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed.⁵

11. Title 18 USC § 31(a)(9) provides:

State.— The term “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

12. Before the full extent of the definition of “State” can be determined, we must account for another Title 18 term used therein, “United States,” defined in 18 USC § 5 as follows:

The term “United States”, as used in this title in a territorial sense, includes all places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, except the Canal Zone.

13. Whereas, in a *territorial* sense, the power of jurisdiction (a) obtains with any type of land mass (of which there are only two: continental and insular), and (b) always extends a certain distance into any adjoining waters: Inclusion of the words “and waters, continental or insular,” brings no new meaning to the said definition of the term “United States” and is therefore superfluous and, for purposes of interpretation, may be excluded without changing the meaning of said definition.

14. Regarding the phrase “except the Canal Zone” at the tag-end of the 18 USC § 5 definition of “United States”: (a) As of October 1, 1979, the United States returns to Panama approximately 60% of what is known as the “Canal Zone,” the Canal Zone ceases to exist in name, and the remaining 40% is dubbed the *Canal Area*, and (b) as of 12:00 Noon December 31, 1999, the United States returns all interest in the Panama Canal and Canal Area to Panamanian rule. Wherefore, inclusion of the phrase “except the Canal Zone” in the 2013 Title 18 USC definition of “United States” operates to imply that the United States retains some kind of interest in a former U.S. territory defunct for more than 33 years and in which the United States retains no territorial interest, is an inference without basis in fact and therefore superfluous and, for purposes of interpretation, may be omitted without changing the meaning of the Title 18 § 5 definition of “United States.”

15. The foregoing leaves the following with which to interpret the full extent of the meaning of the term “United States” in Title 18:

The term “United States,” as used in this title in a territorial sense, includes all places subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

16. Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution provide that only (a) “a district of territory . . . for the permanent seat of the government of the United States” (District of Columbia), (b) “all Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings,” and (c) “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” are subject to the *territorial* jurisdiction of the United States. Whereas, the above interpretation agrees in substance with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, the full extent of the meaning thereof includes only those places subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

17. Whereas, “State” does not define “State,” and the meaning of “State” in the expression/phrase “a State of the United States” in the Title 18 USC § 31(a)(9) definition of “State” is unclear/uncertain, the rule/principle of statutory interpretation known as *noscitur a sociis* allows us to determine its meaning; *to wit, in pertinent part:*

⁵*Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Maxim.”

Noscitur a sociis. It is known from its associates. The meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. . . . [Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. "Maxim"]

noscitur a sociis . . . [Latin "it is known by its associates"] A canon of construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it. [Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., s.v. "Noscitur a sociis"]

The rule *noscitur a sociis* (known by its associates): when a word or phrase is of uncertain meaning, it should be construed in the light of the surrounding words . . .⁶

18. The words immediately surrounding the phrase "a State of the United States" in the 18 USC § 31(a)(9) definition of "State" are:

The term "State" means the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

19. The District of Columbia⁷ and commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States are geographical areas other than "Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings" over which the Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise exclusive legislation; *to wit, in pertinent part*:

territory . . . a geographical area belonging to or under the jurisdiction of a political authority [Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, inc. version 2.5, s.v. "Territory"]

The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation . . . over such District . . . as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and . . . like Authority over all Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; . . . [U.S. Constitution, Article 1 § 8(17)]

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . . [Ibid, Article 4 § 3(2)]

20. Wherefore, the general expression "a State of the United States" in the Title 18 USC § 31(a)(9) definition of "State" means any geographical area other than "Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings" over which the Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise exclusive legislation, and the full extent of the meaning of said definition of the term "State" is:

The District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Atoll, Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Midway Atoll, North Island – JACADS, Sand Island, Kingman Reef, or Navassa Island and no other thing.⁸

21. Wherefore, under Title 18 USC § 31(a)(9):

- **The only States of the United States over which Congress have power of exclusive legislation are territorial-type "States", and**
- **No Union-state is a State of the United States.**

⁶A Dictionary of Law, 7th ed., Jonathan Law and Elizabeth Martin, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), s.v. "Interpretation, Rules and Principles of Statutory."

⁷Congressional provision for "a district of territory . . . for the permanent seat of the government of the United States" appears in the Act of July 16, 1790 (1 Stat. 130) and is referred to unofficially as the Territory of Columbia; later given the official name District of Columbia as of the Act of May 6, 1796 (1 Stat. 461).

⁸U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of Insular Affairs, (1) "All OIA Jurisdictions," and (2) "U.S. Territories under U.S. Fish and Wildlife Jurisdiction or Shared with Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS): (1) <http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/index.cfm>, (2) <http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/islandfactsheet2.cfm>, respectively.

22. The Title 18 USC § 31(a)(9) definition of the term “State” violates (a) *the literal rule* of statutory interpretation by giving a *word* that is reasonably capable of only one meaning, via conversion into a *term of art*, a constitutionally opposite meaning, and (b) *the golden rule* of statutory interpretation by disallowing an ordinary word, as used in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution, its ordinary meaning, resulting in absurdity as cited *supra* in ¶ 20; *to wit*:

“(2) Words that are reasonably capable of only one meaning must be given that meaning whatever the result. This is called the literal rule.

“(3) Ordinary words must be given their ordinary meanings and technical words their technical meanings, unless absurdity would result. This is the golden rule.”⁹

Section 1.2: Meaning of Driver License Compact terms “state,” “home state”.

23. The Driver License Compact provides, in pertinent part:

“State” means a state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.¹⁰

24. Whereas, the Driver License Compact term defined *supra* in ¶ 23 begins the sentence and therefore requires capitalization, it is not immediately clear whether the subject term is “State” or “state.” Rule 1 of Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation provides:

“(1) An Act must be construed as a whole, so that internal inconsistencies are avoided.”¹¹

25. Consulting the remaining provisions of the Driver License Compact for the capitalized form, i.e., “State” with a capital “S,” we find there are no others and that “state” with a lower-case “s” is used elsewhere therein exclusively; wherefore: The term defined is “state.”

26. Whereas, “state” does not define “state,” and the meaning of “state” in the expression/phrase “a state . . . of the United States” in the Driver License Compact definition of “state” is unclear/uncertain, *noscitur a sociis* (*supra*, n. 6) allows us to determine its meaning. Removing “state” therefrom leaves:

a territory¹² or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

27. Wherefore the Driver License Compact term “state” means:

The District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Atoll, Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Midway Atoll, North Island – JACADS, Sand Island, Kingman Reef, or Navassa Island and no other thing.

⁹A *Dictionary of Law*, 7th ed., Jonathan Law and Elizabeth Martin, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), s.v. “Interpretation, Rules and Principles of Statutory.”

¹⁰District of Columbia Code, Division VIII *General Laws* Title 50 *Motor and Non-Motor Vehicles and Traffic* Subtitle IV *Motorized Vehicle Registration, Inspection, Licensing* Chapter 10 *Driver License Compact* Article II *Definitions* § 50-1001 Subsection g.

Montana Code Annotated, Title 61 *Motor Vehicles* Chapter 5 *Driver’s Licenses* Part 4 *Driver License Compact* § 61-5-401 *Driver License Compact* Article II *Definitions* Subsection 1.

Vermont Statutes, Title 23 *Motor Vehicles* Chapter 37 *Driver License Compact* § 3903 *Definitions-Article II* Subsection 5.

¹¹A *Dictionary of Law*, 7th ed., s.v. “Interpretation, Rules and Principles of Statutory,” *supra*, n. 9.

¹²“The Federal law (the Covenant) making the CNMI a U.S. territory passed in 1975.” U.S. Department of the Interior, “Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,” <http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/cnmi.cfm>.

