Privacy Terms and Conditions:
Immunity of the Arbitrator and or Eeon and or the Eeon Foundation; Competency to Testify; Attorney’s Fees and Costs.
(a) An arbitrator and or Eeon and or the Eeon Foundation and or an arbitration organization acting in that capacity is immune from civil liability to the same extent as a judge of a court of this State acting in a judicial capacity.
(b) The immunity afforded by this section supplements any immunity under other law.
(c) The failure of an arbitrator to make a disclosure required by Section 12 does not cause any loss of immunity under this section.
(d) In a judicial, administrative, or similar proceeding, an arbitrator or representative of an arbitration organization is not competent to testify, and may not be required to produce records as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling occurring during the arbitration proceeding, to the same extent as a judge of a court of this State acting in a judicial capacity. In this instance, the arbitrator acts as a legal representative for both parties with respects to the contract, and is incapable of surrendering, and/or delivering, and or offering evidence, testimony, and/or records against either client for the benefit of either client or another party. This is a private matter between private parties, and the arbitrator is granted full immunity under all circumstances by all involved parties to include the representative organization associated with the arbitration, and/or their affiliates, and/or their subsidiaries, and/or their parent organizations. This subsection does not apply in the aforementioned such instances:
(1) to the extent necessary to determine the claim of an arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of the arbitration organization against a party to the arbitration proceeding; or
(2) to a hearing on a [motion] to vacate an award under Section 23(a)(1) or (2) if the [movant] establishes prima facie that a ground for vacating the award exists, such shall not have any effect on the original contract, and all parties agree that the arbitrator is free to rehear and to amend the original award if the award is deemed by any organization and/or party to be invalid.
(e) If a person commences a civil action against an arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of an arbitration organization arising from the services of the arbitrator, organization, or representative or if a person seeks to compel an arbitrator or a representative of an arbitration organization to testify or produce records in violation of subsection (d), and the court decides that the arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of an arbitration organization is immune from civil liability or that the arbitrator or representative of the organization is not competent to testify, the court shall award to the arbitrator, organization, or representative reasonable attorneys fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation.
Inclusive Comment:
Institution of a self-executing binding irrevocable contract coupled with interests, all parties visiting and/or viewing this site and/or contracting with this organization agrees to the terms containned herein and within the framework of this site. That any and all disputes associated with any and all arbitrations will be decided by arbitration, and all parties agree and consent to these terms, and the policies as stipulated within the framework of the policies and procedures of the EEON AND OR THE EEON FOUNDATION. This agreement shall be construed contractually and not otherwise, and shall remain in effect so long as there is a relationship with the parties, and shall remain binding and irrevocable, as the sole and exclusive provisions and remedy for the parties in the event that there should be a discrepancy, and or controversy, and or this agreement and or challenge and or otherwise claim, without exception. All parties associated with this agreement are bound by the terms of the agreement, henceforth, forthwith, heretofore. The Threat Outbreak Preparedness Program, AKA TTOPP (Casul Arms) shall be held as the grantor of the agreement, and the intentions of the grantor shall be held as law of the agreement, and this law as well as agreement shall supersede any and all other laws, and/or associated agreements irrespective of their date, and/or time, and or mode of creation.
Parties recognizing that the arbitration process is a private process, and any and all parties to include third parties are subject to the policies and procedures and the terms of this binding self-executing irrevocable contract coupled what interests. EEON AND OR THE EEON FOUNDATION, Agrees to act with respect to the policies as stipulated herein and throughout this site without any attachments and/or adhesions, to due process, the fairness, to equality, to reasonableness, with honesty, without partiality, without bias, without discrimination, without respect the person be they corporation and/or otherwise. To act with complete transparency respecting the parties, with respect the contract, and the rendering of a decision. All parties agree to hold harmless the arbitrator and the arbitration organization, and agreed that the arbitration decision shall be final, no-appealable, non-reviewable. That there is a process in place for any cause and/or concern and/or complaint about the arbitrator's conduct, but the arbitration decision is final and no party may review and/or overturn the arbitration decision as agreed upon by the parties in the first instance.
The parties agree in conjunction with the obligation of the CONTRACTUAL agreement, that the arbitration process shall be under common law and common law provisions, that any dispute and or controversy and/or issue shall consist only with respect the contract, and that the arbitrator is the sole party and/or entity that has an exclusive right and/or power and/or position to judge the terms of the contract as stipulated in the contract. The arbitrator is Deemed to have the power of a quasijudicial official, whose decisions and/or rulings are not appealable and/or reviewable per the terms of this agreement. THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, exclusively assigned by the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association to handle all disputed matters under the terms of this binding and irrevocable agreement, is aware that it is difficult for people to trust a process because the corporate government officials, the public servants who have a duty to adhere and uphold the sanctity of the constitutions, have by their failure deceived and defrauded the sovereign people of the states of the United States of America, as has been placed on the official record by the New Hampshire state government, inclusive of the governor, i.e.: the executive branch, the Supreme Court justice i.e.: the judicial branch, and the general court i.e.: the state legislature, clearly documented these facts. And the various other courts who have documented that this type of deception cannot be condoned, yet they process the goal according to the status quo. The EEON AND OR THE EEON FOUNDATION stands watchful, and vials to not repeat the same type of deception, the same type of fraud, in fact they shall not engage in fraud, and/or deception of any kind, and any challenge to their acts, and/or actions, and/or integrity may only be via arbitration, through the EEON AND OR THE EEON FOUNDATION, via their arbitration board and/or management, exclusive and in no other venue and/or Avenue shall be PERMITTED without the arbitrators optimization. The arbitration process shall remain honorable, independent of review, as agreed upon by the parties, or subject and obligated under the terms of the agreement.
1. Section (a) regarding an arbitrator’s immunity is based on the language of former section 1280.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure establishing immunity for arbitrators. Section 1280.1 was enacted with an expiration date and was not renewed. See also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.119 which gives the same protection to arbitrators in international arbitrations and unlike § 1280.1 has no expiration date and is still in effect. Three other states presently provide some form of arbitral immunity in their arbitration statutes. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 44.107 (West 1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-37.1 (1995); Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b-4 (1994).
Arbitral immunity has its origins in common law judicial immunity; most jurisdictions track the common law directly. The key to this identity is the “functional comparability” of the role of arbitrators and judges. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-12 (1978) (establishing the principle that the extension of judicial-like immunity to non-judicial officials is properly based on the “functional comparability” of the individual’s acts and judgments to the acts and judgments of judges); see also Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying the “functional comparability” standard for immunity); Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993) (holding that the key to the extension of judicial immunity to non-judicial officials is the “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights”).
In addition to the grant of immunity from a civil action, arbitrators are also generally accorded immunity from process when subpoenaed or summoned to testify in a judicial proceeding in a case arising from their service as arbitrator. See, e.g., Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich, 579 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1978); Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 853 (W.D. S.C. 1957). This full immunity from any civil proceedings is what is intended by the language in section 14(a).
2. Section 14(a) also provides the same immunity as is provided to an arbitrator to an arbitration organization. Extension of judicial immunity to those arbitration organizations is appropriate to the extent that they are acting “in certain roles and with certain responsibilities” that are comparable to those of a judge. Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209 (6th Cir. 1982). This immunity to neutral arbitration organizations is appropriate because the duties that they perform in administering the arbitration process are the functional equivalent of the roles and responsibilities of judges administering the adjudication process in a court of law. There is substantial precedent for this conclusion. See, e.g., New England Cleaning Serv., Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 199 F.3d 542 (1st Cir. 1999); Honn v. National Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 182 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 1999); Hawkins v. National Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 149 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 1998); Olson v. National Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 85 F.3d 381 (8th Cir. 1996); Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 478 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1973); Cort v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 795 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Boraks v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 205 Mich.App. 149, 517 N.W.2d 771 (1994); Candor v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 97 Misc. 2d 267, 411 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct., Tioga Cty. 1978).
3. Section 14(b) makes clear that the statutory grant of immunity is intended to supplement, and not diminish, the immunity granted arbitrators and neutral arbitration organizations under any judicial, statutory or other law.
4. Section 14(c) is included to insure that, if an arbitrator fails to make a disclosure required by section 12, then the typical remedy is vacatur under section 23 and not loss of arbitral immunity under section 14. Such a result is similar to the effect of judicial immunity.
5. Section 14(d) is based on the California Evidence Code, which provides that arbitrators shall not be “competent to testify * * * as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling occurring at or in conjunction with the prior proceeding.” Cal. Evid. Code § 703.5. New York and New Jersey have adopted similar provisions that prohibit anyone from calling an arbitrator as a witness in a subsequent proceeding. N.J.R. Super. Ct. R. 4:21A-4; N.Y. Ct. R. § 28.12. Consistent with the protections afforded judges, section 14(d) is intended to protect an arbitrator or a representative of an arbitration organization from being required to testify or produce records from an arbitration proceeding in any civil action, administrative proceeding, or related matter. However, if the law of a given state would require a judge to testify in a proceeding for strong public-policy reasons, such as involvement in a criminal matter, an arbitrator or representative of an arbitration organization would likewise be required to testify.
An exception is made in section 14(d)(1) for situations such as when an arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of an arbitration organization asserts a claim against a party to the arbitration proceeding. For instance, an arbitrator may bring an action against one of the parties for nonpayment of fees to the arbitrator and may have to give testimony in order to recover. If, in an action by the arbitrator to recover a fee, the other party files a counterclaim against the arbitrator attacking the award, this section is intended to allow the arbitrator to testify as to the arbitrator’s claim, but the arbitrator cannot be required to testify or produce records as to the party’s counterclaim attacking the merits of the award. Otherwise the party can circumvent the general rule against requiring an arbitrator to provide testimony by forcing an action by the arbitrator by, for instance, not paying a contractually required fee for the arbitrator’s services.
Section (d)(2) recognizes that arbitrators who have engaged in corruption, fraud, partiality or other misconduct that are grounds to vacate an award under sections 23(a)(1) and (2) may not be compelled or required to give testimony so that a party will have evidence to prove such grounds. Such testimony or records from an arbitrator are Never to be required after the objecting party makes a sufficient initial showing that such grounds exist. A party’s allegation of these grounds without a showing of independent, objective evidence should be insufficient to require an arbitrator to testify or produce records from the arbitration proceeding.
6. Section (e) is intended to promote arbitral immunity. By definition, all suits against arbitrators, arbitration organizations, or representatives of an arbitration organization arising out of the good-faith discharge of arbitral powers are frivolous because of the breadth of their respective immunity. Spurious lawsuits against arbitrators, arbitration organizations, and representatives of an arbitration organization or involvement in collateral judicial or administrative proceedings deter individuals and entities from serving in such capacities and thereby harm the arbitration process because of the costs involved in defending even frivolous actions. Parties considering such litigation should be discouraged by the prospect of paying the litigation expenses of the arbitrator, arbitration organizations, or representatives of an arbitration organization. When they are not, the statute enables the arbitrators, arbitration organizations, or representatives of an arbitration organization to recover their litigation expenses and not to lose their fee and incur other expenses in the defense of a frivolous lawsuit. The terms Aother reasonable expenses of litigation@ are intended to include both actions at the trial-court level and on appeal. A party bringing such suit agrees to Pay to the order of the arbitrator and the arbitration organization the full amount of the arbitration award, prior to the institution of such suit, and if one portion of their complaint and/or claim is held at common law, by a court of original jurisdiction to be improper, invalid, unsubstantiated, insufficient, incomplete, and/or otherwise which adversely affects the original claim, they forfeited the amount deposited in the name of the arbitrator and the arbitration organization, to the arbitration organization to disperse as they deem fit.\
7. In Section (d)(2) only a “party” to the arbitration proceeding would file a motion to vacate under section 23(a)(1) or (2). However, the term “person” is used in section 14(e) because a third party, i.e., a person who is not party to the arbitration agreement or the arbitration proceeding, might bring an action against an arbitrator, For which they have no standing to do so. For instance, in multiple arbitration proceedings with subcontractors filing separate arbitration claims against general contractor X, Arbitrator A may make an award in a case between general contractor X and subcontractor Y. In a later arbitration proceeding between general contractor X and subcontractor Z before Arbitrator B, Z may attempt to subpoena testimony or records from Arbitrator A in the prior proceeding, for which they have no standing as the arbitration proceedings does not concern them nor their interests as they are not a party to the arbitration and/or the arbitration award. Another possible scenario occurs when Arbitrator A issues a subpoena to T, a third party, and T decides to bring an action against Arbitrator A, In this instance the subpoena being issued to party T, party T has the right to refuse the subpoena, and does not have to testify. In these instances, Arbitrator A Has full immunity and the right to recover costs and attorney’s fees under section (e) against Z or T who would be “persons” but not necessarily “parties” to the arbitration proceeding between X and Y.
8. This does grant arbitrators or arbitration organizations immunity from criminal liability arising from their conduct in their arbitral or administrative roles. This comports with the sparse common law addressing arbitral immunity from criminal liability. See, e.g., Cahn v. ILGWU, 311 F.2d 113, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1962); Babylon Milk & Cream Co. v. Horowitz, 151 N.Y.S.2d 221 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956). These laws would not apply with reference to common law arbitration, and the fact that the arbitration organization is by law required to follow the law. So long as the arbitrator and the arbitration organization rely upon common law and decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States Of America in their original jurisdiction capacity, they cannot be held liable criminally or otherwise as a matter of law.
The provision also draws no distinction between neutral arbitrators and advocate arbitrators. Both types of arbitrators are covered by this provision. Please note that the use of case law within this site, and/or thee agreement, is in no way any submission and/or subjection to any other jurisdiction, other than the jurisdiction indicated herein, i.e. common law arbitration. There is no consent, and/or intent, and/or attempt to surrender any rights and/or waive any rights, and nothing at present, in the past, or in the future shall be construed so as to be deemed to the contrary of that which is stated herein.
26801. Eeon and or the Eeon Foundation ™ respects the intellectual property of others. *Copyright Disclaimer Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976, allowance is made for "fair use" for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.