28. The Driver License Compact introduces another term; *to wit*:
- “Home state” means the state which has issued and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle.¹³
29. Whereas, the Driver License Compact term defined *supra* in ¶ 28 begins the sentence and therefore requires that the initial letter thereof be capitalized, it is not immediately clear whether the term defined is “Home state” or “home state,” requiring application of Rule 1 of Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation (*supra*, n. 11).
30. Inspection of the remaining provisions of the Driver License Compact for the capitalized form, i.e., “Home state” with a capital “H,” reveals no others and that “home state” with a lower-case “h” is used elsewhere therein exclusively; wherefore: The term defined is “home state.”
31. Before we can ascertain the full extent of the meaning of the term “home state,” however, we must account for the meaning of another Driver License Compact term used within said definition, “state”; *to wit*: As defined in the Driver License Compact, the “states” of the United States are the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the other 18 insular U.S. possessions and territories of the United States (*supra*, ¶ 27).
32. Wherefore, under the provisions of the Driver License Compact:
- Of the 20 states of the United States, the District of Columbia is the only state that is a party to the Driver License Compact¹⁴;
 - Interstate commerce by motor vehicle on the highways between any two states of the United States is physically impossible;
 - No Union-state subscriber to the Driver License Compact (*infra*, n. 14) is a state of the United States;
 - The term “home state” means District of Columbia and no other thing;
 - The exclusive power to issue licenses and permits to operate a motor vehicle and suspend or revoke the use of any such license or permit resides in the District of Columbia;
 - Any Union-state-member Department/Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) that issues, suspends, or revokes a license or permit to operate a motor vehicle is an instrumentality of the District of Columbia; and
 - Any Union-state government that operates a DMV located within the exterior limits of that particular Union-state is a political subdivision of the District of Columbia.
33. The definition of the term “state” in the code/statutes of the five Union-states declining membership in the Driver License Compact, i.e., Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, relating to motor vehicles and the licensing of drivers is substantially the same as that in the non-Driver License Compact code/statutes of the 45 Driver License Compact-subscribing Union-state members—and no statute of any of the 50 Union-state governments defines any Union-state, including itself, to be a state of the United States.

¹³District of Columbia Code, Division VIII *General Laws* Title 50 *Motor and Non-Motor Vehicles and Traffic* Subtitle IV *Motorized Vehicle Registration, Inspection, Licensing* Chapter 10 *Driver License Compact* § 50-1001 Article II *Definitions* Subsection e.

Montana Code Annotated, Title 61 *Motor Vehicles* Chapter 5 *Driver’s Licenses* Part 4 *Driver License Compact* § 61-5-401 *Driver License Compact* Article II *Definitions* Subsection 2.

Vermont Statutes, Title 23 *Motor Vehicles* Chapter 37 *Driver License Compact* § 3903 *Definitions-Article II* Subsection 3.

¹⁴http://www.dmv.state.pa.us/pdotforms/fact_sheets/fs-dlc.pdf, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, “Driver License Compact Fact Sheet,” 2.

34. The determinations of fact appearing hereinabove in ¶¶ 23–33 tally with the definition of the term “State” in Title 18 USC § 31(a)(9) and square with the constructive fraud and seminal congressional perversion of “state” into a *term of art* June 30, 1864, and the revision thereof March 9, 1878; *to wit, in pertinent part:*

SEC. 182. *And be it further enacted*, That wherever the word state is used in this act it shall be construed to include the territories and the District of Columbia . . .¹⁵

SEC. 3140. The word “State,” when used in this Title, shall be construed to include the Territories and the District of Columbia . . .¹⁶

Section 1.3: District of Columbia “occupational license” and “limited occupational license”.

35. *Black’s Law Dictionary* and *Bouvier’s Law Dictionary* provide, respectively and in pertinent part:

driver’s license. The state-issued certificate authorizing a person to operate a motor vehicle. [*Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “Driver’s license”]

certificate . . . a document certifying the bearer’s status or authorization to act in a specified way <nursing certificate> . . . [Ibid, s.v. “Certificate”]

LICENSE (Lat. *licere*, to permit). . . .

In governmental regulation. Authority to do some act or carry on some trade or business, in its nature lawful but prohibited by statute, except with the permission of the civil authority or which would otherwise be unlawful.

A license to carry on a business or trade is an official permit to carry on the same or perform other acts forbidden by law except to persons obtaining such permit. . . .

A license of this sort is a personal privilege . . .

A license fee is a tax . . . which a state may impose on all citizens within its borders . . .

When the power is exercised by municipal corporations, a license is the requirement, by the municipality, of the payment of a certain sum by a person for the privilege of pursuing his profession or calling, whether harmful or innocent, for the *general* purpose of producing a reliable source of revenue ; Tied. Lim. Pol. Pow. 271.

If the occupation is *harmful*, the sum paid for its prosecution may be said to be a license fee ; but if *innocent*, it is a license tax. . . . Where the occupation is not dangerous to the public, either directly or incidentally, it cannot be subjected to any police regulation which does not fall within the power of taxation ; Tied. Lim. Pol. Pow. 273. In the regulation of occupations harmful to the public, it is constitutional to require those who apply for a license to pay a reasonable sum to defray the expense of issuing the license and maintaining the proper supervision. . . . Tied. Lim. Pol. Pow. 274. . . . [*Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “License”]

36. The exclusive power to issue licenses and permits to operate a motor vehicle and suspend or revoke the use of any such license or permit resides in the District of Columbia and every license and permit issued by the District of Columbia and every DMV of every political subdivision of the District of Columbia is a certificate and official permit to carry on a business or trade and required of every resident of the District of Columbia who wishes to enjoy the privilege of pursuing his/her profession or calling as a *driver* and engage in the activity of the operation of motor vehicles.
37. The facility for any person who operates a commercial vehicle to secure a limited occupational license to continue his profession/occupation as a driver despite revocation, suspension or cancellation of his/her driver’s license, confirms that said driver’s license is a certificate in the nature of an occupational license for the privilege of pursuing one’s profession or calling as a driver engaged in the activity of the operation of motor vehicles; *to wit, in pertinent part:*

¹⁵“An Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, to pay Interest on the Public Debt, and for other Purposes,” ch. 173, sec. 182, 13 Stat. 223, 306, June 30, 1864.

¹⁶*Revised Statutes of the United States, Passed at the First Session of the Forty-third Congress, 1873–’74*, Title XXXV, Internal Revenue, Ch. 1, Officers of Internal Revenue, p. 601, approved retroactively as of the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved as of the Act of March 9, 1878.

310 Limited Occupational Licenses

- 310.1 . . . a person whose . . . driver's license . . . is revoked, suspended or canceled may request, in writing, that the order be modified to allow the issuance or retention of a driver's license or privilege on a limited basis. . . .
- 310.2 . . . the applicant for an occupational license must show to the satisfaction of the examiner that loss of operating privileges precludes carrying out the applicant's normal . . . occupation, and that driving is necessary to support the applicant and his or her family. . . .
- 310.5 If the applicant operates a commercial vehicle . . . the application shall be accompanied by a written request from the applicant's employer that the license be issued. [Emphasis added.] [D.C. Regulations and D.C. Register, Secretary of the District of Columbia, Office of Documents and Administrative Issuances, Title 18 *Vehicles and Traffic* Chapter 18-3 *Cancellation, Suspension, or Revocation of Licenses* Rule 18-310 *Limited Occupational Licenses*]

Section 1.4: Only citizens, residents of District of Columbia eligible for a driver's license.

38. The Constitution provides that Congress have power of exclusive legislation, which includes personal jurisdiction, only in the geographical territory described in Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2) thereof; *to wit, respectively and in pertinent part:*

The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation . . . over such District . . . as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and . . . like Authority over all Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; . . .

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . .

39. The only persons over whom Congress have power of personal legislative jurisdiction are citizens or residents of the geographical territory enumerated in Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution, *supra*.

40. Dictionaries define domicile/domicil and residence, in pertinent part, as follows:

domicile . . . *noun* . . . the place with which a person has a settled connection for important legal purposes (as determination of his civil status, jurisdiction to impose personal judgments or taxes on him . . . [Merriam-Webster's *Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. "Domicile"]

domicile . . . "domicile . . . is a conception of law employed for the purpose of establishing a connection for certain legal purposes between an individual and the legal system of the territory with which he . . . has . . . because of his dependence on some other person." R.H. Graveson, *Conflict of Laws* 185, 7th ed. 1974.

The residence of a person or corporation for legal purposes. Also termed . . . *legal residence*. . . . [Black's *Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. "Domicile"]

Residence. The act or fact of living in a given place for some time. . . . *Residence* usu. just means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place; *domicile* usu. requires bodily presence plus an intention to make the place one's home. A person thus may have more than one residence at a time, but only one domicile. Sometimes, though, the two terms are used synonymously. Cf. DOMICILE. . . . [Ibid, s.v. "Residence"]

41. The only persons eligible for a District of Columbia *occupational license* or *driving certificate* to engage in the activity of the operation of motor vehicles as a *driver*, are citizens or residents of the District of Columbia; namely those who:

- Are born or naturalized within the geographical limits of the District of Columbia;
- Physically reside within the geographical limits of the District of Columbia;
- Realize gains/profits/income from a source located within the geographical limits of the District of Columbia; or

- Establish residence, for legal purposes such as taxation, licensing, and a species of criminal jurisdiction for which an action is not provided by law, in the District of Columbia, as do all *Federal personnel*, i.e., (a) officers and employees of the Government of the United States, (b) members of the uniformed services, and (c) individuals entitled to receive immediate or deferred retirement benefits under the Social Security retirement program; *to wit*:

the term “Federal personnel” means officers and employees of the Government of the United States, members of the uniformed services (including members of the Reserve Components), individuals entitled to receive immediate or deferred retirement benefits under any retirement program of the Government of the United States (including survivor benefits). [5 USC *Government Organization and Employees Part I The Agencies Generally Chapter 5 Administrative Procedure Subchapter II Administrative Procedure § 552a Records maintained on individuals* Subsection (a)(13)]

42. *Wherefore*: Absent possession of another franchise other than the Social Security franchise, conferred by the Government of the United States or Government of the District of Columbia or any political subdivision of the District of Columbia, any *Union-state-born* American without the bulleted categories cited *supra* in ¶ 41 is:

- Neither a *person* nor *natural person* nor *individual*;
- Without the personal legislative jurisdiction of Congress; and
- Ineligible for any District of Columbia *occupational license*—such as a *driving certificate* to engage in the activity of the operation of motor vehicles as a *driver*, an instrument commonly known as a *driver’s license*—which is available exclusively to citizens or residents of the District of Columbia.

Section 1.5: Driver’s license obtained by mistake by one ineligible therefor.

43. The *Extinguishment of Social Security Contract/Franchise* (Attachment A) restores the precontractual position of the parties prior to execution of Social Security contract; *wherefore*: At the time of initial execution and submission of application for a District of Columbia occupational certificate as a driver, as is the case today, the Undersigned is neither a citizen nor resident of the District of Columbia nor eligible for any District of Columbia occupational license.

44. Upon reaching the age of majority the Undersigned, as a consequence of erroneous belief that the Undersigned is (a) *one born in a state/State of the United States*, (b) a *resident of a state/State*, and (c) a *citizen and resident of the United States* and, as such, cannot use any description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power without getting in trouble with law-enforcement unless the Undersigned [has/obtains] a driver’s license, the Undersigned pays fees by mistake and secures a driver’s license and subsequently pays other fees for renewals thereof, resulting in loss of the Undersigned’s property as a consequence thereof, as the Undersigned does not need a driver’s license to use any description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power for which the Undersigned holds both equitable and legal title, i.e., has *right of possession* and *right of property* of such carriage/contrivance.

Section 1.6: Rescission; fraud, actual and constructive, effect of.

45. Law and equity provide for rescission for *mistake of fact* or *actual* or *constructive fraud*, and voidance where the fraud is the determining motive of the contract *to wit*, *in pertinent part*:

rescission . . . A party’s unilateral unmaking of a contract for a legally sufficient reason . . . Rescission is generally available as a remedy or defense for a nondefaulting party and restores the parties to their precontractual positions. . . . [Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed., s.v. “Rescission”]

rescission . . . an act of rescinding, annulling, or vacating or of canceling or abrogating (as by restoring to another party to a contract or transaction what one has received from him). [Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Rescission”]

RESCISSION. . . The equity for the rescission and cancellation of agreements, deeds, and other instruments arises when a transaction is vitiated by illegality or fraud, or by reason of its having been carried on in ignorance or mistake of facts material to its operation The jurisdiction of equity is exercised upon the principle of *quia timet* ; that us, for fear that such agreements, securities, deeds and other instruments may be vexatiously or injuriously used against the party seeking relief, when the evidence to impeach them may be lost ; or that they may throw a cloud or suspicion over his interest or title ; or where he has a defence good in equity which cannot be made available at law. The cases in which this relief will be granted on account of misrepresentation and fraud may be divided into four classes : *first*, where there is actual fraud in the party defendant in which the party plaintiff has not participated ; *Smith v. Richards*, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 26, 10 L. Ed. 42 ; *secondly*, where there is constructive fraud against public policy and the party plaintiff does not appear to have participated therein ; *thirdly*, where there is a fraud against public policy and the party plaintiff has participated therein, but public policy would be defeated by allowing it to stand ; *fourthly*, where there is a constructive fraud by both parties,—that is, where both parties are *in delicto*, but not *in pari delicto* ; see 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 694 . . . [*Bouvier's Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. “Rescission”]

FRAUD. . . *Actual* or positive *fraud* includes cases of the intentional and successful employment of any cunning, deception, or artifice, used to circumvent, cheat, or deceive another. 1 Story Eq. Jur. § 186.

For instance, the misrepresentation by word or deed of material facts, by which one exercising reasonable discretion and confidence is misled to his injury, whether the misrepresentation was known to be false, or only not known to be true, or even if made altogether innocently ; the suppression of material facts which one party is legally or equitably bound to disclose to another ; all cases of unconscientious advantage in bargains obtained by imposition, circumvention, surprise, and undue influence over persons in general, and especially over those who are, by reason of age, infirmity, idiocy, lunacy, drunkenness, coverture, or other incapacity, unable to take due care of and protect their own rights and interest ; bargains of such an unconscionable nature and of such gross inequality as naturally lead to the presumption of fraud, imposition, or undue influence, when the decree of the court can place the parties *in statu [sic] quo* ; cases of surprise and sudden action, without due deliberation, of which one party takes advantage ; [*sic*] cases of the fraudulent suppression of deeds and other instruments, in violation of, or injury to, the rights of others ; fraudulent awards with intent to do injustice ; fraudulent and illusory appointments and revocations under powers ; fraudulent prevention of acts to be done for the benefit of others under false statements or false promises ; frauds in relation to trusts of a secret or special nature ; [*sic*] frauds in verdicts, judgments, decrees, and other judicial proceedings ; frauds in the confusion of boundaries of estates and matters of partition and dower ; frauds in the administration of charities ; and frauds upon creditors and other persons standing upon a like equity, are cases of actual fraud. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. c. 6.

Legal or *constructive fraud* includes such contracts or acts as, though not originating in any actual evil design or contrivance to perpetrate a fraud, yet by their tendency to mislead or deceive others, or to violate private or public confidence, are prohibited by law.

Thus, for instance, contracts against some general public policy or fixed artificial policy of the law ; cases arising from some peculiar confidential or fiduciary relation between the parties, where advantage is taken of that relation by the person in whom the trust or confidence is reposed, or by third persons ; [*sic*] agreements and other acts of parties which operate virtually to delay, defraud, and deceive creditors ; purchases of property, with full notice of the legal or equitable title of other persons to the same property (the purchaser becoming, by construction, *particeps criminis* with the fraudulent grantor) ; and voluntary conveyances of real estate, as affecting the title of subsequent purchasers. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. c. 7. See Bisph. Eq. 205.