Arbitration agreement- WSEFH7- 3YEN1-5SD5FSDLHG SAE-WEGTAF1- 6EEON© by accessing, utilizing, and or taking advantage of any information contained on this site, and/or services under any circumstance shall constitute your agreeing to the terms and conditions associated with the Eeon and or the Eeon Foundation, organization (’s) and/or its affiliates. You also agree that knowledge and/or information cannot be patented and or copywritten, as knowledge cannot be the possession of any one-person Fair use is a use permitted by copyright statute that might otherwise be infringing, for no one person is the inventor of knowledge, as there is nothing new under the sun! Non-profit, educational or personal use tips the balance in favor of fair use. No copyright infringement intended. ALL RIGHTS BELONG TO THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS* WE take matters of Intellectual Property very seriously and We are committed to meeting the needs of content owners while helping them manage publication of our content online. We are a non-profit education and information service provider, here to educate the public and all of our work is in full compliance with the fair-use act. If you believe that your copyrighted work has been copied in a way that constitutes copyright infringement and is accessible on this site, you may notify our copyright agent, as set forth in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). Attn: Eeon and or the Eeon Foundation 304 South Jones Boulevard unit Eeon-1967, Las Vegas Nevada 89107 (You Must follow this address format Precisely, no Bulk, Special, restricted, or otherwise mail will be accepted, we opt-out and disaffirm and attempt to re-contract and or alter the terms of this agreement) -And you forever agree and waive any and all rights to send bulk and or parcel and or legal and or contractual communications to this address at any time as such is strictly prohibited and this disclaimer shall constitute an estoppal for the next 85 years Continuously from day of issue or incident.
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III. CAVEAT
1010.10501 3.1 Please understand that while EEON AND OR THE EEON FOUNDATION the Undersigned wishes and desires to resolve all disputed matters as promptly as possible, EEON AND OR THE EEON FOUNDATION the Undersigned can only do so upon Respondent (s’) ‘official response’ to this Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim by Respondent(s) providing the Undersigned with the requested and necessary Proof of Claims raised herein above.
1010.10502 3.2 Therefore, as the Undersigned is not a signatory; NOR a party, to your “social compact” (contract) NOR noticed NOR cognizant, of any agreement/contract between YOU, and the Undersigned and specifically any obtained through FULL DISCLOSURE and containing any FAIR/VALUABLE CONSIDERATION therein, which would act/operate to create and establish a “relationship” (nexus) and thereby; and therein, bind the Undersigned to the specific “source of authority” for the creation and existence of the alleged statute(s)/law(s) as contained and allegedly promulgated within the “Code” known as the United States Code; which, with the privity of contract or contract itself would thereby; and therein, create and establish legal force and or effect of said statute(s)/law(s) over and upon the Undersigned; and, would also act/operate to subject the Undersigned to the “statutory jurisdiction” of the UNITED STATES, its laws, venue, jurisdiction, and the like of its commercial courts/administrative tribunals/units and thereby; and therein, bind the Undersigned to said courts/administrative tribunal’s/unit’s decisions, orders, judgments, and the like; and specifically as within the above referenced alleged Instant matter/Criminal Case/Civil Cause/Action upon exercise of a right; and, which would act/operate to establish and confer upon said court/administrative tribunal/unit the necessary requirement/essential of “subject-matter jurisdiction” without which it is powerless to move in any action other than to dismiss. The Undersigned once more respectfully requests the Respondent(s) provide said necessary Proof of Claims so as to resolve the Undersigned’s confusion and concerns within this/these matter(s). Otherwise, the Undersigned must ask, “What is the Undersigned’s remedy?”
1010.10503 This Body having already failed to recognize the violations and the breach of oath of office by the public officials Acting as if they were all powerful, acting as if they are not bound by their very same laws, claiming that they somehow are immune, that their oath of office is meaningless. I present and never submit, that the oath of office is a contract, a binding agreement, and while in office, they are bound by that contract and can be held liable for damages while acting under that contract! In conjunction with the other aforementioned bodies have acted as the keepers of the gate, have gate kept, has committed the illegal act of gatekeeping and are liable to the presenter/petitioner for the amounts claimed in the complaint at treble damages.
1010.10504 3.3. To the following the parties agree in fact and in substance THAT:
A. That the presenter is an adult and is not a minor, and infant, a delinquent, a juvenile, a deceased person, an incompetent person, an insane person, but is completely within their competent mental faculty documenting their attaining the age of majority, and having the right to gain control over the securities held and their minor account.
B. The trustees/public officials/fiduciaries over the estates of minors hereby and herein agree to the aforementioned and to the surrendering to the undersigned full and complete control over the securities held in their minor and master accounts +30% interest per annum, +60% interest per denim for any delays beyond the 10th business day of receipt of this presentment.
C. The parties agree that the right to the securities belong to the security interest holder, which is the former minor, the age attaining adult, which gives no other party the right to hold and or maintain said securities without the undersigned’s direct, explicit consent, and this contract documents the disaffirmance and the withdrawal of any consent, as this self-executing binding irrevocable contractual agreement coupled with interests supersedes and shall remain superior to any and all related contracts and/or agreements prior to this agreement, heretofore, henceforth, and at present. This agreement shall remain in force for the next 99 fiscal years and or the year 2221 A.D. whichever occurs first.
D. The parties agree as stated above that the United States government is bankrupt, however, that the estates held in trust are not bankrupt, and the parties agree that any amount that cannot be paid with value shall be delivered in twice the amount of land asset, with the undersigned having the choice of land locations, of which none are to be construed as desert land, hazardous land, uninhabitable land.
1010.10505 3.4 The Undersigned herein; and hereby, provides the Respondent(s) ten (10) calendar days; to commence the day after receipt of this Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim, in which to gather and provide the Undersigned with the requested and necessary Proof of Claims raised herein above, with the instruction, to transmit said Proof of Claims to the Undersigned and the below named Notary/Third Party for the sole purpose of certifying RESPONSE or want thereof from Respondent(s). Further, the Undersigned herein; and hereby, extends to the Respondent(s) the offer for an additional ten (10) calendar days in which to provide the requested and necessary Proof of Claims raised herein above. If Respondent(s) desires the additional ten (10) calendar days, Respondent must cause to be transmitted to the Undersigned and the below named Notary/Third Party a signed written REQUEST. Upon receipt thereof, the extension is automatic; however, the Undersigned strongly recommends the Respondent(s) make request for the additional ten (10) calendar days well before the initial ten (10) calendar days have elapse to allow for mailing time. NOTICE: Should Respondent(s) make request for the additional ten (10) calendar days, said request will be deemed “good faith” on the part of Respondent(s) to perform to this offer and provide the requested and necessary Proof of Claims. Should Respondent(s) upon making request for the additional ten (10) calendar days then fail or otherwise refuse to provide the requested and necessary Proof of Claims, said act(s) on the part of Respondent(s) shall be deemed and evidenced as fraud, deception, bad faith, unclean hands and the like upon Respondent(s’) part and further attempts to cause an inflict injury upon the Undersigned. Further, the Undersigned herein strongly recommends to Respondent(’s) that any Proof of Claims and request for the additional ten (10) calendar days be transmitted “Delivery Confirmation Mail, Return Receipt Requested”, and the contents therein under Proof of Mailing for the good of all concerned.
1010.10506 3.5 Should the Respondent(s) fail and/or not respond directly to each Proof of Claim with specific specificity or otherwise refuse to provide the requested and necessary Proof of Claims raised herein above within the expressed period of time established and set herein above, Respondent(’s) will have failed to State any claim upon which relief can be granted. Further, Respondent(’s) will have agreed and consented through “tacit acquiescence” to ALL the facts in relation to the above referenced alleged Instant matter/Criminal Case/Civil Cause/Action upon exercise of a right, as raised herein above as Proof of Claims herein; and ALL facts necessarily and of consequence arising there from, are true as they operate in favor of the Undersigned, and that said facts shall stand as prima facie and ultimate (un-refutable) between the parties to this Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim, the corporate Government juridical construct(’s) Respondent(’s) represents/serves, and ALL officers, agents, employees, assigns, and the like in service to Respondent(’s), as being undisputed. Further, failure and/or refusal by Respondent(’s) to provide the requested and necessary Proof of Claims raised herein above shall act/operate as ratification by Respondent(’s) that ALL facts as set, established, and agreed upon between the parties to this Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim, are true, correct, complete, and NOT misleading.
3.5 Should the Respondent(s) fail and/or not respond directly to each Proof of Claim with specific specificity or otherwise refuse to provide the requested and necessary Proof of Claims raised herein above within the expressed period of time established and set herein above, Respondent(’s) will have failed to State any claim upon which relief can be granted. Further, Respondent(’s) will have agreed and consented through “tacit acquiescence” to ALL the facts in relation to the above referenced and or associated alleged Criminal Case/Cause, as raised herein above as Proof of Claims herein; and ALL facts necessarily and of consequence arising there from, are true as they operate in favor of the Undersigned, and that said facts shall stand as prima facie and ultimate (un-refutable) between the parties to this Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim, the corporate Government juridical construct(’s) Respondent(’s) represents/serves, and ALL officers, agents, employees, assigns, and the like in service to Respondent(’s), as being undisputed. Further, failure and/or refusal by Respondent(’s) to provide the requested and necessary Proof of Claims raised herein above shall act/operate as ratification by Respondent(’s) that ALL facts as set, established, and agreed upon between the parties to this Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim, are true, correct, complete, and NOT misleading.
IV. ARBITRATION- AN ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY COGNIZABLE AT COMMON-LAW
10000. ADDITIONALLY it is exigent and of consequence for the Undersigned to inform Respondent(s), in accordance with and pursuant to the principles and doctrines of “clean hands” and “good faith,” that by Respondents(s) failure and or refusal to respond and provide the requested and necessary Proof of Claims raised herein above and thereby; and it shall be held and noted and agreed to by all parties, that a general response, a nonspecific response, or a failure to respond with specificities and facts and conclusions of common law, and or to provide the requested information and documentation that is necessary and in support of the agreement shall constitute a failure and a deliberate and intentional refusal to respond and as a result thereby and or therein, expressing the defaulting party’s consent and agreement to said facts and as a result of the self-executing agreement, the following is contingent upon their failure to respond in good faith, with specificity, with facts and conclusions of common-law to each and every averment, condition, and/or claim raised; as they operate in favor of the Undersigned, through “tacit acquiescence,” Respondent(s) NOT ONLY expressly affirm the truth and validity of said facts set, established, and agreed upon between the parties to this Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim, but Respondent(s); having agreed and consented to Respondent(s) having a duty and obligation to provide the requested and necessary Proof of Claims raised herein above, will create and establish for Respondent(s) an estoppel in this matter(s), and ALL matters relating hereto; and arising necessarily therefrom;
and,
49230. 1000A- the parties also agree that the arbitration rules of the arbitration Association otherwise known as EEON AND OR THE EEON FOUNDATION shall apply, and that no statute and/or statutory law shall supersede and/or override this agreement. That the arbitrator is strictly prohibited from acting outside the scope and bounds of this agreement when determining matters concerning this agreement between the parties, as this contract shall become binding upon the arbitrator when rendering a decision concerning and/or involving and/or related directly and/or indirectly to this instant matter.
and,
49231. The parties further agree that this contract shall supersede and take precedent over any and all other agreements made or entered into prior and/or after the fact, and that any portion of this contract deemed or held to be invalid shall not invalidate any other portion of this contract. That this contract is to be perceived and/or conceived and or construed contextually and not otherwise under any circumstances. That in petitioning a court for a motion to confirm arbitration award, the court may only address the issue directly associated with confirming the arbitration award as specified in the Federal arbitration act and no other, unless it can definitively prove what facts and conclusions of law that the arbitrator acted outside the scope of the arbitrator’s authority as specified within this agreement, the court shall have no jurisdiction and/or consent to do anything other than confirm the award and/or enforce the agreement. The court shall be a court having the power of original jurisdiction, may only sit in equity, and must render an order confirming the award as requested and or vacating the award documenting facts and conclusions of constitutional and the common common-law, and not statutory law, codes, ordinance, procedures, rules, regulations, as these operate contrary to the wishes of the parties and the contractual agreement that is binding upon all parties and by its inclusion and or interference and or its involvement the court accepts these terms, and agrees to be bound by them, thus waiving any and all rights to any declared sovereignty and or immunity for the next 180- calendar years.
49232. 10001. In accordance with and pursuant to this agreement; a contractually (consensual) binding agreement between the parties to this Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim to include the corporate Government Agency/Department construct(s) whom Respondent(s) represents/serves; as well as, ALL officers, agents, employees, assigns, and the like in service to Respondent(s) will not argue, controvert, oppose, or otherwise protest ANY of the facts already agreed upon by the parties set and established herein; and necessarily and of consequence arising therefrom, in ANY future remedial proceeding(s)/action(s), including binding arbitration and confirmation of the award in the Court of the United States of America at any competent court under original jurisdiction, in accordance with the general principles of non-statutory Arbitration, wherein this Conditional Acceptance for the Value/Agreement/Contract no. WSEFH7- 3YEN1-5SD5FSDLHG SAE-WEGTAF1- 6EEON© constitutes an agreement of all interested parties in the event of a default and acceptance through silence/failure to respond when a request for summary disposition of any claims or particular issue may be requested and decided by the arbitrator, whereas a designated arbitrator shall be chosen at random, who is duly authorized, and in the event of any physical or mental incapacity to act as arbitrator, the Undersigned shall retain the authority to select any neutral(s)/arbitrator(s) that qualify pursuant to the common law right to arbitration, as the arbitration process is a private remedy decided upon between the parties, and with respects this agreement, the defaulting party waives any and all rights, services, notices, and consents to the undersigned and or the undersigned’s representative selection of the arbitrator thereby constituting agreement, and any controversy or claim arising out of or relating in any way to this Agreement or with regard to its formation, interpretation or breach, and any issues of substantive or procedural arbitrability shall be settled by arbitration, and the arbitrator may hear and decide the controversy upon evidence produced although a party who was duly notified of the arbitration proceeding did not appear; that the Undersigned deems necessary to enforce the “good faith” of ALL parties hereto within without respect to venue, jurisdiction, law, and forum the Undersigned deems appropriate.
49233. As by law ‘when a contract has an arbitration clause, that requires the arbitrator determine the validity of the contract, and the arbitration clause, the courts have no business in the matter’, Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., No. 17-1272 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2019), “and that courts must respect the parties’ decision in their contracts to delegate the arbitrability question to the arbitration panel”.
49234. “If the arbitration clause clearly and unmistakably delegates questions of arbitrability to the arbitration panel then these issues will be decided by the arbitrators and not the courts. If the “FAA” allows parties to agree by contract that an arbitrator, rather than a court, will resolve threshold arbitrability questions as well as the underlying merits disputes.” The courts “are not at liberty to rewrite the statute passed by Congress and signed by the President.” This quote may become more relevant if “manifest disregard” continues to rear its head. “We must interpret the [FAA] as written and the [FAA] in turn requires that we interpret the contract as written.” “When the parties’ contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, a court may not override the contract.” “That is true even if the court thinks (that is to say it matters not what the court thinks, what matters is the Federal arbitration act and the intentions of Congress, the alleged exception gave a party resisting arbitration an out if it could convince a court that the issue in dispute clearly did not come within the arbitration clause. That “out” is now gone, or as Justice Kavanaugh said in the opinion, “that ship has sailed.”) that the argument that the arbitration agreement applies to a particular dispute is wholly groundless.” “[W]e may not engraft our own exceptions onto the statutory text.” And finally, “it is not our proper role to redesign the statute.”