According to the civilians, *positive* fraud consists in doing one's self, or causing another to do, such things as induce the opposite party into error, or retain him there. The intention to deceive, which is the characteristic of fraud, is here present. Fraud is also divided into that which has induced the contract, *dolus dans causam contractui*, and incidental or accidental fraud. The former is that which has been the cause or determining motive of the contract, that without which the party defrauded would not have contracted. *Incidental* or *accidental* fraud is that by which a person, otherwise determined to contract, is deceived on some accessories or incidents of the contract,—for example, as to the quality of the object of the contract, or its price,—so that he has made a bad bargain. Accidental fraud does not, according to the civilians, avoid the contract, but simply subjects the party to damages. It is otherwise where the fraud has been the determining cause of the contract, *qui causam dedit contractui*: in that case the contract is void. Toullier, Dr. Civ. Fr. liv. 3, t. 3, c. 2, n. § 5, n. 86, *et seq.*

What constitutes fraud. 1. It must be such an appropriation as is not permitted by law. 2. It must be with knowledge that the property is another's, and with the design to deprive him of it. 3. It is not in itself a crime, for want of a criminal intent; though it may become such in cases provided by law. See Poll. Contr. 534.

Fraud, in its ordinary application to cases of contracts, includes any trick or artifice employed by one person to induce another to fall into or to detain him in an error, so that he may make an agreement contrary to his interest; [*sic*] and it may consist in misrepresenting or concealing material facts, and may be effected by words or by actions. See Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. 340, 26 L. Ed. 82. . . .

Effect of. Fraud, both at law and in equity, when sufficiently proved and ascertained, avoids a contract *ab initio*, whether the fraud be intended to operate against one of the contracting parties, or against third parties, or against the public . . .

In Criminal Law. Without the express provision of any statute, all deceitful practices in defrauding or endeavoring to defraud another of his known right, by means of some artful device, contrary to the plain rules of common honesty, are condemned by the common law, and punishable according to the heinousness of the offence; Co. Litt. 3 b; Dy. 295; Hawk. Pl. Cr. c. 71.

In considering fraud in its *criminal* aspect, it is often difficult to determine whether facts in evidence constitute a fraud, or amount to a felony. It seems now to be agreed that if the *property* obtained, whether by means of a false token or a false pretence, be parted with absolutely by the owner, it is a fraud; but if the possession only be parted with, and that possession be obtained by fraud, it will be a felony; Bacon, Abr. *Fraud*; 2 Leach 1066; 2 East, Pl. Cr. c. 673.

Of those gross frauds or cheats which, as being "levelled [*sic*] against the public justice of the kingdom," are punishable by indictment or information at the common law; 2 East, Pl. Cr. c. 18, § 4, p. 821; the following are examples: [*sic*] Uttering a fictitious bank bill; Com. V. Boynton, 2 Mass. 77; selling unwholesome provisions; 4 Bla. Com. 162; *mala praxis* of a physician; 1 Ld. Raym. 213; rendering false accounts, and other frauds, by persons in official situations; Rex v. Bembridge, cited 2 East 136; 5 Mod. 179; 2 Campb. 269; 3 Chitty, Cr. Law 666; fabrication of news tending to the public injury; Stark, Lib. 546; and per Scroggs, C. J., Rex v. Harris, Guildhall 1680; cheats by means of false weights and measures; 2 East, Pl. Cr. c. 18, § 3, p. 820; and generally the fraudulent obtaining of another by any deceitful or illegal practice or token (short of felony) which affects or may affect the public; 2 East, Pl. Cr. c. 18, § 2, p. 818; as with the common cases of obtaining property by false pretences. See DECEIT, MISREPRESENTATION. [*Bouvier's Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. "Fraud"]

FRAUD. . . . Constructive fraud consists in any act of commission or omission contrary to legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, which is contrary to good conscience and operates to the injury of another. . . . [*Black's Law Dictionary*, 1st ed., s.v. "Fraud"]

Section 1.7: Documentary evidence of actual, constructive fraud, betrayal of trust on the part of Congress; connivance therewith by the [Union-state] Legislature et al.

46. Congress, as Trustees of that certain voluntary trust, i.e., the Trust of July 4, 1776, by the name of *the United States of America*, via abjuration in substance, deed, and fact of the responsibilities with which they are charged by the Trustor thereof, namely the real and natural sovereign corporation known as *the good People of these Colonies*, to which end said Trustees are under solemn oath to uphold, perform, and secure, as of:
- February 3, 1913, perpetrate actual and extrinsic fraud, fraud in the inducement, and fraudulent concealment in the form of the Sixteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution, against *the People* of the several *Union-states* of the Union, Beneficiaries of the said Trust, as facilitated by the *constructive fraud* of:
 - The Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved as of the Act of March 9, 1878, i.e., the *Revised Statutes of the United States, Passed at the First Session of the Forty-third Congress, 1873-'74*. . . Title XXXV, Internal Revenue, ch. One, Officers of Internal Revenue, sec. 3140, p. 601; and
 - "An Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, to pay Interest on the Public Debt, and for other Purposes," ch. 173, sec. 182, vol. 13 of the *Statutes at Large*, 13 Stat. 223, p. 306, June 30, 1864,

via illicit manufacture of prima facie evidence, effectively commandeering through lexical stratagem, under color of law, via intentional production of confusion in the public mind as to the meaning of a certain *word/term of art*, i.e., “state,” extra-constitutional geographical territory over which to exercise absolute exclusive legislative power, dating to June 30, 1864, as aforesaid, by causing, with malice aforethought, the Protectors and Beneficiaries of the said Trust of July 4, 1776, i.e., *the People*, to believe, as of February 3, 1913, that the said Sixteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution, legislatively inapposite as a constitutional amendment per se and therefore fraudulent on its face, obtains against *the People*—who, beginning July 4, 1776, and continuing to and beyond February 3, 1913, are nontaxpayers in substance and fact, without the scope and neither of the subject nor of the object of the revenue laws of the United States—in order to deceive and coerce *the People* into, among other things, the goldsmith-banker contrivance and commercial artifice known as *income tax*, for the aggrandizement of the private creditors of the Government of the United States when, per statutory definition and meaning of that certain *term of art* created by *Congress* via the Act of June 30, 1864, *supra*, and resulting in Section 3140 of the *Revised Statutes* as aforesaid, namely “State,” the Sixteenth Article of Amendment to the *Constitution* obtains only against residents of “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” i.e., the geographical District of Columbia, the Territories, and “Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings,” thereby imposing and enforcing on *the People* through misrepresentation and willful concealment of material facts, a fraudulent interpretation, in letter and spirit, of the organic Declaration of Trust of *the United States of America*, namely *The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America* of July 4, 1776, and each and every subsequent de jure Trust instrument derived therefrom, e.g., the *Articles of Confederation*, *Constitution for the United States of America*, and *Bill of Rights*, resulting in incalculable, catastrophic damage and injury to the Trust, the Beneficiaries of the Trust, and myriads of others of Mankind in general, adversely affected, directly or indirectly, by said congressional fraud and mischief since and including June 30, 1864; and