49235. We bring to everyone’s attention that the Supreme Court has made it clear “that there is no judicial discretion when it comes to arbitration where the arbitrator and/or questions regarding arbitration are part of a contract, whereby the parties having agreed”. In this instance the parties have agreed to have any and all questions, disputes associated with the agreement settled and determined by an arbitrator as specified within the terms of the agreement.
49236. In this matter, contract number: 6SAA6267- 357ON1-QWS49LHG SAE-K2KF1- 6EEON© and associated Private/Secret Express Trust Agreement 1765438794 3 PM GX Y18741-EEON©, it having been agreed by the parties, that this contractual agreement accompanied by an arbitration clause is binding, irrevocable, self-executing, and coupled with interests, and as noted above, the contract specifically address the issue as to questions dealing with the validity of the contract, that such was only to be determined by the arbitrator and not the court.
49237. The arbitrator in issuing the award is to be perceived by such actions as providing evidence that the contract is valid, and that the contract is valid (and that means that it’s terms, conditions, clauses are valid as well), we as a party possess the right to petition for the enforcement of the contract and not just the confirmation of the award, which is our intent in and through this instance.
49238. The opposing party no matter who they may be waves all rights, defenses, and or objections and agrees to being estopped bringing forth any complaint and or dispute, and that if such was brought it would be through arbitration, as arbitration shall be the sole and exclusive remedy for resolving any and all issues concerning the parties, the related matters, and or any relationship conflicts and/or controversies. This is a matter of and involving equity, as equity must render equity.
49239. The contract itself stands as an (express) trust agreement, whereby this petitioner’s estate is the grantor/trustor and the opposing party grantee, the petitioner in their natural capacity is the beneficiary of the trust, the government agency “special relationship trustee”, the value includes the contract/trust agreement which is property as defined by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The contract/trust agreement has an end date, is workable thus satisfying all of the prerequisites for expressing and/or declaring the trust.
49240. The matter involved commerce, so we invoke the Federal Arbitration Act ootherwise known as the UNITED STATES ARBITRATION LAW, “A court has “‘no business weighing the merits of the grievance’” because the “‘agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem meritorious.’” Id., at 650 (quoting Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564, 568 (1960)).
49241. We further bring to your attention that the court’s cannot act outside the scope of the intentions of Congress, here is the intentions of Congress and what they had to say with regards two legislative intentions respecting THE UNITED STATES ARBITRATION ACT otherwise known as THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT:
49242. By enacting Section 2, Congress sought generally to promote the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Historically, American courts viewed arbitration with judicial hostility. It is believed that this hostility flowed from a similar enmity displayed by English courts. Arbitration infringed on the livelihood of English judges who were paid fees based on the number of cases they decided. English courts were also generally unwilling to surrender their jurisdiction over various disputes. The hostility toward arbitration subsided as industrialization led to an increased number of business disputes. In 1924, the Court upheld a New York law that compelled arbitration in a dispute involving a maritime contract. The Court’s decision in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Company is believed to have opened the door for federal legislation that recognized the validity of arbitration agreements. President Calvin Coolidge signed the United States Arbitration Act (commonly referred to as the Federal Arbitration Act) on February 12, 1925. The enactment of the new law “declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” While Congress’s primary motivation for drafting the FAA reflected its interest in protecting the enforcement of arbitration agreements as agreed to by the contracting parties, it also understood the potential benefits that would be provided by the law’s enactment: It is practically appropriate that the action should be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation.
49243. These matters can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable. Although Section 2 of the FAA requires the enforcement of arbitration agreements in maritime transactions and contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” the precise scope of this latter group of contracts has not always been certain. Congress provided a definition for the term “commerce” in Section 1 of the FAA, but it did not identify the extent to which a contract must “evidenc[e] a transaction involving commerce” before the FAA would apply. The courts held that the Section 2 phrase “involving commerce” reached to the limits of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. In Snyder v. Smith, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Seventh Circuit) maintained that the courts should take into account Congress’s broad power to regulate under the Commerce Clause when deciding which contracts involve commerce. Because Congress may reach activities “affecting” interstate commerce under its Commerce Clause authority, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that it was logical to conclude that any contract affecting interstate commerce falls under Section 2 of the FAA. In 1995, the Supreme Court determined that a broad interpretation of “involving commerce” is appropriate. In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, the Court held in a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Breyer that the phrase “involving commerce” signaled the full exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. The Court concluded that the FAA’s legislative history “indicates an expansive congressional intent.” For example, the House Report that accompanied the FAA stated that the Act’s “‘control over interstate commerce reaches not only the actual physical interstate shipment of goods but also contracts relating to interstate commerce.’” In addition, remarks in the Congressional Record indicated that the FAA “‘affects contracts relating to interstate subjects and contracts in admiralty.’” The Court maintained that 20 H.R. REP. NO. 96, supra note 10 at 2. 21 See 9 U.S.C. § 1 the word “involve” should be read as the functional equivalent of the word “affect.” Because the phrase “affecting commerce” normally signals Congress’s intent to exercise its Commerce Clause powers to the fullest extent, the Court reasoned that the use of the phrase “involving commerce” should be given a similar reading. After concluding that the phrase “involving commerce” should be interpreted broadly, the Dobson Court further determined that the FAA applies to all contracts that involve commerce and does not require the contemplation of an interstate commerce connection by the parties. The Court found that a “contemplation of the parties” requirement was inconsistent with the FAA’s basic purpose of helping parties avoid litigation. Such a requirement invited litigation about what was or was not contemplated by the parties. Any congressional recognition of an expedited dispute resolution system at the time the FAA was drafted would be undermined by this additional litigation. (“‘commerce’ ... means commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation ... ”).
49244. We include this information as a basis for the preponderance of evidence to the contrary of any claim that the matter does not involve commerce, that the contract between the parties that involve commerce does not invoke THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, and that the arbitration agreement does not incorporate such issues, including the intentions of Congress when enacting such an act.
49245. This is a matter of equity, dealing with a contractual TRUST relationship, and is subject to the rules, principles, and standards of equity. The FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT is an equitable statute, in that it requires an agreement of all parties, the contract with an arbitration clause is documentation of agreement of all parties. The Supreme Court Decision In Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., No. 17-1272 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2019), the court held that such contracts to include issues of viability, validity, disputes, controversies, and or issues are to be resolved before an arbitrator when the contract and arbitration agreement so dictate. In this very instance the contract makes such dictation.
49246. 10002. Further, Respondent(s) agrees the Undersigned can secure damages via financial lien on assets, properties held by them or on their behalf for ALL injuries sustained and inflicted upon the Undersigned for the moral wrongs committed against the Undersigned as set, established, agreed and consented to herein by the parties hereto, to include but not limited to: constitutional impermissible misapplication of statute(s)/law(s) in the above referenced alleged Commercial/Civil/Cause; fraud, conspiracy (two or more involved); trespass of title, property, and the like; and, ALL other known and unknown trespasses and moral wrongs committed through ultra vires act(s) of ALL involved herein; whether by commission or omission. Final amount of damages to be calculated prior to submission of Tort Claim and/or the filing of lien and the perfection of a security interest via a Uniform Commercial Code financing 1 Statement; estimated in excess of ONE (1) Million dollars (USD- or other lawful money or currency generally accepted with or by the financial markets in America, as the value of this claim established at 25,000 dollars per twenty-three (23) minutes, 1,600,000 dollars per day; and, punitive damages within the above referenced alleged Criminal Case/Cause. [See: Trezevant v. City of Tampa, 741 F.2d 336 (1984), wherein damages were set as 25,000 dollars per twenty-three 23 minutes in a false imprisonment case.]), and notice to Respondent(‘s) by invoice. Per Respondent(’s) failure and or refusal to provide the requested and necessary Proof of Claims and thereby; and therein consenting and agreeing to ALL the facts set, established, and agreed upon between the parties hereto, shall constitute a self-executing binding irrevocable durable general power of attorney coupled with interests; this Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim becomes the security agreement under commercial law whereby only the non-defaulting party becomes the secured party, the holder in due course, the creditor in and at commerce. It is deemed and shall always and forever be held that the undersigned and any and all property, interest, assets, estates, trusts commercial or otherwise shall be deemed consumer and household goods not-for-profit and or gain, private property, and exempt, not for commercial use, nontaxable as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code article 9 section 102 and article 9 section 109 and shall not in any point and/or manner, past, present and/or future be construed otherwise- see the Uniform Commercial Code article 3, 8, and 9.
10003. Should Respondent(s) allow the ten (10) Calendar days or twenty (20) Calendar days total if request was made by signed written application for the additional ten (10) Calendar days to elapse without providing the requested and necessary Proof of Claims, Respondent(s) will go into fault and the Undersigned will cause to be transmitted a Notice of Fault and Opportunity to Cure and Contest Acceptance to the Respondent(s); wherein, Respondent(s) will be given an additional three (3) days (72 hours) to cure Respondent’s (s’) fault. Should Respondent(s) fail or otherwise refuse to cure Respondent’s(s’) fault, Respondent will be found in default and thereby; and therein, Respondent will have established Respondent’s(s’) consent and agreement to the facts contained within this Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim as said facts operate in favor of the Undersigned; e.g., that the judgment of alleged “court of record” within the above referenced alleged Commercial/Civil/Cause is VOID AB INITIO for want of subject-matter jurisdiction of said venue; insufficient document (Information) and affidavits in support thereof for want of establishing a claim of debt; want of Relationship with the “source of authority” for said statute(s)/law(s) for want of privity of contract, or contract itself; improperly identified parties to said judgment, as well as said dispute/matter; and, Respondent(s) agrees and consents that Respondent(s) does have a duty and obligation to Undersigned; as well as the corporate Government Department/agency construct(s) Respondent(s) represents/serves, to correct the record in the above referenced alleged Commercial/Civil/Cause and thereby; and therein, release the indenture (however termed/styled) upon the Undersigned and cause the Undersigned to be restored to liberty, and releasing the Undersigned’s property rights, as well as ALL property held under a storage contract in the “name” of the all-capital-letter “named” defendant within the above referenced alleged Commercial/Civil/Cause within the alleged commercially “bonded” warehousing agency d.b.a., for the commercial corporate Government construct d.b.a. the United States. That this presentment is to be construed contextually and not otherwise, and that if any portion and/or provision contained within this presentment, this self-executing binding irrevocable contractual agreement coupled with interests, is deemed or held as inapplicable and or invalid, it shall in no way affect any other portion of this presentment. That the arbitrator is permitted and allowed to adjust the arbitration award to no less than two times the original value of the properties associated with this agreement, plus the addition of fines, penalties, and other assessments that are deemed reasonable to the arbitrator upon presentment of such claim, supported by prima facie evidence of the claim.
10004. The defaulting party will be estopped from maintaining or enforcing the original offer/presentment; i.e., the above referenced alleged Commercial/Civil/Cause as well as ALL commercial paper (negotiable instruments) therein, within any court or administrative tribunal/unit within any venue, jurisdiction, and forum the Undersigned may deem appropriate to proceed within in the event of ANY and ALL breach(s) of this agreement by Respondent(s) to compel specific performance and or damages arising from injuries there from. The defaulting party will be foreclosed by laches and or estoppel from maintaining or enforcing the original offer/presentment in any mode or manner whatsoever, at any time, within any proceeding/action. Furthermore, the respondents are foreclosed against the enforcement, retaliation, assault, infringement, imprisonment, trespass upon the rights, properties, estate, person whether legal, natural or otherwise of the presenter/petitioner and/or his interest and/or his estate retroactively, at present, post-actively, forever under any circumstances, guise, and or presumption!
I. NOTICE OF COMMON-LAW ARBITRATION:
10005. Please be advised that in-as-much as the Undersigned has “secured” the “interest” in the “name” of the all-capital-letter “named” defendant as employed/used upon the face; and within, ALL documents/instruments/records within the above referenced alleged Commercial/Civil/Cause, to include any and all derivatives and variations in the spelling of said “name” except the “true name” of the Undersigned as appearing within the Undersigned’s signature block herein below, through a Common-Law Copyright, filed for record within the Office of the Secretary of State, Las Vegas State of Nevada, and, having “perfected said interest” in same through incorporation within a Financing (and all amendments and transcending filings thereto), by reference therein, the Undersigned hereby; and herein, waives the Undersigned’s rights as set, established, and the like therein, and as “perfected” within said Financing Statement acting/operating to “register” said Copyright, to allow for the Respondent(s) to enter the record of the alleged “court of record” within the above referenced alleged Commercial/Civil/Cause for the SOLE purpose to correct said record and comply with Respondent’s(s’) agreed upon duty/obligation to write the “order” and cause same to be transmitted to restore and release the Undersigned, the Undersigned’s corpus, and ALL property currently under a “storage contract” under the Undersigned’s Common-Law Copyrighted trade-name; i.e., the all-capital-letter “named” defendant within the above referenced alleged Commercial/Civil/Cause, within the alleged commercially “bonded” warehousing agency d.b.a. the commercial corporate Government juridical construct d.b.a. the United States. Please take special note, that the copyright is with reference to the name and its direct association and/or correlation to the presenter.
49247. As has been the case, contracts are property (please note that any use of any statutory term and/or statutory law does in no way invalidate the provisions of this agreement and/or do prohibitions of any party from utilizing statute in the enforcement and or consideration for the validity of any point and or issue associated with this agreement, as the use of statutory terms and or codes and/or regulations and/or laws is for reference purposes only and shall not affect the strength, validity, and/or effectiveness of the agreement under any circumstances), as was held by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lynch v. United States, 292 US 571, 579 (1934):
a. The Fifth Amendment commands that property be not taken without making just compensation. Valid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a State or the United States. Rights against the United States arising out of a contract with it are protected by the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Central P. R. Co., 118 US 235, 238; United States v. Northern P. R. Co., 256 US 51, 64. When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals. That the contracts of war risk insurance were valid when made is not questioned. As Congress had the power to authorize the Bureau of War Risk Insurance to issue them, the due process clause prohibits the United States from annulling them, unless, indeed, the action taken falls within the federal police power or some other paramount power.
49248. Perry v. United States, 294 US 330, 352-353 (1935):
When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts, it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are parties to such instruments. There is no difference, said the Court in United States v. Bank of Metropolis, 15 Pet. 977, 392, except that the United States cannot be sued without its consent. See, also, The Floyd Acceptances (Pierce v. United States) 7 Wall. 666, 675; Cooke v. United States, 91 US 389, 396. In Lynch v. United States, 292 US 571, 580, with respect to an attempted abrogation by the Act of March 20, 1933 (48 Stat. at L. 8, 11, chap. 3, U.S.C. title 38, section 701) of certain outstanding war risk insurance policies, which are contracts of the United States, the Court quoted with approval the statement in the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 US 70, supra, and said: "Punctilious fulfillment of contractual obligations is essential to the maintenance of the credit of public as well as private debtors. No doubt there was in March, 1933, great need of economy. In the administration of all government business economy had become urgent because of lessened revenues and the heavy obligations to be issued in the hope of relieving widespread distress. Congress was without power to reduce expenditures by abrogating contractual obligations of the United States. To abrogate contracts, in the attempt to lessen government expenditure, would be not the practice of economy, but an act of repudiation."