- August 14, 1935, and the Social Security Act of the same date, i.e., H. R. 7260 and Title VIII § 801 thereof, under the pretext of a personal retirement program for the benefit of *the People* of the several *Union-states* of the Union, but principally to establish their liability for income tax—whose sole purpose is the payment of interest on the national debt incurred by Congress and owed to private lenders, the primary and ultimate beneficiaries thereof—in the nature of a Ponzi scheme, in concert with other actors in the Government of the United States, dupe *the People* (“new investors”), into “volunteering” to pay, as of this writing, as much as 35% (and more in some cases) of their earnings in so-called income tax; 6.2% to the retirement of third parties (12.4% if a Social Security franchisee works on his own) whom they do not know and have never met (“old investors”), to which contributions they retain no accrued property rights; and 0.0% toward their own personal retirement, concealing that (1) the principal part of the scheme is liability for income tax, an element bearing no relation to the purported purpose of the Social Security retirement program, and (2) the prospect of their realizing a benefit (“dividend”) from the so-called retirement program is a *gamble*, dependent on the United States/District of Columbia’s success in drawing into the scheme *ever-increasing numbers* of other “investors” (new taxpayers) who contribute Social Security payroll taxes in amounts sufficient to cover scheduled retirement benefits (artificially high dividends for “earlier investors”; less and less dividends, culminating in none, for “later investors”) at the time of their own retirement, a Ponzi scheme and unconscionable bargain and fraud perpetrated through, among other things, misrepresentation and concealment of material risks, duties, and facts by Congress and other actors within the District of Columbia and Government of the United States; and
- Thereafter enroll each and every member of the [*Union-state*] Legislature and Government and the legislature and government of every other *Union-state* as a subscribing member of

the Social Security political movement of the District of Columbia municipal corporation,¹⁷ incorporated for political purposes and having subordinate and local powers of legislation, whereupon each and every [*Union-state*] legislator and government officer, employee, and elected official establishes residence, for certain legal purposes such as taxation, licensing, and a species of criminal jurisdiction for which an action is not provided by law, “*That the legislative power of the District shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within said District,*”¹⁸ and submits to the absolute exclusive personal legislative power and jurisdiction of Congress and enacts into law each and every single piece of legislation to them presented (in the name, and by the authority, of Congress) and thereafter pervert, in the code/statutes of [*Union-state*], the meaning of the word “state” via transmutation into a *term of art* with a restricted meaning so as to render irrelevant in substance, [*Union-state*] and every other de jure *Union-state* of the United States of America, as contemplated by the Founding Fathers and Framers of the Constitution, and thereafter graft the Federal term “State” to the proper name of a *Union-state* and create a *political subdivision of the District of Columbia*, such as the “State of [*Union-state*],” i.e., one of the so-called *50 States*, the 50 political societies of Social Security franchisees residing within the exterior limits of each respective *Union-state*, and thereafter conceal the fraud from the Beneficiaries of the Trust of July 4, 1776, and enact legislation that appears to be in the name and by the authority of *the good People of these Colonies* of July 4, 1776, and *We the People* of March 4, 1789, but in actuality in the name and by the authority of the District of Columbia municipal corporation, and prey upon and mislead residents of [*Union-state*], already defrauded of their birthright and *right of property* of their own labor, paycheck, and wealth and effectively conscripted as a United States Government employee¹⁹ by Congress in the Social Security income-tax act, to waive/surrender legal title and ownership of every new carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power purchased, to the *District of Columbia Municipal Corporation Social Security Motor Vehicle Constructive Trust*, retaining only equitable and beneficial title and ownership thereof, whereupon the (a) personal information of each initial ultimate purchaser of a new carriage/contrivance, and (b) identifying information of the said carriage/contrivance is lodged in a *motor vehicle record* in a DMV run by one of the 50 political subdivisions/societies of the District of Columbia, reserving for the exclusive use of those beneficiaries of the said Social Security Motor Vehicle Constructive Trust who are willing to pay a fee for a District of Columbia driving certificate (occupational license), called a *driver license* or *operator license*, for the privilege of pursuing his/her profession or calling as a driver in the activity of the operation of motor vehicles for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo, thereby constituting a device that operates to ensure that each such driver is a subject of all legislation within the District of Columbia, thereby defrauding and depriving the Beneficiaries of the Trust of July 4, 1776, of the right of *Liberty*, as guaranteed by the Declaration of Trust thereof, under color of law and aegis of a law form without the common and statute law, essentially unknown to unwitting victims of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation Social Security Motor Vehicle Constructive Trust.

Part 2.

Extinguishment of contract (driving certificate) by rescission by reason of the giving of consent by mistake, disavowal of apparent consent.

47. *Whereas:* The *Extinguishment of Social Security Contract/Franchise* (Attachment A) documents that the Undersigned assumed the political liabilities and obligations that came with the former

¹⁷“An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” Ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” Ch. 180, Sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, i.e., § 2 of the *Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74*); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, Ch. 332, Sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

¹⁸Ibid (16 Stat, 419), § 18.

¹⁹5 USC 552a(a)(13); 26 USC 3401(c).

Social Security contract, account, and franchise unwittingly and gave, against interest, the Government of the United States, also known as the Government of the District of Columbia, apparent consent to exercise absolute exclusive legislative, judicial, and executive power over, among other things, the Undersigned's life, liberty, and property, thereby altering the Undersigned's position to his injury and risk and relinquishing, unwittingly, *right of property* of the Undersigned's labor, earnings, and wealth and suffering loss of a substantial portion thereof, an unconscionable bargain, based on representations from numerous disparate promoters, all of which run to the District of Columbia and Government of the United States, and willful concealment of material risks, duties, and facts in the former Social Security contract, account, and franchise, and gave the Undersigned's apparent consent to the District of Columbia and Government of the United States via the former Social Security contract, account, and franchise by mistake as a consequence thereof, which apparent consent the Undersigned certainly would not have given had such representations not been foisted on the Undersigned or the material risks, duties, and facts cited in Attachment A disclosed to the Undersigned—thereby rendering impossible the mutual agreement and assent of the parties to substance and terms of contract; and

Whereas: The *Extinguishment of Social Security Contract/Franchise* restores the parties to their respective precontractual positions; and

Whereas: The only Americans eligible for an occupational license, permit, or limited occupational license to engage in the activity of the operation of motor vehicles, i.e., the driving certificate commonly known as a *driver's license*, are citizens or residents of the District of Columbia; and

Whereas: There exists no evidence that at the time of submission of application for a driving certificate for the Undersigned to engage in the activity of the operation of motor vehicles, or anytime thereafter, the Undersigned is a citizen or resident of the District of Columbia,

Now, Therefore: The Undersigned hereby extinguishes, as of the date by the Undersigned last-below written, [UNION-STATE] DRIVER LICENSE [driver license serial number] by rescission, as authorized by law, and disavows, *ab initio*, the said apparent consent given by the Undersigned and obtained by the United States, District of Columbia, and State of [Union-state] through the Undersigned's mistake, effective the date of initial submission of application for a State of [Union-state] driving certificate for the Undersigned, and hereby declares void all motor vehicle records, motor-vehicle related forms, traffic citations, insurance records, and other documents of any kind whatsoever bearing the Undersigned's personal information or signature that may appear to evidence the Undersigned's consent or authorization re former [UNION-STATE] DRIVER LICENSE [driver license serial number], given by the Undersigned and obtained by the United States, District of Columbia, and State of [Union-state] by mistake as aforesaid.

Part 3.

Voluntary surrender of occupational license (driving certificate) to operate a motor vehicle (18 USC 31(a)(6)) as a driver, obtained by mistake by one ineligible, ab initio, to hold such certificate.

48. For the above reasons and on that basis, the Undersigned hereby surrenders [UNION-STATE] DRIVER LICENSE [driver license serial number]:

Place *Union-state* Driver License here.
Attach by staple. There should be
no writing in this space when sending.

Part 4.

Demand for expunction from every motor vehicle record of the Undersigned's personal information, given by the Undersigned and obtained by the United States, District of Columbia, and State of [Union-state] through the Undersigned's mistake.