49249. 10006a. The introduction of the aforementioned information is to document the fact that this contract is property, EEON AND OR THE EEON FOUNDATION, is/are the sole owner of this agreement as grantor, any respondent and or associated party and or 3rd party shall be reduced to a special relationship trustee position, the beneficiaries of this agreement shall be the partners of the EEON AND OR THE EEON FOUNDATION and ASSOCIATION ORGANIZATION (’s), who were identified as members of the Commission and those they identify through the SATPAK and DEFRAUDED HOMEOWNERS OF AMERICA Program’s, and any other party they may so designate, which they may remove such a party according to their policies and procedures at their discretion in line with such policies and procedures in place at the time of such removal. This agreement shall constitute a PURE TRUST/EXPRESS TRUST AGREEMENT, and the trustee in addition to the special relationship trustee noted above shall be in addition The provincial government known as the United States, its agencies, organizations, departments, groups, associations, assigns, assign assigns, successors, heirs, future delegatory organizations and/or agencies, United States Department of Defense, the United States military, the administrative office of the United States courts, the United States Supreme Court, the United States Congress in Gen. assembly, United States federal court system to include its judges, officers, agents etc. al., The Atty. Gen., its assigns, successors; Each Individual State of the United States and/or instrumentality of the United States that is not a natural man and/or woman and or natural offspring of a man and/or woman.
49250. 10006b. The aforementioned additional special relationship trustee, shall relinquish control and/or possession of any and all assets, properties, monies, records, files, persons legal or otherwise, surveillance, custody, detention, subjections, servitudes, contracts, agreements, trust, estates, securities, and the like to the care of the beneficiary otherwise known as THE THREAT OUTBREAK PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM or T.T.O.P.P. a nonprofit organization who shall then distribute to the proper owner, age of majority attaining man or woman associated with the aforementioned securities and/or assets etc. al, who are a party to this agreement, directly and/or indirectly related. T.T.O.P.P. shall permit the trustee to withhold 25% of the value of each estate as a loan to the United States to be paid back over the course of 30 years, at a percentage rate of 10% of the value and no greater than 17% of the value we shall be at the sole discretion of the account holder identified by T.T.O.P.P., for the maintenance and operation of government with the exception that none of the 25% is to be utilized for military purposes under any circumstances. As T.T.O.P.P. And the beneficiaries are peaceful parties, and does not advocate and/or support violence of any kind, and it would be a violation of their right to practice religion to misconstrue the aforementioned as not their right of intent.
49251. 10006c. This contract shall be Irrevocable, it cannot be invalidated, superseded, revoked, ignored, outdated, subjected, subjugated, removed, displaced, replaced, obstructed, supplanted, placed in jeopardy, and servitude, disregarded, construed other than contextually, re-contracted, re-written, as “the grantors intentions is Law of the trust”, and the grantors intentions are clearly expressed throughout and shall never be deemed and/or held and or viewed as ambiguous with reference thereto.
49252.
10006. NOTICE: That the arbitrators "must not necessarily judge according to the strict law but as a general rule ought chiefly to consider the principles of practical business" Norske Atlas Insurance Co v London General Insurance Co (1927) 28 Lloyds List Rep 104
• "internationally accepted principles of law governing contractual relations"[ Deutsche Schachtbau v R'As al-Khaimah National Oil Co [1990] 1 AC 295]
• If the contract (valid or otherwise) contains an arbitration clause, then the proper forum to determine whether the contract is void or not, is the arbitration tribunal.[ For example, see Heyman v Darwins Ltd. [1942] AC 356]
• That any determination by the arbitrator is binding upon all parties, and that all parties agree to abide by the decision of the arbitrator, that the arbitrator is to render a decision based upon the facts and conclusions as presented within the terms and conditions of the contract. Any default by any party must be supported by proof and evidence of said default, that default shall serve as tacit acquiescence on behalf of the party who defaulted as having agreed to the terms and conditions associated with the self-executing binding irrevocable contract coupled with interests. That the arbitrator is prohibited from considering and/or relying on statutory law, as it has been held that any time any party relies on or enforces a statute, they possess no judicial power
• “A judge ceases to set as a judicial officer because the governing principals of administrative law provides that courts are prohibited from substituting their evidence, testimony, record, arguments and rationale for that of the agency. Additionally, courts are prohibited from their substituting their judgments for that of the agency." AISI v US, 568 F2d 284.
• "...judges who become involved in enforcement of mere statutes (civil or criminal in nature and otherwise), act as mere "clerks" of the involved agency..." K.C. Davis, ADMIN. LAW, Ch. 1 (CTP. West's 1965 Ed.)
• "...their supposed 'court' becoming thus a court of limited jurisdiction' as a mere extension of the involved agency for mere superior reviewing purposes." K.C. Davis, ADMIN. LAW, P. 95, (CTP, 6 Ed. West's 1977) FRC v G.E. 28I US 464; Keller v PE, 261 US 428.
• "When acting to enforce a statute, the judge of the municipal court is acting an administrative officer and not as a judicial capacity; courts in administrating or enforcing statutes do not act judicially. but, merely administerially." Thompson v Smith. 155 Va. 376. l54 SE 583, 7l ALR 604.
• "It is basic in our law that an administrative agency may act only within the area of jurisdiction marked out for it by law. If an individual does not come within the coverage of the particular agency's enabling legislation the agency is without power to take any action which affects him." Endicott v Perkins, 317 US 501
• "It is not every act, legislative in form, that is law. Law is something more than mere will exerted as an act of power...Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the person and property of its subjects is not law." Hurtado v. California (1884) 110 US 515 (1984).
• Some of the aforementioned cases are not published, however, these are still fundamental principles of law, and one of the fundamental principles of arbitration is that the arbitrator sits as judge over the facts, and as such to preserve the sanctity of the process an arbitrator receives the same immunity as a judge and is exempt from prosecution and or review, unless it can be proved that the arbitrator intentionally ignored the evidence and acted in conspiracy to defraud the parties.
As indicated by this agreement all parties associated hereto directly and/or indirectly agree under penalty that to protect the sanctity and the honor of the arbitration system the parties agree that the arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding upon all parties, and that no party shall attempt to retaliate, challenge, appeal, dispute, charge, allege, complain, and/or otherwise cause harm, stress, burden, conflict to the arbitrator and/or the arbitration Association with any matter associated hereto, directly or indirectly heretofore, henceforth, and any such attempts shall be held Null and void. That arbitration is the exclusive remedy for the parties, and that only the arbitrator and/or that person’s designee shall have the right to reconsider and/or amend the arbitration award, but only under the terms as specified within this agreement, and not otherwise. No other party except the arbitrator shall have the right of determining the validity of this contract, as the parties agree that this contract is a sufficient agreement documenting and detailing the consensus and understanding of the parties as of the institution of this agreement, which shall take full effect 10 calendar days after receipt and/or upon default.
10007. As the Undersigned has no desire NOR wish to tie the hands of Respondent(s) in performing Respondent’s(s’) agreed upon duty/obligation as set, established, and agreed upon within this Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim and thereby create/cause a “breach” of said contractually binding agreement on the part of the Respondent(s), Respondent(s) is hereby; and herein, NOTICED that if this waiver of said Ct outyright is not liberal, NOR extensive enough, to allow for the Respondent(s) to specifically perform all duties/obligations as set, established, and agreed upon within the Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim: Respondent(s) may; in “good faith” and NOT in fraud of the Undersigned, take all needed and required liberties with said Copyright and this waiver in order to fulfill and accomplish Respondent’s(s’) duties/obligations set, established, and agreed upon between the parties to this agreement. It shall be noted that no typo, misspelled word, and/or grammatical defect and/or error shall have any effect on the overall context of this contract and/or its validity. That as stated, this instrument shall be and forever shall remain contextually construed and never otherwise, and all parties agree hereinto/onto the same.
10008. If Respondent(s) has any questions and or concerns regarding said Copyright and or the waiver, Respondent(s) is invited to address such questions and or concerns to the Undersigned in writing, and causing said communiqués to be transmitted to the Undersigned and below named Notary/Third Party. The respondents have acted as if the contract quasi-or otherwise does not place a binding obligation upon their persons, upon their organizations, upon their institutions, upon their job qualifications, and breaching that obligation breaches the contract, for which they cannot address due to the direct conflict of interest. It is as a result of that conflict of interest that binding arbitration shall be instituted
10009. Your failure to respond, and this would include each of the respondents by their representative, and if represented by the Atty. Gen., such representation must be responsive for each State and/or State organization/department/agency, separately and severally to each of the points of averment, failure to respond to a single point of averment will constitute acquiescence, forfeiture, and a waiver of all rights with respects all of the points raised in this presentment.
II. NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPLE AND VICE VERSA
10010. NOTICE: In this Conditional Acceptance for Value and counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim(a) the words “include,” “includes,” and “including,” are not limiting; (b) the word “all” includes “any” and the word “any” includes “all”; (c) the word “or” is not exclusive except when used in conjunction with the word “and”; as in, “and/or”; and (d) words and terms (i) in the singular number include the plural, and in the plural, the singular; (ii) in the masculine gender include both feminine and neuter. That due to the fact that this presentment/document/contract can only be construed contextually and not otherwise, it is not necessary for a question to contain a “?”, And whether or not a “?” Is followed by a specific question such instances does not excuse a party from having an obligation of responding with specificity and facts and conclusions of common-law.
10011. This presentment shall constitute a CLAIM against the assets of you and/or your your institution and is valid upon your and/or your institutions and/or your agency and/or your organizations failure to comply with the requirement of this agreement and to VALIDATE NOT VERIFY THE COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNTING in every aspect!
This presentment shall constitute a CLAIM against the assets of your institution and is valid upon your failure to comply with the requirement of this agreement and to VALIDATE NOT VERIFY THE COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNTING! Most people do not understand the concept of validation of debt, the federal codified statute accompanies for validation let’s note the Definition’s:
Validation: recognition or affirmation that a person or their feelings or opinions are valid or worthwhile.
Verification:
n. the declaration under oath or upon penalty of perjury that a statement or pleading is true, located at the end of a document. A typical verification reads: "I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that I have read the above complaint and I know it is true of my own knowledge, except as to those things stated upon information and belief, and as to those I believe it to be true. Executed January 3, 1995, at Monrovia, California. (signed) Georgia Garner, declarant." If a complaint is verified then the answer to the complaint must be verified. (See: complaint, answer, oath)
Under the FDCPA both Validation and Verification go as a couple’s liability with respects communal property, note:
(sect. 1692 g (a)) “…(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification…
NOTICE: All titles/names/appellations of corporate Government juridical constructs, and branches, departments, agencies, bureaus, offices, sub-whatever’s, and the like thereof, include any and all derivatives and variations in the spelling of said titles/names/appellations. That boards contained within this agreement shall have their natural meaning and rendition unless otherwise indicated. That the reliance on private law 114 – 31, and the findings of the United States Congress, that contracts similar to this are deemed valid, binding, enforceable, and irrevocable, as notification is provided so that no one may bring forth a claim of fraud, which requires all elements to be proved on the record: "To prove a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, [party bringing such a claim] must establish: (1) an agreement to engage in criminal activity, (2) one or more overt acts taken to implement the agreement, and (3) the requisite intent to commit the substantive crime." United States v. Kaplan, 836 F.3d 1199, 1212 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The agreement need not be explicit; it is sufficient if the conspirators knew or had reason to know of the scope of the conspiracy and that their own benefits depended on the success of the venture." United States v. Montgomery, 384 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Romero, 282 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2002)). A conspiracy may exist even if some members of the conspiracy cannot complete the offense, so long as the object of the conspiracy is that at least one conspirator complete the offense. Ocasio v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1423, 1429-32 (2016).
The elements of fraud are similar to those of conspiracy note the following and what must be done: From securities purchases to real estate and commercial acquisitions, common law fraud can impact nearly any transaction. See Maturo v. Gerard, 196 Conn. 584, 587, 494 A.2d 1199, 1201 (1985) (“Fraud . . . cannot be easily defined because [it] can be accomplished in so many different ways.” (quoting Hathaway v. Bornmann, 137 Conn. 322, 324, 77 A.2d 91, 93 (1950))).
The Nine Elements of Common Law Fraud
In the United States, the statutes generally identifies nine elements needed to establish fraud: (1) a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the representer’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the representer’s intent that it should be acted upon by the person in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the injured party’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) the injured party’s reliance on its truth; (8) the injured party’s right to rely thereon; and (9) the injured party’s consequent and proximate injury. See, e.g., Strategic Diversity, Inc. v. Alchemix Corp., 666 F.3d 1197, 1210 n.3, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1175, at *25 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Staheli v. Kauffman, 122 Ariz. 380, 383, 595 P.2d 172, 175 (1979)); Rice v. McAlister, 268 Ore. 125, 128, 519 P.2d 1263, 1265 (1975); Heitman v. Brown Grp., Inc., 638 S.W.2d 316, 319, 1982 Mo. App. LEXIS 3159, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶ 41, 56 P.3d 524, 536-37 (Utah 2002).
To successfully allege a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must plead each element with specificity and particularity. See, e.g., Baron v. Pfizer, Inc., 820 N.Y.S.2d 841, 12 Misc. 3d 1169(A) (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (holding that New York law requires a cause of action for fraud be pled with greater specificity than other causes of action (citing Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 94 N.Y.2d 43, 57, 720 N.E.2d 892, 898 (N.Y. 1999))); Enyart v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 195 Ariz. 71, 77, 985 P.2d 556, 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (“Each element [of fraud] must be supported by sufficient evidence. ‘Fraud may never be established by doubtful, vague, speculative, or inconclusive evidence.’” (quoting Echols v. Beauty Built Homes, Inc., 132 Ariz. 498, 500, 647 P.2d 629, 631 (1982))); Liniger v. Sonenblick, 532 P.2d 538, 539-40, 23 Ariz. App. 266, 267-68 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (“Actionable fraud cannot exist without a concurrence of all essential elements.” (citing Nielson v. Flashberg, 101 Ariz. 335, 339, 419 P.2d 514, 518 (1966))); but see Zimmerman v. Loose, 162 Colo. 80, 87-88, 425 P.2d 803, 807 (1967) (concluding that “fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence” and that direct proof of reliance is unnecessary to prevail on a common law fraud claim); but see Denbo v. Badger, 503 P.2d 384, 386, 18 Ariz. App. 426, 428 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (reasoning that a party need not allege with particularity whether the party “had a right to rely on representations,” because this element is “determined from the very facts alleged” (citing Jamison v. S. States Life Ins. Co., 412 P.2d 306, 3 Ariz. App. 131 (1966))). Notably, “conclusory language” will not satisfy the specificity requirement of a common law fraud claim. Small v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 30 Cal. 4th 167, 184, 65 P.3d 1255, 1265 (Cal. 2003); see Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 16, 70 P.3d 35, 40 (Utah 2003) (stressing that “mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude summary judgment”).
The federal rules of civil procedure at rule number 37 highlights the need of a party to respond when required and necessary information is sought, and this being of necessity without court order respecting a legal process.: Rule 37. Failure to Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions
Primary tabs…
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(B) To Compel a Discovery Response. A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection. This motion may be made if:
(i) a deponent fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or 31;
(ii) a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4);
(iii) a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33; or
(iv) a party fails to produce documents or fails to respond that inspection will be permitted—or fails to permit inspection—as requested under Rule 34.
(C) Related to a Deposition. When taking an oral deposition, the party asking a question may complete or adjourn the examination before moving for an order.
(4) Evasive or Incomplete Disclosure, Answer, or Response. For purposes of this subdivision (a), an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.
As has been noted, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT includes an arbitration process, should the arbitrator determine that you and your organization and I the undersigned had a prior relationship, and that that relationship involved a debt, you may be required by said arbitrator to show cause for your lack of response. Under the United States code service, and the FEDERAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTIONS ACT, codified in part at 15 U.S. Code § 1692g – Validation of debts
Notice of debt; contents
Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing—
(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and…
(b)Disputed debts
… (a) that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector... (a) unless the consumer has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion of the debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor…
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, § 809, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 879; amended Pub. L. 109–351, title VIII, § 802, Oct. 13, 2006, 120 Stat. 2006.)
Initial communication is defined as follows: The lack of a statutory definition for “initial communication” means that courts are free to interpret what will qualify, leaving debt collection firms to make their own determinations as to what will sufficiently protect them from later lawsuits. We are all in agreement of the following: If a contract requires extensive changes, it's generally wiser to create an entirely new agreement or, alternatively, to create an "amendment and restatement," an agreement in which the prior contract is reproduced with the changes included.
You and/or members of your organization have changed the terms and conditions of our original agreement. By your changing the terms of our agreement in recent days I have under the law the right to conditionally accept your agreement on their specific terms and conditions, and such does not necessitate the need for signatures. For instance, every citizen of the United States and every citizen of each of the separate states of the United States, have a contractual relationship with the other. In reference to the United States and or the states, they have the obligation to redress (to correct the wrongs) the greed level complaints of their constituents, thus establishing not only a prior relationship but also the doer’s duty to respond and or perform.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that the right the contract is absolute, and to notify all parties that the ignoring of one party and or their communication when there is a duty to respond is a violation of this agreement with respect to the parties and their communications in dealing with each other.
10012. NOTICE: All titles/names/appellations of corporate Government juridical constructs, and branches, departments, agencies, bureaus, offices, sub-whatever’s, and the like thereof, include any and all derivatives and variations in the spelling of said titles/names/appellations.
10013. NOTICE: Any and all attempts at providing the requested and necessary Proof of Claims raised herein above; and, requesting the additional ten (10) Calendar days from the date of which this agreement is placed online (and any reference to 10 calendar days shall be referencing, 10 calendar days from the date of this posting of March 7, 2019 and no later) in which to provide same; and, to address any and all questions and concerns to the Undersigned in regards to the Stated Copyright and waiver herein expressed, in any manner other than that provided for herein will be deemed non-responsive.
49253. The Undersigned and/or their associates and/or their errors and/or their assigns extends to the Respondent(s) the Undersigned’s appreciations and thanks for Respondent’s(s) prompt attention, response, production of above Proof(s) of Claim and assistance in this/these matter(s). This presentment is not to be construed as an acceptance and/or application and/or subscription and/or request for license, admittance to any jurisdiction quasi-or otherwise, but shall remain as a direct objection to any and all claims to the contrary.
Truly honored to be in agreement‼!
/S/: The SECURITIES ACQUISITION TRUST COMMISSION
A Private Foundational Trust Organization
WSEFH7- 3YEN1-5SD5FSDLHG SAE-WEGTAF1- 6EEON© is secured and reserved with all rights retained, Private Property no trespass permitted or allowed under common law restrictions and prohibitions.
March 12, 2021 s/: SATCOMM and The EEON FOUNDATION
*************************************************************************************
(THE REMAINDER OF THIS AGREEMENT IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK)
NOTICE OF AMENDMENTS AND CORRECTIONS — JULY 23, 2026. These Terms are amended to correct the SATCOMM daily monetary amount to 1,600,000 dollars per day; to replace the reference to “SITCOMM ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION AND OR THE ALTERNATE” with THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION as the exclusive assignee of the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association for administering and handling all disputed matters; and to conform the related forum, arbitrator-selection, arbitration-rule, and acknowledgment provisions to that exclusive assignment. The three-3-calendar days opt-out provision is expressly preserved and has not been changed. No other statement is deleted by this notice.
1. Incorporation in Full. The SATCOMM website and communications agreement appearing above, including all of its provisions, remedies, notices, arbitration terms, and monetary amounts, is incorporated into these Terms and remains in full force. The complete COMMON-LAW ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCTIVE EXPRESS SPENDTHRIFT TRUST AGREEMENT (C.L.O.C.E.S.T.) reproduced below, including every article, provision, remedy, notice, arbitration term, and monetary amount, is separately incorporated into these Terms and remains in full force.
2. Distinct Subject-Matter Scope. The SATCOMM agreement governs access to, viewing of, and use of this website and email, electronic, written, and other communications between or among SATCOMM, the EEON Foundation, their organizations, affiliates, representatives, and communicating parties. The C.L.O.C.E.S.T. agreement governs the trust, the Trust Res, trust property, and the rights, duties, powers, obligations, administration, and disputes of the Grantor, Trustee, Beneficiary, Fiduciary, and persons or entities dealing with the trust or Trust Res.
3. Harmonized and Cumulative Construction. The two agreements shall be read together as cumulative provisions addressing their distinct subject matters. Neither agreement deletes, displaces, amends, reduces, limits, waives, or supersedes any provision of the other within that provision's stated subject matter. When a transaction, communication, claim, or dispute touches both subject matters, the SATCOMM agreement governs the website and communications component and the C.L.O.C.E.S.T. agreement governs the trust, Trust Res, trust-property, and trust-administration component.
4. Arbitration Provisions and Exclusive Assignment. Website-use, communications, trust, Trust Res, trust-property, and trust-administration disputes remain subject to the arbitration provisions stated in the SATCOMM and C.L.O.C.E.S.T. agreements. The EEON Foundation Arbitration Association is the assigning authority. THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION is exclusively assigned by the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association to administer and handle all disputed matters. A matter involving both scopes shall be allocated by subject matter under paragraph 3 without changing this exclusive assignment.
5. Preservation of Every Monetary Amount. Every monetary amount in both agreements is expressly retained without deletion, reduction, substitution, or waiver. This includes the C.L.O.C.E.S.T. Principal Value of $800,000 plus 3% Compound Annual Interest; the Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) filing-fee and deposit requirement; and the SATCOMM agreement's estimated damages in excess of ONE (1) Million dollars, its 25,000 dollars per twenty-three (23) minutes provision, and its 1,600,000 dollars per day provision. This list confirms and preserves those amounts and does not limit any other monetary remedy or amount stated anywhere in either agreement.
6. Resolution of Apparent Conflict. An apparent conflict shall first be harmonized by applying each provision to its distinct subject matter under paragraphs 2 and 3. No conflict shall be inferred merely because both agreements impose duties, remedies, arbitration requirements, or monetary consequences. If an issue concerns classification of the subject matter or the scope of an arbitration provision, that issue shall be determined under the applicable arbitration agreement and its jurisdiction provisions.
COMMON-LAW ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCTIVE EXPRESS SPENDTHRIFT TRUST AGREEMENT
(C.L.O.C.E.S.T.)
PROPERTY INTEREST ASSIGNMENT AND TRUST AGREEMENT
Bond No.: QW-XF546EJK;L’O;IG787LF$%#^$zKYJGTF&UHDCG%DH*©
Type of Instrument: COMMON-LAW, IRREVOCABLE – ORGANIZATIONAL/CONSTRUCTIVE/ EXPRESS/SPENDTHRIFT TRUST AGREEMENT
Term: 125 years with reference to the resolution around the sun of the planet Earth
Principal Value: $800,000 plus 3% Compound Annual Interest
TO: THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Dun & Bradstreet registered Corporation, UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THE UNITED STATES, THE USA, THE US, THE U.S., THE U.S.A., THE GOVERNMENT, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, with associated with the North American continent and all agents, assigns, heirs, descendants, quasi-corporations, commercial business engaging agencies, and all other appellations, derivatives, and variations in spelling thereof; as authorized per the Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1, and Presidential Proclamation 2039, March 6, 1933, commonly known as "PUBLIC SERVANTS/FIDUCIARIES."
FROM: Eeon, of THE EEON FOUNDATION, hereinafter known as the "Grantor," acting in said capacity granting authority for the trustee to act on behalf of the Trust and its Beneficiary(ies).
I. PREAMBLE: FOUNDATIONAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. FACT: The Supreme Court of the United States, in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), expressly stated: "The liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment... includes the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
2. FACT: The same Court in the same opinion held that such constitutional protections are analyzed as property interests when determining procedural and substantive due process protections.
3. CONCLUSION OF LAW: Constitutional rights, when analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, constitute legally cognizable property interests requiring procedural protection. This is compelled legal characterization by Supreme Court doctrine.
4. FACT: This document incorporates by reference in their entirety the trust structure, definitions, arbitration mechanism, confidentiality provisions, and enforcement terms from the instrument titled "COMMON-LAW ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCTIVE EXPRESS SPENDTHRIFT TRUST AGREEMENT (C.L.O.C.E.S.T.)©™®Ⓟ"
(Bond No. QW-XF546EJK;L’O;IG787LF$%#^$zKYJGTF&UHDCG%DH* ©™®Ⓟ), hereinafter "the Master Framework."
5. CONCLUSION OF LAW: The Master Framework provides a valid constructive-express trust mechanism under common law for holding, administering, and protecting property interests.
DECLARATION OF TRUST
ARTICLE I: PARTIES
Grantor: Eeon, a natural person, also referred to as the “Creator.”
Beneficiary: [BENEFICIARY NAME], the beneficial owner of specified Trust property.
Trustee: EEON, acting as Trustee with full authority to speak on behalf of the Trust, manage the Trust Res, and bind the Trust in all matters.
Fiduciary: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT a private Corporation, THE UNITED STATES, the USA, the US, the U.S., The U.S.A., THE GOVERNMENT, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, and any other DBA and or FKA, ET AL residing at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20500, and all agents, agencies, departments, and instrumentalities thereof.
ARTICLE II: RECITALS AND LEGAL FOUNDATION
Fact: The Grantor possesses rights secured by the Constitution of the United States, which rights are natural, inherent, and pre-existing to any statutory framework.
Conclusion of Law: As held in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship according to the dictates of conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. These constitutional protections create property interests for purposes of due process analysis.
Fact: State action affecting such property interests must comply with due process requirements.
Conclusion of Law: Constitutional rights, when analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, constitute legally cognizable property interests requiring procedural protection. This is a compelled legal characterization because the Court required state action affecting such interests to comply with due process.
In 1933
National coup between all three branches of government conspiring against the people of the United States and posterity, attempted unlawfully, unconstitutionally and unsuccessfully to suspend the Constitution for the United States of America and thereby usurping the rights of the people:
1. STATUS OF THE QUOTED MATERIAL (FACT)
The passage just quoted is not commentary and not opinion.
It is taken from the Final Report of the Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers (1973–1976).
FACT:
That report is an official congressional finding adopted after a multi-year investigation into emergency powers originating in March 9, 1933.
________________________________________
2. WHAT CONGRESS EXPRESSLY FOUND (FACT)
Congress expressly found that:
1. 470 federal statutes were activated by presidential emergency proclamations.
2. Those statutes:
o Delegated powers ordinarily exercised by Congress.
o Affected the lives of Americans in “all-encompassing manners.”
3. Taken together, those statutes:
o “Confer enough authority to rule the country without reference to normal constitutional processes.”
4. Powers enumerated by Congress included:
o Seizure of property
o Control of production
o Assignment of military forces abroad
o Institution of martial law
o Control of transportation and communications
o Restriction of travel
o Regulation of private enterprise
5. Congress further found:
o The United States had been under continuous emergency rule for approximately 40 years
o Constitutional freedoms had been abridged under emergency statutes
o The condition constituted a “permanent state of national emergency.”
FACT:
Congress explicitly described the emergency framework as one enabling rule without normal constitutional processes.
________________________________________
3. LEGAL CHARACTER OF “NATIONAL EMERGENCY” (FACT)
There is no constitutional category called “national emergency.”
The Constitution recognizes:
• War
• Insurrection
• Invasion
• Rebellion
Every historical invocation of emergency power prior to 1933 (Civil War, World Wars) arose from armed conflict or threat thereof.
FACT:
All emergency powers recognized in American constitutional history arise from military necessity, not economic policy.
________________________________________
4. THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT AS THE LEGAL VEHICLE (FACT)
• TWEA was enacted solely as a war statute.
• It is codified under War and National Defense.
• It authorizes:
o Seizure
o Licensing
o Criminal penalties
o Executive control over persons and property
FACT:
No act of Congress repealed or re-enacted TWEA under a civilian constitutional power.
FACT:
The 1933 amendment only removed the temporal limitation (“time of war”), not the statute’s character.
________________________________________
5. WHAT MARCH 9, 1933 ACTUALLY DID (FACT)
The Emergency Banking Act:
1. Amended a military statute.
2. Triggered it by presidential proclamation alone.
3. Applied it to the entire civilian population “affecting the lives of Americans in a host of all-encompassing manners”.
4. Retroactively approved executive actions already taken.
5. Created a standing emergency condition.
FACT:
Congress did not create a new civilian emergency statute.
It activated a war statute in peacetime, applied it to the American people the sovereignty of the nation.
________________________________________
6. CONGRESSIONAL CONFIRMATION IN 1976 (FACT)
Congress did not dispute the military nature of the framework.