49. The doctrine of *estoppel by matter in pais*, also known as *equitable estoppel* and *estoppel by conduct*, is defined, in pertinent part, as follows:

BY MATTER IN PAIS. Such arises from the acts and declarations of a person by which he designedly induces another to alter his position injuriously to himself. . . . Equitable estoppel, or estoppel by conduct, is said to have its foundation in fraud, considered in its most general sense ; Bisph. Eq. § 282. It is said (Bigelow, Estop. 437) that the following elements must be present in order to constitute an estoppel by conduct: 1. There must have been a representation or concealment of material facts. 2. The representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts. 3. The party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter. 4. It must have been made with the intention that the other party would act upon it. 5. The other party must have been induced to act upon it. . . . Tiedm. Eq. Jur. 107. The rule of equitable estoppel is, that one by his acts, declarations, or silence where it is his duty to speak, has induced another, in reliance on such acts, declarations, or silence, to enter into a transaction, he shall not, to the prejudice of the person misled, impeach the transaction : per . . . Stowe v. U. S., 19 Wall. (U. S.) 13, 22 L. Ed. 144 . . . Given v. Printing Co., 114 Fed. 92, 52 C. C. A. 40 ; Linton v. Ins. Co., 104 Fed. 584, 44 C. C. A. 54 . . . [*Bouvier's Law Dictionary*, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. "Estoppel"]

50. *Whereas: The Extinguishment of Social Security Contract/Franchise (Attachment A):*

- demonstrates that officers, employees, and agents of the United States, District of Columbia, or any political subdivision of the District of Columbia are barred, by reason of *equitable estoppel*, from asserting that the Undersigned or any derivative or variation in the spelling of the Undersigned's full true name is a *person/individual* or citizen or resident of a state, State, or the United States, and
- restores the parties, i.e., the Government of the United States and the Undersigned, to their respective precontractual positions; and

Whereas: Only persons/individuals, i.e., citizens or residents of the District of Columbia, are eligible for a District of Columbia occupational license/driving certificate to engage in the operation of motor vehicles for commercial purposes on the highways as a *driver* in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo; and

Whereas: There exists no evidence that demonstrates that at the time of application for a District of Columbia occupational license/driving certificate for the Undersigned, or now, the Undersigned or any derivative or variation in the spelling of the Undersigned's full true name, e.g., [NAME, FULL TRUE], is a person/individual or eligible for a District of Columbia occupational license/driving certificate such as [UNION-STATE] DRIVER LICENSE [driver license serial number],

*Wherefore: **Demand is hereby made** for the immediate expunction from every motor vehicle record in the possession or control of the United States, District of Columbia, or State of [Union-state] or any other political subdivision of the District of Columbia, of the Undersigned's personal information, given by the Undersigned and obtained by the United States, District of Columbia, and State of [Union-state] through the Undersigned's mistake.*

Conclusion.

Please be advised: This Extinguishment of Driving Certificate by Rescission and its contents are binding on every principal and agent re the subject matter set forth herein and shall, along with the accompanying Affidavit of Mailing, be entered in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding that may arise in connection therewith.

Please be further advised: As one without the scope of legislation within the District of Columbia and all political subdivisions of the District of Columbia, the Undersigned enjoys all rights and remedies in due

Attachment A

Contents of Attachment A.

Certified copy of:

- Extinguishment of Contract by Rescission by Reason of the Giving of Consent by Mistake, Disavowal of Apparent Consent, and Divestment of Right (Entitlement) to Receive Social Security Retirement or Survivor Benefits; and
- Affidavit of Mailing for the above instrument.

Affidavit of Mailing

United States of America *)
)
[Union State]) ss.
)
[County name] County)

I am over 18 years of age and not a party to the within action. My mailing location is:

[Name of mailing agent]
[Street identifiers]
[City], [Union-state]

On the [sequential (numerically)] day of [Month] [Year], I mailed one original of the following:

(1) Documentary evidence of actual, constructive fraud, betrayal of trust on the part of Congress; connivance therewith by the [Union-state] Legislature et al; (2) Extinguishment of contract (driving certificate) by rescission by reason of the giving of consent by mistake; disavowal of apparent consent; (3) Voluntary surrender of occupational license (driving certificate) to operate a motor vehicle (18 USC 31(a)(6)) as a driver, obtained by mistake by one ineligible, ab initio, to hold such certificate; and (4) Demand for expunction from every motor vehicle record of the Undersigned's personal information, given by the Undersigned and obtained by United States, District of Columbia, and State of [Union-state] through the Undersigned's mistake, signed, sworn to, and executed by [Full True Name] the [sequential (spelled out)] day of the [sequential (spelled out)] month in the year of our Lord two thousand [year (spelled out)] [[Month] [day], A.D. [year]], with three (3) subscribing witnesses, eighteen (18) pages in length, with twelve (12) attachment pages,

a total of thirty (30) pages mailed herewith, including all enclosure/attachment pages (not including this Affidavit of Mailing), by United States Postal Service® Certified Mail™, in a sealed envelope with postage pre-paid, properly addressed to [Name of senior executive of motor vehicles]; John G. Roberts, Jr.; Eric H. Holder, Jr.; [Name of Union-state Chief Justice]; and [Name of Union-state Attorney General] as follows:

[Name of senior executive of motor vehicles] [20-digit Certified Mail™ No.]
[Union-state] [Title of senior executive of motor vehicles]
[Union-state] [Department/Division] of Motor Vehicles
[Street address or P.O. Box]
[City, State, ZIP Code]

John G. Roberts, Jr. [20-digit Certified Mail™ No.]
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
One First Street N.E.
Washington, DC 20543

* In this Affidavit of Mailing, the proper noun "United States of America" means the collective of the States (commonwealths) united by and under that certain Constitution ordained and implemented March 4, 1789, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (the "Constitution"), and thereafter, numbering 50 at present, in conformance with the popular and ordinary meaning of the word "States," i.e., the plural form of the word "State," as "States" and "State" are used in the Constitution and all other congressional legislation thereafter prior to June 30, 1864; also known as *the Union* and *the Republic*.

Eric H. Holder, Jr.
Attorney General of the United States
United States Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

[20-digit Certified Mail™ No.]

[Name of Union-state Chief Justice]
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of [Union-state]
[Street address or P.O. Box]
[City, State, ZIP Code]

[20-digit Certified Mail™ No.]

[Name of Union-state Attorney General]
[Union-state] Attorney General
State of [Union-state] Department of Justice
[Street address or P.O. Box]
[City, State, ZIP Code]

[20-digit Certified Mail™ No.]

I, [Name of mailing agent], hereby solemnly swear, declare, and state that the foregoing is true, correct, and complete and that this Affidavit of Mailing is executed [Month] [Day], [Year], in [County name] County, [Union-state], United States of America.

[Name of mailing agent (printed)]

Date

Witness: [Name of Witness (printed)]

Date

Witness: [Name of Witness (printed)]

Date

Witness: [Name of Witness (printed)]

Addendum.

- Sample *Certificate of Origin for a Vehicle*
- Sample *Copy Certification by Notary*
- Sample *Demand for Manufacturer's Certificate of Ownership*
- Sample *Notice, Traffic-enforcement*
- Sample *Notice, Parking-enforcement*
- General note re criminal charges under Title 18 USC

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN FOR A VEHICLE

**AMERICAN HONDA
MOTOR CO. INC.**

DATE

[REDACTED]

INVOICE NO.

[REDACTED]

VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NO.

[REDACTED]

YEAR

[REDACTED]

MAKE

[REDACTED]

BODY TYPE

4 DOOR UTILITY ENG. NO.

SHIPPING WEIGHT

[REDACTED]

H.P. (S.A.E.)

[REDACTED]

G.V.W.R.

NO. CYLS.

[REDACTED]

SERIES OR MODEL

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I, the undersigned authorized representative of the company, firm or corporation named below, hereby certify that the new vehicle described above is the property of the said company, firm or corporation and is transferred on the above date and under the Invoice Number indicated to the following distributor or dealer.

NAME OF DISTRIBUTOR, DEALER, ETC.

**SUPERIOR OLDSMOBILE-CADILLACGMCTRUCK, INC.
D/B/A-BRIGHTON HONDA
8704 W.GRAND RIVER AVE
BRIGHTON MI 48116**

[REDACTED]

It is further certified that this was the first transfer of such new vehicle in ordinary trade and commerce.

*CERTIFIED FOR SALE *
*IN ALL 50 STATES *

AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.

BY:

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE)

(AGENT)

[REDACTED]

TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA

CITY - STATE

FORM 1483

[Sample]

COPY CERTIFICATION BY NOTARY

State of _____ }
County of _____ } ss.