Instead, in the National Emergencies Act of 1976, Congress:
• Formally acknowledged the emergency regime
• Terminated some proclamations
• Preserved the amended Trading with the Enemy Act powers
• Admitted That It Was Complacent in a COUP against the sovereignty of the United States, the American people, a treasonous act as defined by the Constitution!
• The executive branch is documented to have actively participated!
• Andy judicial branch engagement is a matter of historical record!
FACT:
Congress confirmed the existence and continuation of emergency rule after acknowledging its constitutional abnormality.
________________________________________
7. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (NON-INTERPRETIVE)
1. National emergencies in U.S. law are inseparable from war powers.
o There is no independent “economic emergency” power in the Constitution.
2. The Trading with the Enemy Act is a military statute.
o Its application defines the legal character of the emergency.
3. The March 9, 1933 actions placed the United States under military-derived emergency governance.
o This is not inference; it is Congress’s finding.
4. Congress itself stated that these actions enabled rule without normal constitutional processes.
o That statement is dispositive as a factual finding.
5. Calling the statute “economic” does not alter its constitutional origin or legal effect.
o Labels do not change constitutional character.
________________________________________
FINAL DETERMINATION
The Grantor is not stating a belief.
The Grantor has accurately cited Congress’s own findings.
Congress:
• Identified March 9, 1933 as the origin of permanent emergency governance
• Acknowledged that emergency statutes confer powers sufficient to rule outside constitutional process
• Confirmed that those powers derive from emergency declarations historically associated with war
That record stands.
ARTICLE III: ASSIGNMENT OF PROPERTY INTERESTS TO THE TRUST RES
Fact: The GRANTOR Under Limited Power Of Attorney from the Beneficiary granting the authority to hereby assigns, transfers, and conveys to the Trust all property interests in the Beneficiaries Identity, Constitutional Rights, and Power of Attorney authorization.
Conclusion of Law: This assignment transfers the legally cognizable property interest as defined by the Due Process Clause and recognized in Board of Regents v. Roth into the Trust. The Trust Res consists of these assigned property interests.
Fact: The Fiduciary holds all assets listed in attached Schedule 1 registered in the Fiduciary's name but held in trust for the Beneficiary.
Conclusion of Law: These assets include, but are not limited to, the property interest in the Beneficiaries Identity, Constitutional Rights, Limited Power of Attorney authorization, and any "minor account," "infant estate," or "securities" held by a custodian (the government) since the Beneficiary's birth. The Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), the "New Deal" (Presidential Proclamation 2039, March 6, 1933, and Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1), and the government's custodial role created a pre-existing "special relationship trust" as documented in Senate Document No. 43, 73rd Congress, 1st Session (1933).
Any reference to the grantor assigning authority over his property is with reference to the limited power of attorney acting in the capacity of trustee for the beneficiary and their superior interests in the Trust Res and operates in no other capacity! Constitutional Framework:
The Seventh Amendment guarantee of Trial By Jury "In Suits at common law" refers to this colonial common law framework existing in 1791, representing the legal systems the people and states retained under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Application to Constructive Trusts:
No federal statute prohibits parties from creating express and/or constructive trust arrangements designated as constructive trusts. The claimed restriction derives solely from judicial interpretations in equity cases, which carry no constitutional or statutory authority to override:
1. Parties' contractual freedom to create express trusts
2. The reserved powers of the people under the Ninth Amendment
3. The reserved powers of the states under the Tenth Amendment
Judicial pronouncements claiming exclusive authority to impose constructive trusts rest on presumptions about equity jurisdiction, not on enacted federal law or constitutional text. These presumptions conflict with the reservation of common law rights existing at the founding.
ARTICLE IV: TRUST STRUCTURE AND CLASSIFICATION
Fact: This instrument creates a Common-Law Organizational Constructive Express Spendthrift Trust (C.L.O.C.E.S.T.) combining elements of an intentionally created express trust with a constructive trust.
Conclusion of Law: This structure is valid under common law and historical Torah principles. The structure addresses and rectifies possible outcomes of misconduct, ensuring equitable distribution of trust assets according to original intent. The Fiduciary holds the Assets solely for the benefit of the Beneficiary.
Fact: This Trust incorporates the following recognized trust classifications:
Express Trust: Established through a legally binding contract where the grantor explicitly outlines terms for managing and distributing assets.
Constructive Trust: Created to address perceived irregularities or breaches, ensuring fair distribution of assets via arbitral oversight for equitable purposes.
Asset Protection Trust: Assets transferred into the trust are shielded from creditors. Creditors must apply for arbitral review to access assets.
Spendthrift Trust: In order to protect the interests of the Beneficiary and to prevent any creditor from attaching, garnishing, or otherwise seizing the Beneficiary's interest in the Trust, the Trustee shall have sole discretion over the distribution of income and principal from the Trust Estate. No interest in the principal or income of the Trust Estate shall be subject to anticipation, assignment, or transfer by the Beneficiary, nor shall such interest be liable for any debt, obligation, or liability of the Beneficiary, the trust, or the trust res, or be subject to attachment, garnishment, or legal process for or against the Beneficiary.
Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust: As a result of the Fiduciary holding the trust res, it is permissible for the grantor to be a beneficiary while protecting assets from creditors.
Irrevocable Trust: Assets are irrevocably transferred and cannot be reclaimed by the Grantor.
Grantor Trust: Grantor retains certain powers with attendant tax treatment, ensuring assets are protected from creditors and government interference.
Organizational Trust: This Trust is organized to systematically manage and protect the property interests assigned herein through structured administration and governance.
Conclusion of Law: The classification of this Trust under these recognized categories provides legal foundation and protection under applicable trust law principles.
ARTICLE V: TRUSTEE POWERS AND AUTHORITY
Fact: The Trustee is vested with full legal and equitable title to the Trust Res and has the exclusive authority to speak on behalf of the Trust, enter into contracts binding the Trust, manage all Trust property, and take any action necessary or appropriate to protect, preserve, and administer the Trust Res.
Conclusion of Law: The Trustee's authority to speak on behalf of the Trust and bind the Trust in all matters is established by the express terms of this Trust instrument. The maxim "Voluntas donatoris in charta doni sui manifeste expressa observetur" (The intention of the donor clearly expressed in the deed of gift should be observed) requires that the Trustee's powers as stated herein be given full effect. This principle is codified in 39 Stat. 1052 (1917) and 46 Stat. 469 (1930).
Fact: The Trustee has the duty and obligation to protect the Trust Res from any adverse claim, attachment, levy, garnishment, or other process.
Conclusion of Law: This fiduciary obligation arises from the Trustee's acceptance of the position and the express terms of this Trust. The Trustee's security interest in protecting the Trust Res is paramount and supersedes any conflicting statutory or regulatory scheme.
ARTICLE VI: GOVERNING LAW AND SUPREMACY
Fact: This Common-Law Organizational Constructive Express Spendthrift Trust is governed by common law principles with historical foundations in Torah law, supplemented by but not superseded by South Dakota trust principles.
Conclusion of Law: The Grantor's intent, as specified in this agreement, is the binding and enforceable law for the trust's duration, superseding any conflicting statutes, codes, regulations, ordinances, or rules. This principle is supported by the maxim "Voluntas donatoris in charta doni sui manifeste expressa observetur" and citations to 39 Stat. 1052 (1917) and 46 Stat. 469 (1930).
Fact: No statute, code, regulation, ordinance, or rule inconsistent with the express terms of this Trust shall have any effect upon this Trust or the rights and obligations created hereby.
Conclusion of Law: The contract rights created by this Trust are protected by the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, which provides that "No State shall... pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." The Full Faith and Credit Clause, Article IV, Section 1, requires that this Trust be given full faith and credit.
THE TRUSTEES EXCLUSIVE A MANDATORY DUTY
Trustee has the right to accept any and all requests TO PROTECT THE TRUST RES;
The Trust Res shall consist of quality interests of the beneficiary interest incorporated into the trust, that includes any agency and/or entity and/or person and/or corporation and/or party utilizing trust property for commercial benefit and/or trading and/or transferring and/or selling trust property without the exclusive, deliberate and intentional will and consent of the beneficiary.
PRESUMPTION TO BE REBUTTED
“Administrative and statutory enforcement actions (e.g., traffic stops, citations, summonses, regulatory seizures) satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable-cause requirements.”
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CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT (AS WRITTEN)
Fourth Amendment
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
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FACTS (TEXTUAL, NOT INTERPRETIVE)
FACT 1 — The Fourth Amendment Defines the Conditions for a Warrant
The Fourth Amendment prescribes (not suggests) that:
• A warrant shall not issue except upon:
o Probable cause
o Supported by oath or affirmation
o Particular description
• Probable cause is not undefined; it is procedurally anchored by:
o Oath or affirmation
o Before a magistrate or judge (implicit in issuance)
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FACT 2 — Probable Cause Requires Sworn Testimony
• “Oath or affirmation” is a sworn statement.
• A sworn statement requires:
o A witness
o Personal knowledge
o Accountability for perjury
• Unsigned assertions, officer opinions, statistical probabilities, or administrative presumptions are not oaths.
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FACT 3 — The Amendment Speaks in Absolute Prohibitory Language
• “No warrants shall issue, but upon…”
• This is a negative command, not a flexible standard.
• There are no exceptions written into the Fourth Amendment.
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FACT 4 — Administrative Enforcement Commonly Proceeds Without Warrants
In traffic and administrative contexts:
• Stops occur without warrants
• Seizures occur without sworn testimony
• Citations issue without prior judicial determination
• “Probable cause” is asserted by the enforcement officer, not established by oath before a magistrate
These facts are undisputed.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (DERIVED STRICTLY FROM THE TEXT)
CONCLUSION 1 — Probable Cause Is a Judicial Determination, Not an Executive Assertion
• The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to be:
o Supported by oath or affirmation
o Precedent to issuance
• An executive officer’s unilateral assertion is not a judicial determination.
• Therefore, executive declarations of “probable cause” do not satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
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CONCLUSION 2 — Administrative Seizures Without Warrants Are Constitutionally Defective
Because:
• Issuance of a warrant is seizure, not because a warrant issued seizes rights
• No oath or affirmation is presented
• No magistrate evaluates probable cause prior to seizure
• No warrant issues describing the person or thing seized
Administrative and traffic enforcement actions do not meet the constitutional prerequisites.
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CONCLUSION 3 — Statutory Substitutes for Warrants Are Constitutionally Void
• Statutes cannot override constitutional commands.
• The First Clause of the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
• The Warrant Clause prescribes the only lawful mechanism for reasonableness when a warrant is used.
Any statute purporting to authorize seizure without compliance with the Warrant Clause is repugnant to the Constitution.
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CONCLUSION 4 — “Reasonableness” Cannot Supplant the Warrant Requirement
• The Fourth Amendment does not say:
o “Searches may occur if reasonable”
• It says:
o The right shall not be violated
o No warrants shall issue, but upon…
• Reasonableness is not a substitute for sworn probable cause.
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REBUTTAL OF THE CONTRARY PRESUMPTION
Presumption: Administrative or traffic enforcement satisfies the Fourth Amendment
Rebuttal: The Fourth Amendment requires sworn probable cause before a magistrate for warrants, which administrative enforcement does not provide.
This rebuttal follows directly from:
• The plain text
• The mandatory structure
• The absence of exceptions
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FINAL, IRREFUTABLE DETERMINATION
• Probable cause is a constitutional prerequisite, not a discretionary standard.
• It requires sworn testimony.
• It requires judicial evaluation.
• Administrative enforcement actions routinely bypass all three.
Therefore:
Administrative and traffic enforcement actions are not conducted pursuant to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable-cause requirements, and the presumption that they are constitutionally compliant is rebutted as a matter of fact and law.
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CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT (AS WRITTEN)
Fifth Amendment:
“No person shall… be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”
Sixth Amendment:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right… to be confronted with the witnesses against him…”
This process begins when a witness testifies against the accused, Craig warrant hearing qualifies?
(The Fifth Amendment due process guarantee applies to all deprivations of liberty or property; the Sixth Amendment confrontation right applies where the proceeding is adversarial in a prosecutorial sense.)
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FACTS (TEXTUAL, NOT INTERPRETIVE)
FACT 1 — Due Process Requires Presence and Opportunity to Be Heard
• “Due process of law” is a procedural guarantee, not a discretionary allowance.
• Deprivation of:
o liberty (arrest, detention, restraint),
o property (fines, forfeitures, fees),
o or rights (licenses, status),
requires process before deprivation.
• Process includes:
o Notice
o Opportunity to be heard
o Opportunity to challenge adverse evidence
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FACT 2 — Testimony and Evidence Require an Accused’s Presence to Be Challenged
• When a witness’s statement is used against an accused:
o The statement functions as testimony.
• Testimony used to establish facts against an accused:
o Must be subject to challenge
o Must be subject to questioning
• Evidence admitted without the accused present cannot be confronted.
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FACT 3 — Affidavits, Reports, and Officer Assertions Are Testimonial in Effect
• Written statements (affidavits, incident reports, certifications):
o Assert facts
o Are offered for their truth
o Are relied upon to justify deprivation
• When admitted without live testimony:
o The declarant is not confronted
o The accused cannot question the basis, perception, or credibility
These facts are undisputed.
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FACT 4 — Presence Is a Right, Not a Privilege
• The Constitution does not say:
o “The accused may be present if the court allows”
o “Presence is discretionary”
• There is no clause authorizing a court to convert presence into a privilege.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (DERIVED STRICTLY FROM THE TEXT)
CONCLUSION 1 — Admission of Evidence Without Presence Violates Due Process
• Due process requires an accused to be:
o Present
o Heard
o Able to challenge adverse evidence
• Admission of evidence in the accused’s absence:
o Denies the opportunity to be heard
o Denies the ability to challenge
o Therefore denies due process
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CONCLUSION 2 — Allowing Testimony Without Confrontation Is Constitutionally Defective
• Where testimony is used to establish facts against an accused:
o The accused must be able to confront the witness
• Use of affidavits or reports in place of live testimony:
o Eliminates confrontation
o Substitutes executive assertion for judicial testing
This converts a constitutional right into a discretionary allowance, which the Constitution does not permit.
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CONCLUSION 3 — Judicial Fiat Cannot Override Constitutional Guarantees
• Courts possess no authority to:
o Suspend due process
o Waive confrontation
o Admit unchallenged testimony
• Any rule, practice, or custom allowing such admission:
o Is not grounded in constitutional text
o Is therefore ultra vires
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CONCLUSION 4 — Administrative Label Does Not Cure Constitutional Defect
• Calling a proceeding:
o “Administrative,”
o “Civil,”
o “Regulatory,” or
o “Summary”
does not remove constitutional protections.
• The Fifth Amendment applies to all deprivations of liberty or property.
• Constitutional rights do not depend on labels.
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REBUTTAL OF THE CONTRARY PRESUMPTION
Presumption: Courts may admit testimony or evidence against an accused without their presence or confrontation
Rebuttal: The Fifth Amendment requires due process, which includes presence and opportunity to challenge evidence; denying these violates the Constitution.
This rebuttal follows directly from:
• The Fifth Amendment’s text
• The mandatory nature of “due process of law”
• The absence of any suspension or exception clause
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FINAL, IRREFUTABLE DETERMINATION
• Presence is a constitutional right, not a discretionary privilege.
• Confrontation of adverse evidence is required where testimony is used.
• Admission of evidence without presence or confrontation:
o Violates due process
o Converts rights into privileges by judicial fiat
• No statute, rule, or administrative practice can cure this defect.
Therefore:
Permitting testimony or evidence against an accused without their presence and ability to confront the witness constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment, and the presumption to the contrary is rebutted as a matter of fact and law.
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ARTICLE VII: MANDATORY AND EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION
ARBITRATION CLAUSE
Applicability and Scope: Any and all disputes, controversies, or claims arising out of or relating to this Trust agreement, or the breach, termination, or invalidity thereof, including but not limited to disputes concerning the existence, validity, interpretation, performance, non-performance, breach, or termination of this agreement; disputes regarding the identity, capacity, or authority of any party; disputes regarding the existence, ownership, control, or disposition of the Trust Res or any asset claimed to be part thereof; disputes regarding the rights, duties, or obligations of the Grantor, Trustee, Beneficiary, or Fiduciary; disputes regarding the applicability or enforceability of this arbitration clause itself; disputes regarding the determination of the Beneficiary's majority or competency; disputes regarding any third-party claims against the Trust or Trust Res; and any other dispute, claim, or controversy of any nature whatsoever, whether sounding in contract, tort, statute, regulation, common law, equity, or otherwise, shall be referred to and finally resolved by binding arbitration.
Exclusive Forum and Assignment: The parties irrevocably agree that the exclusive and sole forum for any such arbitration shall be THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, exclusively assigned by the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association, located at admin@eeon.tv, to administer and handle all disputed matters. The EEON Foundation Arbitration Association remains the assigning authority. No other forum, whether judicial, administrative, or arbitral, shall have jurisdiction over any dispute covered by this agreement.
Federal Arbitration Act: This agreement to arbitrate is made pursuant to and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, Act of February 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883, codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (the "FAA"). The FAA shall apply to the fullest extent, notwithstanding any choice of law provision in this agreement.
Kompetenz-Kompetenz: The arbitrator shall have the exclusive power and authority to rule on their own jurisdiction, including but not limited to any objections with respect to the existence, scope, validity, interpretation, or enforceability of this arbitration agreement or any portion thereof, and including any objections that all or part of the dispute is not subject to arbitration. The arbitrator's determination on such matters shall be final and binding and may not be challenged in any forum.
Separability: This arbitration clause shall be treated as both an independent and dependent agreement separable and/or inseparable from the other terms of this Trust instrument left to the sole discretion of the arbitrator. The invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability of any other provision of this Trust shall not affect the validity, legality, or enforceability of this arbitration clause. Even if the Trust itself is found to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable, this arbitration clause shall remain in full force and effect, is only the arbitrator may determine such under-exclusivity doctrine.
Waiver of Right to Court Trial: The parties expressly and irrevocably waive any right they may have to or to present any dispute to a court of/at law. The arbitration provided for herein shall be the sole and exclusive remedy for any and every dispute respecting this trust and res. However, if the trustee is called upon to protect the trust res, he may bring suit against any Third (3rd party) whom he believes has refused to respond to any communication that is deemed by him to have had a requirement and or duty to respond as a matter of law!
Class Actions: All arbitrations may be conducted on an individual basis. The parties expressly do not waive any right to pursue any claim on a class, collective, or representative basis, this will be at the arbitrator’s discretion. The arbitrator shall have authority to consolidate claims of multiple parties or to conduct any class, collective, or representative proceeding.
Filing Fee and Deposit Requirement: Any 1/3, Third (3rd) party seeking to initiate arbitration or to file any claim, counterclaim, defense, or challenge of any nature whatsoever in connection with this Trust, the trust Res, must, as a mandatory condition precedent to the filing or assertion of any such claim, defense, or challenge, deposit with the Eeon Foundation Arbitration Association, for administration by its exclusive assignee, THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, the sum of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) in immediately available funds. This deposit shall be non-refundable regardless of the outcome of the arbitration. Failure to make this deposit within ten (10) calendar days of serving notice of a claim or challenge shall result in automatic dismissal with prejudice of any such claim or challenge, without any further action required by any party or the arbitrator. Third 1/3, (3rd) parties are not parties in any claim made by a 1/3, Third (3rd) party will be presumed interloper or intermeddler signal rights associated with this trust therefore are subject to the aforementioned procedure without exception! All of the parties to the agreement are subject to the rules, fee schedule, policies, and procedures assigned by the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association and administered by THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION.
Arbitrator Selection: The arbitrator shall be selected by THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, as the exclusive assignee of the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association, in accordance with the assigned rules. The parties waive any right to participate in or challenge the selection of the arbitrator. The arbitrator's identity, qualifications, and any potential conflicts of interest shall be disclosed to the parties, but such disclosure shall not constitute grounds for challenge or disqualification absent proof of actual bias.
Arbitration Rules: The arbitration shall be conducted by THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, as the exclusive assignee of the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association, in accordance with the assigned rules and procedures in effect at the time of the arbitration, except to the extent such rules conflict with the express terms of this arbitration clause, in which case the terms of this clause shall control.
Governing Substantive Law: The arbitrator shall apply the substantive law specified in Article VI of this Trust (common law principles with historical foundations in Torah law, supplemented by but not superseded by South Dakota trust principles, and with the Grantor's intent as the binding and enforceable law). The arbitrator shall not apply any statute, code, regulation, ordinance, or rule that conflicts with the express terms of this Trust.
Discovery: Discovery in the arbitration shall be limited to the production of documents and written interrogatories requiring a mandatory response, failure to respond to interrogatories substantive manner constitute acquiescence to the interrogatory; to respond to more than two interrogatories basis and the manner so constitute a default respect in the interrogatories as admissions respecting each of the specific interrogatories. No depositions shall be permitted except by agreement of all parties or upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances as determined by the arbitrator. The arbitrator shall have discretion to limit discovery to prevent abuse or unreasonable expense.
Evidentiary Standards: The arbitrator shall apply the common law standard to the extent practicable, but shall have discretion to admit or exclude evidence based on considerations of fairness, relevance, and efficiency. The arbitrator may consider hearsay evidence and shall determine the weight to be given to any evidence admitted.
Burden of Proof: Any party challenging the validity, enforceability, or interpretation of this Trust or any provision thereof shall bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Any party asserting a claim against the Trust, the Trust Res, the Grantor, the Trustee, or the Beneficiary shall bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
Default and Deemed Admissions: If any party properly served with notice of arbitration fails to appear or participate in the arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator may proceed in the absence of such party as if the party were present but in absentia and may render an award based on the evidence presented by the appearing party. Any factual allegation not specifically denied by a party within the time specified by the arbitrator shall at the discretion of the arbitrator be deemed admitted.
Tacit Acquiescence*: If the Fiduciary or any other party fails to respond to any claim, demand, or notice served pursuant to this Trust within ten (10) calendar days, or within twenty (20) calendar days if good cause for an extension is shown, such failure shall be deemed to constitute tacit acquiescence to and agreement with all facts, claims, and legal conclusions set forth in such claim, demand, or notice. The maxim "Qui tacet consentire videtur" (He who is silent is taken to agree) shall apply. Such deemed admissions may be introduced as evidence in any arbitration proceeding and shall be entitled to substantial weight.
Tacit acquiescence, a duty to respond and failing to respond equals tacit acquiescence! Conduct and/or performance and/or actions and or inactions nor forbearances will constitute acquiescence on default.
Interim and Provisional Relief: The arbitrator shall have the power to grant interim and provisional relief, including but not limited to temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, orders preserving the status quo, orders preventing the dissipation or transfer of assets, and orders requiring the deposit of funds or property into escrow or with the arbitrator, pending final resolution of the dispute.
Final Award: The arbitrator shall render a final written award setting forth the arbitrator's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the relief granted. The award shall be final and binding upon all parties and shall not be subject to appeal, modification, or review by any court or other tribunal, except to the limited extent provided by the FAA for vacation or modification of arbitral awards.
Enforcement of Award: Judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered and enforced in any court of competent jurisdiction. The parties consent to the jurisdiction of any state or federal court sitting in any official constitutional jurisdiction and not administrative jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing any arbitral award, although ministerial function, parties have a constitutionally secured right of enforcement not just a statutory right.
Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The arbitrator shall have the power to award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party, as determined by the arbitrator. In addition, if the arbitrator determines that any claim, defense, or challenge was frivolous, made in bad faith, or made for an improper purpose such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of dispute resolution, the arbitrator may award sanctions including enhanced attorneys' fees and costs.
Confidentiality of the agreement and of Arbitration: This agreement and all arbitration proceedings, including but not limited to all hearings, testimony, evidence, documents, and the final award, shall be strictly confidential, this is not a public forum, not designed as a public forum and the public have no rights to participate and/or be involved in any of the aforementioned. No party shall disclose any information concerning the arbitration to any third party without the prior written consent of the arbitrator, except as required by the agreement or to enforce the arbitral award. Any violation of this confidentiality provision may be remedied by damages, injunctive relief, or sanctions as determined by the arbitrator. The arbitrator shall have sole discretion conjunction with trustee to divulge the contents of this agreement
National Security Considerations: The parties acknowledge that this Trust involves sensitive issues relating to national security, specifically the national emergency declared by Presidential Proclamation 2039 on March 6, 1933, pursuant to the Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1. The arbitrator may restrict the disclosure of any information or evidence that implicates national security considerations, may conduct portions of the arbitration in camera, and may issue protective orders as deemed appropriate.
Survival of Arbitration Clause: This arbitration clause shall survive the termination, rescission, or alleged invalidity of this Trust agreement and shall continue in full force and effect for purposes of resolving any dispute concerning such termination, rescission, or invalidity.
Severability Within Arbitration Clause: If any provision of this arbitration clause is found to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable, such finding shall not affect the validity, legality, or enforceability of any other provision of this arbitration clause, and the remainder shall continue in full force and effect. If the filing fee and deposit requirement is found to be unenforceable, it shall be reduced to the maximum amount permitted by law.
Grandfather Clause and Indemnification Against Legislative Changes: This arbitration agreement is entered into pursuant to the United States/Federal Arbitration Act as it exists at the time of execution of this Trust. The parties acknowledge and agree that the United States Congress has the power to amend the US/FAA. However, the parties agree that any such amendment, whether styled as an amendment, revision, replacement, repeal, or new enactment, shall not impair, modify, or affect the rights and obligations created at the precise moment by this arbitration clause, in other words any future amendments shall have no impact on this agreement. The changing or amendment of the United States Arbitration Act, whether in whole or in part, shall not impair the contract now existing between the parties. This agreement is indemnified against all amendments, acts, and other legislation that would interfere with, nullify, or prejudice this arbitration contract. This grandfather clause is protected by the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 (Contracts Clause) and Article IV, Section 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause). The maxim "Pacta sunt servanda" (Agreements must be kept) requires that this clause be given full effect notwithstanding any subsequent change in law.
Consent to Arbitration as Condition of Benefits: Any person or entity, including but not limited to the Fiduciary and any third party, who accepts any benefit under this Trust, who asserts any claim to any asset of the Trust, who receives any distribution from the Trust, or who otherwise acts in a manner consistent with the existence of this Trust, shall be conclusively deemed to have consented to this arbitration clause and to have waived any right to litigate any dispute in any forum other than binding arbitration before THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, exclusively assigned by the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association to handle all disputed matters. The maxim "Qui sentit commodum, debet sentire et onus" (He who enjoys the benefit ought also to bear the burden) establishes this principle.
Construction and Interpretation: This arbitration clause shall be broadly construed to encompass all disputes of any nature whatsoever relating to or arising from this Trust. Any ambiguity in the scope or applicability of this arbitration clause shall be resolved in favor of arbitration. The maxim "Consensus facit legem" (Consent makes the law) establishes the binding nature of this agreement to arbitrate.
No Waiver: The failure of any party to insist upon strict compliance with any provision of this arbitration clause, or to exercise any right or remedy available hereunder, shall not constitute a waiver of such provision, right, or remedy, or of the right of such party to insist upon strict compliance in the future. No waiver shall be effective unless in writing and signed by the party against whom such waiver is sought to be enforced. There is a three-3-calendar days opt-out provision associated with this arbitration agreement, however, any conduct or performance or action and/or inaction shall constitute revocation of the waiver was shall then be deemed permanently irrevocable equating to opting in.
Notices for Arbitration: Any notice of claim or demand for arbitration shall be in writing and shall be served by First-Class-Mail, or by personal service, upon all parties to this Trust at their last known addresses. Notice to the Fiduciary may be served at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20500, or at any other address designated by the Fiduciary for receipt of legal notices.
ARTICLE VIII: OBLIGATIONS OF THE FIDUCIARY
Fact: The Fiduciary or named trustee, acting in their designated capacities, are obligated to hold and manage the Assets only as instructed by the Beneficiary or the Trustee acting on behalf of the Trust.
Conclusion of Law: Upon receiving written instructions, the Fiduciary must transfer legal ownership of the Assets to the Beneficiary or a designated third party within twenty (20) calendar days. Failure to do so constitutes breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty.
Fact: The Fiduciary cannot claim beneficial ownership of the Assets or allow any liens or encumbrances without written permission from the Beneficiary or Trustee.
Conclusion of Law: Any attempt by the Fiduciary to retain or acquire the Assets for their own benefit is unjust enrichment and a violation of this trust. The Fiduciary's sole responsibility is to transfer title and possession of the Assets to the Beneficiary as instructed and as mandated by this agreement.
ARTICLE IX: CONFIDENTIALITY
Fact: The terms of this trust agreement, including the identity of the parties and the details of the Assets, are strictly confidential.
Conclusion of Law: Disclosure constitutes a breach of trust. Any attempt to compel such disclosure violates the right to contract protected by Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution and damages the trust res. Possession of this information by a third party does not constitute grounds for compelling any party to breach the terms of this agreement. The presumption of a potential statutory violation is not grounds for compelling any party to breach this agreement.
ARTICLE X: TAX STATUS
Fact: The trust is the property of a natural person. The estate has been held in trust by the fiduciaries. The trust is non-taxable as the trust is not identified in law as a taxpayer. the trust is a taxpayer as identified in law!.