On this the _____ day of _____ (Mo.), _____ (Yr.), I certify that the attached or preceding

document of _____ pages is a true, exact, complete and unaltered photocopy of
(1) Documentary evidence of actual, constructive fraud, betrayal of trust on the part of Congress; connivance therewith by the [Union-state] Legislature et al; (2) Extinguishment of contract (driving certificate) by rescission by reason of the giving of consent by mistake; disavowal of apparent consent; (3) Voluntary surrender of occupational license (driving certificate) to operate a motor vehicle (18 USC 31(a)(6)) as a driver, obtained by mistake by one ineligible, ab initio, to hold such certificate; and (4) Demand for expunction from every motor vehicle record of the Undersigned's personal information, given by the Undersigned and obtained by the United States, District of Columbia, and State of [Union-state] through the Undersigned's mistake.

Description of Original Document

presented to me by

[Full True Name]

Original Document's Custodian on Above Date

and that, to the best of my knowledge, the original document is neither a public record nor a publicly recordable instrument, certified copies of which are available from an official source other than a Notary Public.

- OR -

an official notarial record in my possession.

Signature of Notary Public, Notary Public

Place Notary Seal/Stamp Above

Notary's Name Printed/Typed

Appointment Expiration Date

OPTIONAL

Not required by law, this information can be useful for those relying on the document and prevent fraud.

Further Description of Attached Document

Address Where Original is Kept: _____

Original Document Date: _____ Copy Kept by Notary? Yes No

Signer(s) or Issuing Agency: _____

Capacity Claimed by Custodian

~~Individual~~

~~Corporate Officer~~ Title: _____

~~University or School Officer~~ Title: _____

~~Governmental Officer or Agent~~ Title: _____


~~Business Proprietor or Manager~~

~~Attorney~~

~~Trustee~~

~~Other:~~ _____

Custodian Is Representing: _____



[Full True Name]
[Street identifiers]
[City, Union-state]
(Please be advised: ZIP Code™ declined.¹)

[Date]

[Name of dealership]
[Street address]
[City, State, ZIP Code]

Demand for Manufacturer's Certificate of Ownership

Dear Sirs:

This is written demand for the manufacturer's certificate of ownership, also known as a "Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin," "Certificate of Origin for a Vehicle," etc., for that certain [Year] [Make] [Model], serial number [leave large blank space for serial number], upon tender of payment in full for said carriage/contrivance/conveyance.

Thank you very much for your courteous service.

Sincerely yours,

[*Full True Name* (signed)]
[Full True Name (printed)]

¹We note that under section 122.32 of the U.S. Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual, the use of a zip code remains voluntary. See United States Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual § 122.32, at 55 (Mar. 1992). . . . *Joseph Peters v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation*, 966 F.2d 1483, 296 U.S.App.D.C. 202, 22 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1123 (1992).

Notice to all State and Federal Officers, Employees, and Agents.

Please be advised: [Full True name] (the “Undersigned”) has investigated the matter and has neither seen nor been presented with any evidence, nor is he seized of knowledge of any material fact, that demonstrates that the device/carriage/conveyance before you bearing serial number [serial number], to which private property the Undersigned has both *right of property* and *right of possession* is:

- a *motor vehicle*, as the term “motor vehicle” is defined in the controlling legal definition of said term; or
- engaged in *interstate commerce*, as the term “interstate commerce” is defined in the controlling legal definition of said term; or

the Undersigned is:

- a *person*, as the term “person” is defined in any body of state/State/Federal law;
- a *natural person*, i.e., an individual (*U.S. v. Middleton*, No. 99-10518, 231 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2000));
- an *individual*, as the term “individual” is defined in any body of state/State/Federal law;
- the holder of a Social Security franchise, account, or number; or
- one who is eligible for a driver’s license,

and believes that none exists.

Please be further advised: As one without the scope of the statutes of the United States and State of [Union-state], the legal and equitable owner of this private property enjoys all rights and remedies in due course of law against officers, employees, and agents of the United States or State of [Union-state] who, in discharge of discretionless ministerial duties, commit without authority, contrary to their duty, and in violation of the due process of the *Constitution for the United States of America* or laws of the United States or State of [Union-state], positive acts of trespass for which they are personally liable.

Please be further advised: This *Notice to all State and Federal Officers, Employees, and Agents* and its contents are binding on every principal and agent and shall be entered in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding that may arise in connection with the subject matter set forth herein.

Please understand the extreme seriousness of this matter and conduct yourself accordingly.

Thank you for your kind attention.

Subscribed and sworn to upon penalty of perjury under the civil and penal codes of [Union-state] this [sequential (numerically)] day of [Month] 20[year], in [County name] County, [Union-state].

[*Full True Name* (signed)]

[Full True Name (printed)]

Notice to all State and Federal Officers, Employees, and Agents.

Please be advised: [Full True name] (the “Undersigned”) has investigated the matter and has neither seen nor been presented with any evidence, nor is he seized of knowledge of any material fact, that demonstrates that the device/carriage/conveyance before you bearing serial number [serial number], to which private property the Undersigned has both *right of property* and *right of possession* is:

- a *motor vehicle*, as the term “motor vehicle” is defined in the controlling legal definition of said term; or
- engaged in *interstate commerce*, as the term “interstate commerce” is defined in the controlling legal definition of said term; or

the Undersigned is:

- a *person*, as the term “person” is defined in any body of state/State/Federal law;
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- an *individual*, as the term “individual” is defined in any body of state/State/Federal law;
- the holder of a Social Security franchise, account, or number; or
- one who is eligible for a driver’s license,

and believes that none exists.

Please be further advised: As one without the scope of the statutes of the United States and State of [Union-state] and the legal and equitable owner of this private property, the Undersigned enjoys all rights and remedies in due course of law against officers, employees, and agents of the United States or State of [Union-state] who, in discharge of discretionless ministerial duties, commit without authority, contrary to their duty, and in violation of the due process of the *Constitution for the United States of America* or laws of the United States or State of [Union-state], positive acts of trespass for which they are personally liable.

Please be further advised: This *Notice to all State and Federal Officers, Employees, and Agents* and its contents are binding on every principal and agent and shall be entered in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding that may arise in connection with the subject matter set forth herein.

Please understand the extreme seriousness of this matter and conduct yourself accordingly.

Thank you for your kind attention.

Subscribed and sworn to upon penalty of perjury under the civil and penal codes of [Union-state] this [sequential (numerically)] day of [Month] 20[year], in [County name] County, [Union-state].

[*Full True Name* (signed)]

[Full True Name (printed)]

General note re criminal charges under Title 18 USC.

Anyone who has extinguished the Social Security franchise, any other franchise, and, ideally, all licenses¹ and is charged with a crime allegedly committed without Federal geographical territory may, *before trial*, file a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss² for the court's lack of personal jurisdiction; exhibits thereto consisting of:

1. *Affidavit of Specific Negative Averment* (defined *infra*), substantially in the form of that beginning under "Part 1" on browser-page 7 and concluding on browser-page 8 of "Sample handling of a demand from a tax collector" (Link 4 hereof), but with content customized to the criminal complaint and allegation that one is an "individual" or "citizen of the United States" or "resident of the *State of [Union-state]*," sworn to before three (better), but no less than two (sufficient) witnesses (do not use a notary public);
2. A 2–3 page brief demonstrating the meaning of the Title 18 term "United States" and, if necessary, "State"; there is no disputing, arguing, or denying; only a recital of facts and law and a *request*, i.e., the motion (not a *demand*, which is too confrontational), that the judge dismiss the case based thereon; and
3. A certified copy of (a) any and all pertinent extinguishment instruments, and (b) respective Affidavit of Mailing (use a notary public to produce certified copies).

Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., provides, in pertinent part, the following under "averment":

averment. . . . *n.* A positive declaration or affirmation of fact; esp., an assertion or allegation in a pleading <the plaintiff's averment that the defendant ran a red light>. . . .

negative averment. An averment that is negative in form but affirmative in substance and that must be proved by the alleging party. • An example is the statement "she was not old enough to enter into the contract," which is more than just a simple denial.