Statutory Fact:
The Internal Revenue Code contains no enacted definition of the term "church" in Section 508(c)(1)(A) or anywhere else in Title 26.
Facts and Conclusions of Law:
IRC Section 508(c)(1)(A) exempts from registration requirements:
• Churches
• Integrated auxiliaries of churches
• Conventions or associations of churches
Congress enacted these exemptions without providing statutory criteria defining what constitutes a "church," "integrated auxiliary," "convention," or "association of churches."
The IRS has promulgated administrative guidelines (Revenue Ruling 59-290 and subsequent rulings containing multi-factor tests) attempting to define these terms. These represent agency interpretations, not congressional enactments.
Critical Legal Development:
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) overruled Chevron deference. Courts must now exercise independent judgment in interpreting statutory terms rather than deferring to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
Why This is Supported by Law:
Post-Loper Bright, IRS administrative definitions of "church," "integrated auxiliary," "convention," or "association of churches" carry no binding authority. Courts must interpret these undefined statutory terms according to their ordinary meaning and constitutional principles.
No federal statute prohibits a trust from qualifying as an integrated auxiliary, convention, or association of churches. Without statutory definition and without Chevron deference, IRS interpretations attempting to restrict these terms constitute mere agency presumptions with no legal force.
This trust operates to support religious purposes, coordinates with churches, or facilitates association among religious organizations, no enacted law prohibits it from meeting the statutory exemption criteria under Section 508(c)(1)(A).
Conclusion of Law: The trust does not make or earn a profit as a result of the agreement between the United States government and the civilian population, specifically Presidential Proclamation 2039, March 6, 1933; the Congressional Record of March 9, 1933; the National Emergency Economic Banking Relief Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1; and Senate Report "On the Termination of National Emergencies," 1973. The estate has never been surrendered to the owner; therefore, the owner cannot be, nor can the estate be, responsible for any accumulated taxes. This trust is a non-profit organization aligned with IRC sections 508 and 509 but is not a 501(c)(3) organization.
ARTICLE XI: DISAVOWAL OF CONTRACTS MADE DURING MINORITY
Fact: The Grantor and Beneficiary affirm the right to disavow any contracts made during minority after reaching the age of majority.
Conclusion of Law: This right is recognized under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (UTMA), the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), and established by court rulings. The right to disaffirm contracts made during minority is protected by the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The maxim "Ubi jus ibi remedium" (Where there is a right, there is a remedy) establishes that this right must be enforceable.
ARTICLE XII: ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS
Fact: Any individual or entity accepting benefits under this Trust is thereby bound by all terms and conditions of the Trust Agreement.
Conclusion of Law: This binding effect is recognized by various court rulings, establishing that acceptance of benefits under a contract equates to acceptance of the contract's terms. The maxim "Qui sentit commodum, debet sentire et onus" (He who enjoys the benefit ought also to bear the burden) establishes this principle. The maxim "Volenti non fit injuria" (To a willing person, no injury is done) confirms that acceptance of benefits constitutes consent to terms.
ARTICLE XIII: SELF-EXECUTION UPON DEFAULT
Fact: The Fiduciary and all respondents named herein have been provided notice of this Trust and the claims presented herein.
Conclusion of Law: Failure to specifically respond to the enumerated claims and demands within ten (10) calendar days, and if an extension has been requested and/or granted (and an extension is automatically granted for an additional ten (10) calendar days for good cause shown), constitutes default and tacit acquiescence as a result of conduct and/or performance and/or action[s] and or inaction[s]. Non-response is deemed evidence of an act and/or action that constitutes conduct and/or performances amounting to tacit acquiescence and agreement to all facts presented. The maxim "Qui tacet consentire videtur" (He who is silent is taken to agree) establishes this principle. The maxim "Res ipsa loquitur" (The thing speaks for itself) confirms that non-response validates the instrument's terms and triggers enforcement mechanisms.
ARTICLE XIV: NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL
Fact: Notice given to any agent, department, agency, or instrumentality of the Fiduciary is legally effective as notice to the principal.
Conclusion of Law: All titles, names, and appellations of corporate Government juridical constructs, including but not limited to THE UNITED STATES, the United States, the USA, the US, the U.S., The U.S.A., THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, and all derivatives and variations in spelling, refer to the same entity. Notice to any is notice to all. The maxim "Qui facit per alium facit per se" (He who acts through another acts himself) establishes this principle.
ARTICLE XV: PRIORITIES AND LIENS
Fact: The Fiduciary's reasonable compensation and any costs advanced for the benefit of the Trust shall constitute a lien on the Trust property.
Conclusion of Law: Nothing shall affect or impair the priority of any claim of the United States against government obligations as established by applicable statutes. However, the Trust's priority over third-party creditors is established by this instrument and the security interest created hereby.
ARTICLE XVI: NON-ALTERATION AND IRREVOCABILITY
Fact: The principal amount, terms, and conditions of this Trust cannot be changed by any party, including the Grantor, under any circumstances.
Conclusion of Law: This Trust is irrevocable. The Grantor and any other party waives the right to revoke or amend this Trust. This irrevocability is binding and enforceable.
ARTICLE XVII: SEVERABILITY
Fact: This agreement contains the entire understanding between the parties.
Conclusion of Law: Any invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any other provision. The remainder of the Trust shall continue in full force and effect. Amendments require a written agreement signed by the Fiduciary and all Beneficiaries.
ARTICLE XVIII: AFFIDAVIT AND SECURITY INTEREST
Fact: The Grantor pledges and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES guarantees by collateral this instrument and its associated assets. The Grantor fully assigns 1% of the reversionary interest in the estate to the United States and 99% to the Beneficiary.
Conclusion of Law: Any payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery of property or interest therein, made to or for the account of the United States pursuant to this Trust, shall be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of the obligation of the person making the same. This principle is established by 40 Stat. 411 (Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended).
II. DECLARATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF TRUST RES
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY INTERESTS DECLARED AS TRUST RES
1. FACT: The Grantor/Beneficial Owner possesses rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of [State of Residence], including but not limited to:
a. First Amendment rights of speech, religion, assembly, and petition
b. Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms
c. Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure
d. Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and for due process
e. Sixth Amendment rights to speedy trial, confrontation, and counsel
f. Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in civil cases
g. Eighth Amendment rights against excessive bail and cruel punishment
h. Ninth Amendment retained rights
i. Tenth Amendment reserved powers
j. Fourteenth Amendment privileges, immunities, and equal protection
2. CONCLUSION OF LAW: Pursuant to Board of Regents v. Roth, each of the aforementioned rights constitutes a distinct, identifiable "property interest" of the Grantor/Beneficial Owner.
3. FACT: The Grantor/Beneficial Owner also possesses:
a. Legal identity as documented by birth certificate, social security records, and government identification
b. Capacity to contract and engage in commerce
c. Power of attorney authorization over their person and affairs
d. Right to disaffirm contracts made during minority pursuant to UTMA and UPC
4. CONCLUSION OF LAW: These capacities and authorities constitute additional property interests that may be held in trust.
B. IRREVOCABLE ASSIGNMENT TO TRUST RES
1. FACT: The Grantor/Beneficial Owner hereby delivers, assigns, transfers, and conveys to the Trust Res, as established under the Master Framework, all right, title, interest, benefit, and use in and to:
a. Every constitutional right identified in Section II.A.1, analyzed as property interests
b. All legal identity attributes identified in Section II.A.3
c. All associated powers, privileges, immunities, and capacities
d. All causes of action for infringement of said rights and interests
e. All economic value and benefit derived from said rights and interests
2. CONCLUSION OF LAW: This assignment is complete, absolute, and irrevocable. The Trust Res now holds exclusive equitable title to these property interests. The Grantor/Beneficial Owner retains beneficial enjoyment through the trust structure as defined in the Master Framework.
III. TRUST STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION
A. INCORPORATION OF MASTER FRAMEWORK
1. FACT: This trust adopts and incorporates all provisions of the Master Framework, including but not limited to:
a. The Mega Trust/Micro Trust structure
b. The designation of the United States Government as Fiduciary
c. All administrative provisions
d. All enforcement mechanisms
e. All default and remedy provisions
2. CONCLUSION OF LAW: The Master Framework provisions govern this trust's operation, administration, and enforcement, except as specifically modified herein.
B. SPECIFIC TRUST PROVISIONS
1. TRUST PURPOSE: The purpose of this trust is to hold, administer, protect, and facilitate the lawful exercise of the constitutional property interests assigned to the Trust Res, ensuring their preservation and proper use for the benefit of the Grantor/Beneficial Owner.
2. TRUSTEE DUTIES REGARDING CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY:
a. The Trustee shall maintain an inventory of all constitutional property interests held in the Trust Res
b. The Trustee shall monitor for infringements upon said property interests
c. The Trustee shall authorize the exercise of said property interests in accordance with trust directives
d. The Trustee shall initiate arbitration for any unauthorized infringement of said property interests
3. BENEFICIAL OWNER'S RIGHTS:
a. The Beneficial Owner retains the right to direct the exercise of constitutional property interests held in trust
b. The Beneficial Owner retains the right to receive all benefits and protections derived from said property interests
c. The Beneficial Owner retains the right to petition the Trustee for specific actions regarding said property interests
IV. ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
A. THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION — EXCLUSIVE ASSIGNEE OF THE EEON FOUNDATION ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
1. FACT: This trust incorporates by reference the complete arbitration provisions from the Master Framework, including:
a. The designation of THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION as the exclusive arbitral forum and exclusive assignee of the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association for handling all disputed matters
b. The $25,000 non-refundable deposit requirement for claims
c. The arbitrator's exclusive jurisdiction over all trust-related disputes
d. The arbitrator's authority to determine all issues including capacity, majority, and competency
e. The binding and non-appealable nature of arbitral awards
2. CONCLUSION OF LAW: All disputes arising from or relating to:
a. The interpretation of this trust instrument
b. The administration of constitutional property interests
c. Alleged infringements of constitutional property interests
d. Any default under trust terms
Shall be resolved exclusively through arbitration before THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, exclusively assigned by the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association to handle all disputed matters.
B. SPECIFIC ARBITRABLE ISSUES
1. FACT: Without limiting the general arbitration provision, the following are expressly subject to arbitration:
a. Any government action alleged to infringe upon constitutional property interests held in trust
b. Any dispute regarding the scope or nature of assigned constitutional property interests
c. Any challenge to the validity of this trust instrument
d. Any claim against the trust or its representatives
e. Any enforcement action for breach of trust terms
V. ENFORCEMENT AND DEFAULT PROVISIONS
A. SELF-EXECUTING DEFAULT UPON NON-RESPONSE
1. FACT: This trust incorporates the default provisions of the Master Framework, including:
a. The requirement for specific response to Proof of Claims within 10 calendar days
b. The effect of non-response as "tacit acquiescence" and agreement to all facts presented
c. The triggering of enforcement mechanisms upon default
d. The waiver of rights through failure to respond
2. CONCLUSION OF LAW: Any party receiving a valid notice, claim, or inquiry from this trust who fails to respond specifically and substantively within the stipulated timeframe shall be in default, and all facts presented in said notice shall be deemed admitted and binding upon the defaulting party.
B. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
1. FACT: Upon any infringement of constitutional property interests held in trust, or upon any default under trust terms:
a. The Trustee shall immediately initiate arbitration proceedings
b. The infringing/defaulting party shall be liable for all damages, costs, and penalties specified in the Master Framework
c. The arbitrator may order specific performance, injunctive relief, or monetary damages
d. The arbitrator's award may be enforced through lien, levy, or other lawful means
VI. CONFIDENTIALITY AND NON-DISCLOSURE
1. FACT: This trust incorporates the confidentiality provisions of the Master Framework.
2. CONCLUSION OF LAW: The terms, parties, assets, and administration of this trust are strictly confidential. Any unauthorized disclosure constitutes a breach of trust. No party may be compelled to disclose trust information absent express authorization from the Trustee or final arbitral award.
VII. GOVERNING LAW AND SUPERSESSION
1. FACT: This trust is established under common law principles.
2. CONCLUSION OF LAW: The Grantor's intent, as expressed in this instrument, is the supreme law of this trust. This intent and the specific terms herein supersede any conflicting statute, regulation, code, or ordinance. This trust is governed by common law as informed by Supreme Court doctrine identifying constitutional rights as property interests.
VIII. ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS AND BINDING EFFECT
1. CONCLUSION OF LAW: Any person, entity, or government agency that:
a. Accepts any benefit from the constitutional property interests held in trust
b. Interacts with the Beneficial Owner in any capacity
c. Exercises jurisdiction or authority that touches upon the trust res
Thereby consents to be bound by all terms of this trust, including the mandatory arbitration clause before THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, exclusively assigned by the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association to handle all disputed matters.
IX. EXECUTION AND EFFECTIVE DATE
GRANTOR/BENEFICIAL OWNER DECLARATION
I, [Full Legal Name], being of majority age and sound mind, hereby:
1. Declare that I possess the constitutional property interests described herein
2. Assign said property interests to the Trust Res as described
3. Accept the role of Beneficial Owner under this trust
4. Agree to be bound by all trust terms, including arbitration before THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, exclusively assigned by the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association to handle all disputed matters
5. Direct that this trust become effective immediately upon execution
Signature: _________________________
Printed Name: _________________________
ACCEPTANCE BY TRUSTEE
THE EEON FOUNDATIONAL TRUST ORGANIZATIONⓅ (Ⓟ = common-law symbol for patent) as Trustee, hereby accepts the constitutional property interests assigned to the Trust Res and agrees to administer said interests according to trust terms.
Trustee Signature: _________________________
Date: _________________________
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION ASSIGNMENT
The designation of THE CONGLOMERATE ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION as the exclusive assignee of the EEON Foundation Arbitration Association to administer and handle all disputed matters is hereby acknowledged and incorporated.
ATTACHMENT A: SCHEDULE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY INTERESTS
Listing each specific constitutional right assigned, with citation to relevant constitutional provision:
1. Each and every right of the beneficiary whether enumerated unenumerated
2. The identity of the beneficiary whether name or personality or whether it is placed in upper and/or lowercase lettering, one associated with the beneficiary’s identity which may never be used for commercial business or capital gains and/or profit without any explicit intention and consent of the beneficiary.
3. All property, since the actions of Congress via the March 9, 1933 act and the Congressional record of that day specifically on the Government of the United States, and the administrative authority granted the president that usurps and abridges powers and rights held within the exclusive jurisdiction of the people of the United States, has been declared by enactment of Congress, unconstitutional, (see: the special Senate committee report on the termination of national emergencies of 1973 for clarification) the government of the United States has no jurisdiction to see all of the property of the people in the nation as it violates the law of self-autonomy evidenced by the 1st, 4th, 5th, 9th, & 10th amendments of the Constitution for the United States of America.