The Affidavit of Specific Negative Averment (§ 1 *supra*) takes things a step further than a simple negative averment because it is sworn "true, correct, and complete" (the nature of an affidavit; *vis-à-vis* a so-called *declaration*, which is attested "true and correct" only): The *negative averment* is one's positive assertion that he is not a citizen or resident of a state/State or the United States, i.e., the *District of Columbia* (*see* Link 4 as directed in § 1, *supra*); the *proof* of the same is the 2–3 page brief demonstrating the meaning of "state"/"State"/"United States" in the code under which one is charged, using the Rules and Principles of Statutory Interpretation.

If one needs to demonstrate the meaning of the Title 18 term "State," one should provide a non-argumentative proof of the extent of the meaning of said term as revealed in the discourse *How to use a car without the need for a driver's license*, document-pages 3–6.

¹Although extinguishment of the driver's license and any other license, concomitant with the Social Security franchise, is ideal, as long as one does not (1) produce, following extinguishment of the Social Security franchise, as authorization to perform a particular act, a license, or (2) cause to be created a record of use of the driver's license, such as a traffic citation, whether or not one proffers the license (or just reveals his/her name) to the traffic officer or not, the driver's license and any other District of Columbia occupational certificate can be extinguished without incident subsequent to the filing of a Title 18 USC (or any other) criminal charge against one. It is, however, more hygienic to extinguish a license before one runs into criminal charges, but failing to do so does not necessarily exclude remedy and liberation thereafter.

²http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcmp/rule_12.

Any United States Attorney who infers that there are more than 20 Title 18 USC “States” of the “United States” (*territorial sense* exclusively) such as the so-called *State of Illinois*, *State of Nevada*, etc., must be required to demonstrate that the territorial- and personal-jurisdictional limitations of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution are void/defunct and that every *de jure Union-state*, such as *Illinois*, *Nevada*, etc., is, per 18 USC § 31(a)(9), a “commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States”; *to wit*: “*Semper necessitas probandi incumbit qui agit*. The claimant is always bound to prove: the burden of proof lies on him.”

No ZIP Code™ should appear on anything signed or sworn to by the defendant or any envelope accepted by him/her in the mail. Any such mailpiece should be returned unopened, bar codes (front and back) and extraneous numbers/words blacked out, diagonal hash marks through the street and city-State-ZIP Code™ identifiers, and marked “No such address” and “RTS.” If incarcerated, one should make every effort to post bond quickly so as to avoid dealing with mail sent to him/her via the address of the detention facility, which always bears a ZIP Code™.

Apply the same procedure to any Federal civil complaint, less measures peculiar to the criminal process. Note: There is no substantial difference between State and Federal jurisdiction in civil or *malum prohibitum* criminal matters because, ultimately, “state,” “State,” and “United States” equate to the same thing, District of Columbia, and are used against the defendant in their political sense, whether the geographical, governmental, commercial, or territorial sense has application or not—and every state/State/Federal court is a legislative tribunal, instrumentality, and political field unit of the District of Columbia.

The above applies, minimally, in all statutory governmental civil causes of action and *malum prohibitum* criminal prosecutions. The difference between a *malum prohibitum* and *malum in se* offense is, in pertinent part, as follows:

malum . . . *noun* . . . *plural mala* . . . an offense against right or law : EVIL, WRONG [Merriam-Webster’s *Unabridged Dictionary*, inc. version 2.5, s.v. “Malum”]

malum prohibitum . . . *plural mala prohibta* . . . an offense prohibited by statute but not inherently evil or wrong [Ibid, s.v. “Malum prohibitum”]

malum in se . . . *plural mala in se* . . . an offense that is evil or wrong from its own nature or by the natural law irrespective of statute [Ibid, s.v. “Malum in se”]

In some *Union-states* statutes rule exclusively; and there is no such thing as a *mala in se* crime in the code/statutes of such *Union-states* because common-law offenses are abolished, making all alleged crimes in those particular *Union-states*, technically, *mala prohibta*; an arrangement that purportedly gives the United States (District of Columbia) *concurrent personal jurisdiction* with the particular “state” (District of Columbia) for purposes of criminal law enforcement; *to wit*:

Common law offenses are abolished and no act or omission shall constitute a criminal offense unless designated a crime or violation under this code or another statute of this state. . . . [Emphasis added.] [Kentucky Revised Statutes, Title L *Kentucky Penal Code* Chapter 500 *General Provisions* § 500.020 *Offenses defined by statute – Common law abolished* Subsection 1]

“Concurrent legislative jurisdiction for purposes of criminal law enforcement,” as used in KRS 3.250 to 3.275, means the joint power of the United States and the Commonwealth of Kentucky to enact and enforce their own criminal laws, including those pertaining to motor vehicle traffic control, over the lands in question. Under concurrent legislative jurisdiction for purposes of criminal law enforcement, both the United States and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or either of them, may take jurisdiction over a given criminal offense, according to the laws of the respective sovereign. [Ibid, Title I *Sovereignty and Jurisdiction of the Commonwealth* Chapter 3 *Grants to United States of Lands and Rights to Acquire* § 3.250 *Legislative finding*]

Per the Declaration of Independence and Constitution the foregoing arrangement is not possible in substance, only in form: *to wit*:

Duo non possunt in solido unam rem possidere. Two cannot possess one thing each in entirety.

One or the other, the “state” (District of Columbia) or United States (District of Columbia); has jurisdiction—*unless the two are one and the same*. None of the terms “state,” “State,” or “United States” defines the “Commonwealth of Kentucky”; the government of the State of Kentucky is a political subdivision of the District of Columbia.

All appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, the United States (District of Columbia) has personal jurisdiction over all Social Security franchisees no matter where in the world they may live, work, or travel. *Union-state* governments have personal jurisdiction over *persons* (Social Security franchisees) who reside within the exterior limits of their respective *Union-state*; but, because said governments are composed exclusively of Social Security franchisees, every such franchisee is the subject of all legislation within the District of Columbia and his government a political subdivision of the District of Columbia and only along for the ride. This is the origin and nature of the so-called *Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force*: (1) Federal (District of Columbia), and (2) State (District of Columbia) authorities operating jointly. All “State” Police/Troopers are *Political Subdivision of the District of Columbia* Police/Troopers.

Documentary evidence that “State” = Federal.

Congress tip their hand by divulging via official act that (1) they make “State” law (i.e., that “State” does not mean *Union-state* but *District of Columbia*: geographical territory over which Congress exercise absolute exclusive territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislative power and jurisdiction), and (2) “Federal” and “State,” when used as adjectives, mean substantially the same thing (District of Columbia); *to wit*:

Commercial crimes. Any of the following types of crimes (Federal or State): Offenses against the revenue laws; burglary; counterfeiting; forgery; kidnapping; larceny; robbery; illegal sale or possession of deadly weapons; prostitution (including soliciting, procuring, pandering, white slaving, keeping house of ill fame, and like offenses); extortion; swindling and confidence games; and attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or compounding any of the foregoing crimes. Addiction to narcotic drugs and use of marihuana will be treated as if such were commercial crime. [U/L emphasis added.] [Title 27 Code of Federal Regulations § 72.11]

The above also confirms that all *Federal* (District of Columbia) and *State* (District of Columbia) statutes are *in pari materia*³ with each other.

The reason the Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce (subject-matter jurisdiction only) is because different *Union-states* have different laws and a forum of commonality is needed for jurisdictional purposes in the resolution of disputes; not because people involved in interstate commerce are an inherent menace to society and need to be regulated as a criminal class.

Further: The words/expressions “rules,” “regulations,” and “rules and regulations” (e.g., Code of Federal Regulations) are taken directly from the territorial clause of the Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2), and have no application in *Union-states*, only in territory or other property belonging to the United States, such as the District of Columbia, over residents thereof. ■

³*in pari materia* . . . [Latin “in the same matter”] . . . On the same subject; relating to the same matter. • It is a canon of construction that statutes that are *in pari materia* may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject. . . . *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 7th ed., s.v. “*In pari materia*.”